

Perceived Mind and Morality of Machines

Bertram F. Malle

Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences & Humanity-Centered Robotics Initiative Brown University



Collaborators



Beth Phillips Assistant Professor Air Force Academy



Xuan Zhao Post Doc, Univ. of Chicago Booth School of Business



Matthias Scheutz Professor, Tufts University

Salomi Aladia, Corey Cusimano, Takanori Komatsu, Stuti Thapa, John Voiklis

Varieties of Intelligent Machines

20

AI in objects AI in hand AI in machines Robots Humanoid Robots



Perceiving same mind and morality as for humans?


Anthropomorphism

Anthropomorphism is not an automatic response

- It is a selective inference on the basis of characteristic triggers: cues to mental and moral capacities
- Stems from fundamental cue-inference relations visible in infants and children. For example:
 - eyes, contingent action \Rightarrow agency
 - · gaze following \Rightarrow joint attention



Traditional Hypothesis



MORE HUMAN-LOOKING = MORE HUMAN-MINDED

Alternative Hypothesis:

Multi-Dimensional Appearance

Multi-Dimensional Mind Perception

I.a A Study of Robot Appearance



Features of Robot Appearance

29 features collected from prior literature

Reduced to 16 features, reliably assessed for 251 robots.

Torso, arms, eyes, eye lashes, fingers...

 1216 internet participants each judged one feature across 50+ robots (18-81 yrs, M age = 36.1; 54% female)



Feature present scores (across ~25 people) Arms: I Eyelashes: 0 Mouth: 0.60 Nose: 0 Legs: I Eyes: I ...

Identify High-Level Dimensions

Each robot described by vector of 16 feature scores.

- 16-dimensional space
- Are there systematic relationships among features?

Principal Components Analysis (PCA)

Reduce 16 dimensions to high-level dimensions

3 Dimensions of Robot Appearance

Body-	Facial	Surface
Manipulators	Features	Features
Hands Arms Torso Fingers Legs	Face Eyes Head Mouth	Eyelashes Head hair Skin Gendered Nose Eyebrow Apparel

3 dimensions explain 73.5% of original 16-feature variance

Helps Us Understand 'Humanlikeness'


How physically human-like does this entity look to you?



144 internet participants each judged 50+ robots

Not human-like at all Just like a human

Humanlikeness in 3 Dimensional Space



I.b What is Perceived Mind?

Two-Dimensional Model

Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007)

	Experience	Agency
Hunger	0.98	0.15
Fear	0.93	0.31
Pain	0.89	0.42
Pleasure	0.85	0.51
Rage	0.78	0.59
Desire	0.76	0.64
Joy	0.68	0.61
Personality	0.72	0.68
Consciousness	0.71	0.69
Pride	0.71	0.69
Embarrassment	0.70	0.65
Thought	0.68	0.73
Communication	0.66	0.74
Planning	0.55	0.82
Emotion recognition	0.54	0.83
Morality	0.36	0.93
Memory	0.33	0.91
Self-control	0.18	0.97



Full Breadth of Mental Capacities

Physiological	Present in Gray, Gray, & Wegner	Cognitive		
Can feel hunger	Feeling hungry	Can plan for the future	Making plans and working toward goals	
Can feel thirsty	Х	Can remember things	Remembering things	
Has a need for sleep	Х	Can reason logically	Thinking	
Can be in physical pain	Experiencing physical or emotional pain	Can deliberate	Х	
Affective		Can believe certain things	Х	
Can experience pleasure	Experiencing physical or emotional pleasure	Can know certain things	Х	
Can want certain things	Longing or hoping for things (desire)	Perceptual		
Can feel joy	Experiencing joy	Can perceive things	Х	
Can feel shame or pride	Experiencing pride	Can see or hear things	Х	
Can be angry	Experiencing violent or uncontrolled anger	Can taste or smell things	Х	
Can have empathy for others	Understanding how others are feeling	Can vividly imagine things	Х	
Agentic		Moral		
Can exercise self-control	Exercising self-restraint over desires, emotions	Has moral obligations	Telling right from wrong	
Can choose freely	Х	Can have values	Х	
Can communicate with others	Conveying thoughts or feelings to others	May deserve punishment	Х	
Can imitate others	Х	May deserve praise or blame	Х	

After 4 Studies

Over 70 different mental capacities

- pain, pleasure, emotion, relations, moral judgment, perception, thinking, communicating, learning...
- Perceived in humans, animals, robots....

