

**ライフコース選択の臨界点
—生き方はどこまで自由に選べるのか？—**

**Life Courses in Flux
New Opportunities and New Constraints**

- 主 催：ドイツ日本研究所，明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部ジェンダーセンター
- 助 成：ドイツ研究振興協会（D F G）
- 後 援：国際交流基金，明治大学国際連携本部
- 日 時：2010年10月22日（金）～ 23日（土）
- 会 場：明治大学紫紺館3階
- 企 画：岩田クリスティーナ，マーレン・ゴツィック，田中洋美／ドイツ日本研究所
出口剛司，宮本真也／明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部ジェンダーセンター

**German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo (DIJ)
Meiji University, School of Information and Communication, Gender Center**

- Sponsored by German Research Foundation (DFG)
- In cooperation with The Japan Foundation and Meiji University Headquarters of International Collaboration
- 22 - 23 October 2010 at Meiji University Shikonkan Hall, 3F
- Organizers: Maren Godzik, Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt, Hiromi Tanaka-Naji, German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo (DIJ) & Takeshi Deguchi, Shinya Miyamoto Meiji University, School of Information and Communication, Gender Center

ライフコース選択の臨界点—生き方はどこまで自由に選べるのか

少子高齢化や労働市場の再編成は大きな影響を各国にもたらしている。日本とドイツも例外ではない。第二次大戦後、両国は高度経済成長を経験したが、その時期にライフコースの「標準化」が見られた。その後、日本でもドイツでも、個人化がすすみ、生き方やライフスタイルが多様化したといわれる。しかしながら自由に生き方を決められるかといえば決してそうではない。本シンポジウムでは、日・独・米・香港を拠点に活動する研究者が集い、日独社会における個人の生き方の変容を、願望、社会規範、現在の社会状況等との関連から検討し、「ライフコース選択の臨界点」を探る。特に、近年のライフコースの変容と持続について、ライフストーリーないしバイオグラフィーの視点も取り入れ、仕事、家族、住まいの三つの分野に焦点を絞り考察する。

Life Courses in Flux: New Opportunities and New Constraints

Japan and Germany are currently undergoing fundamental changes that have ramifications for individual life courses. Population aging and decline, as well as the ongoing restructuring of the labour market are major factors that affect individuals and society at large. 'Standardized' life courses which emerged in both countries during the time of rapid economic growth after WW II seem to be losing their dominance, but how exactly do biographies of younger people differ from those of older generations? In what way do people cope with increasing biographical freedom – and the accompanying insecurities – and how do they negotiate the options they have? How are these transformations represented in the media and popular culture? In the realms of work, family, and housing, opportunities and constraints have to be constantly balanced out by the individual. It is these three interrelated areas which this international conference focuses upon.



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はじめに

明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部
ジェンダーセンター運営委員
出口剛司

日独国際シンポジウム「ライフコースの臨界点——生き方はどこまで自由に選べるのか」は、明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部ジェンダーセンターの学術企画の一つとして、2010年10月22日、23日の両日に明治大学駿河台キャンパスにおいて開催されたものである。同センターは、2011年4月に情報コミュニケーション学部には附属する組織として開設