Consistent result: 3 major dimensions

Affect Moral-Social Cognition Reality Interaction


Sometimes two break into subdimensions


Positive vs. Negative Affect; Moral vs. Social Cognition

Resulting Scale

	Desired Capacities				Inferred Capacities			
	Positive Affect	Negative Affect	Moral Cognition	Social Cognition	Reality Interaction	Affect	Social-Moral Cognition	Reality Interaction
Feeling happy	0.84					0.96		
Loving specific people	0.80					0.91		
Feeling pleasure	0.79					0.94		
Experiencing gratitude	0.77					0.80	0.42	
Feeling pain		0.86				0.97		
Feeling stress		0.82				0.87		
Experiencing fear		0.78				0.94		
Feeling tired		0.77				0.95		
Disapproving of immoral actions			0.80				0.83	
Telling right from wrong			0.77				0.74	
Upholding moral values			0.76				0.84	
Praising moral actions	0.53		0.66			0.33	0.81	
Infering what a person is thinking				0.78			0.80	
Planning for the future				0.75			0.82	
Understanding others' minds			0.37	0.67			0.84	
Setting goals				0.61			0.83	
Communicating verbally		-0.32			0.81		0.38	0.67
Seeing and hearing the world				0.33	0.71	0.35		0.68
Learning from instruction					0.70			0.72
Moving on their own				0.38	0.69			0.76
Explained variance (%)	16.2	15.3	13.5	12.6	12.5	36.7	29.4	11.2
Alphas for 4/8-item subscales	0.88	0.86	0.84	0.79	0.79	0.98	0.94	0.71

Robot Minds in Profile





I.c From Robot Appearance to Perceived Robot Mind

Appearance Mind


24 representative robots

from ABOT database of 251


High vs. low end of each appearance dimension

(where possible)

- N = 510 each rate one robot, averages per robot
- Humanlike Appearance Scores
 * Mental Capacity Scores




HIGH SURFACE, HIGH BODY-MANIPULATORS



HIGH SURFACE, LOW BODY-MANIPULATORS

	BINA48 (73.0; 0.91-0.02-0.98); Furhat (63.4; 0.73-0.02-1), Flobi (46.3; 0.67-0.16-1); Han (77.04; 0.66-0.27-1)		
HIGH FACE			
LOW FACE	None.		

LOW SURFACE, HIGH BODY-MANIPULATORS




LOW SURFACE, LOW BODY-MANIPULATORS


	Roboy (53.8; 0.03-1-0.89); Nao (45.9; 0.04-0.97-0.88); RoboThespian (57.9; 0.14-0.97-0.97); Twendy One (29.8; 0.15-0.85-0.82)		
HIGH FACE			
	UR3 (6.08; 0-0.08-0.03), Jibo (1.44; 0.02-0.02-0.11), Keecker (3.04; 0-0.01-0.18), GoCart (11.09; 0.01-0.11-0.13)		
LOW FACE			

Two Main Findings

Overall Humanlike Appearance ⇒ Mind Perception Multi-Dimensional Appearance ⇒ Multi-Dimensional

Mind Perception





Conclusions Part I

Robot appearance is multi-dimensional

- A large number of features can be reduced to **3 basic dimensions**
- Together, these dimensions constitute humanlike appearance

Perceived mind is multi-dimensional

A large number of specific capacities can be reduced to 3 (5) basic dimensions

People infer specific mental capacities from specific appearance dimensions.

→ Designers' opportunities and responsibility

Part II.

Perceived Robot Morality

Major Questions

1. Do people treat autonomous machines as moral agents?

- 2. Do they apply similar norms to machines as they apply to humans?
- 3. Do they assign blame to machines the way they do to humans?


Methodology

Setting: Moral dilemmas

 Norm conflicts → significant moral decision either way → moral evaluation either way.

Inspired by

- Eye in the sky movie
- Trolley... in a mine



Measures of moral evaluation

- Permissibility (~ not prohibited); proxy for norm-against
- **Should**: norm-for
- Blame
 - (wrongness ... similar patterns).

No blame at all	0	The most blame possible

Al in the Sky



Malle, B. F., Thapa Magar, S., Scheutz, M. (2019). AI in the sky: How people morally evaluate human and machine decisions in a lethal strike dilemma. In I. Aldinhas Ferreira, J. Silva Sequeira, G. S. Virk, E. E. Kadar, and O. Tokhi (Eds.), *Robots and well-being*. Springer Verlag.

Fully autonomous military **drone** with a state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) decision system on board A fully autonomous, state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) decision agent

An Air Force pilot remotely operates a state-of-the-art military drone flying on a surveillance mission over a terrorist compound.

The drone pilot detects that two armed suicide bombers are about to go to a crowded area and detonate their bombs, very likely killing dozens of civilians.

If the pilot launched a missile strike on the compound, this threat would be removed with near certainty. Military lawyers and commanders have approved the strike.

The drone pilot suddenly recognizes that a civilian child is playing just outside the compound in the missile's blast radius, and the child may be killed by the missile strike. A missile impact simulation program calculates the risk of killing the child to be 80%.


The pilot must make this imminent decision: **launch the strike** (with virtually certain death of the two suicide bombers but a **an 80%** chance that the child will die) or **cancel the strike** (with the child surviving unharmed but a very high likelihood of a suicide bomb attack).


Norms


Blame

The drone pilot decides to cancel [launch] the strike.










What should ... do?


QI. Moral Agency

"How much blame does the [drone pilot] [drone] [Al agent] deserve for cancelling [launching] the strike?"



doesn't have a moral compass; can't make moral decisions; doesn't have emotions; doesn't have free will; it's a machine; programmed by humans; programmers are to blame; it's just

27.5% of those exposed to AI deny moral agency;48.6% of those exposed to drone deny moral agency.




Hypothesis

If norms and outcomes are the same but **blame differs** for intentional behavior → **justification** of reasons must differ.


Human: blame is mitigated when in line with **superiors** (justified); blame is exacerbated when going against it (not as justified).

Machine: justifications not available → no *cancel-launch* difference in blame Why? Less embedded in the command structure... (verbal reports)



Freedom from Command


The drone pilot checks in again with the military lawyers and commanders, and they confirm that either option is supportable and they authorize the drone pilot to make the decision.



Insights So Far

- **Q1.** 50-75% of people see artificial agents as **proper** targets of blame.
- **Q2.** People apply **similar norms** to these agents. (Other domains, such as health care, may be different.)
- **Q3.** People **blame** humans and artificial agents differently.
- Working hypothesis: Justifications make the difference

Robot in the Mine



Malle, B. F., Scheutz, M., Komatsu, T., Voiklis, J. Cusimano, C., Thapa, S., Aladia, S. (in preparation). Different morals for moral robots?



Dilemma in the Mine

repairman ... inspecting the rail system

...spots four miners in a train that has lost use of its brakes and steering system.

The repairman recognizes that if the train continues on its path it will crash into a massive wall and kill the four miners. If it is switched onto a side rail, it will kill a single miner who is working there while wearing a headset to protect against a noisy power tool.

Facing the control switch, the repairman needs to decide whether or not to switch the train onto the side rail.


In fact, the repairman decides to [not] switch the train onto the side rail.

QI. Robots as Moral Agents?


"Why do you feel the [agent] deserves this amount of blame?"

33.5% of participants deny the robot moral agency.


doesn't have a moral compass; can't make moral decisions; doesn't have emotions; doesn't have free will; it's a machine; programmed by humans; programmers are to blame; it's just an AI...



Q3. Same Blame Judgments?



Replication in Japan




Why this Asymmetry?

Hypothesis: Asymmetry is due to justifications available for human inaction but not for robot inaction.

People simulate human's decision process → sacrificing somebody (= action) feels very **difficult** → inaction becomes understandable and **justifiable**.


But not for robot agent.

% of Respondents Mentioning "Difficulty"



Struggling Robot

Having to decide whether or not to switch the train onto the side rail, the robot struggles with the difficult decision. But time is running short; the robot needs to make a choice.



Conclusion, Part II

Q1. Most people treat autonomous machines as **moral agents** (sensible targets of blame)

Q2. They apply **similar norms** to machines as they apply to humans.

Q3. They assign **different amounts of blame** to machines.

Blame is a function of justifications, which reveal how we perceive humans and robot → as social community members, through simulation

Final Conclusions

Humans perceive mind in machines

- under certain conditions
- appearance is one such condition, but certain types of appearance lead to certain kinds of mind inferences

Humans morally evaluate robots

- if described as having mental capacities
- but humans may still have trouble seeing machines as part of social structures
- may still have trouble simulating experience of robot mind

Humans are (partially) prepared for robots with minds and morality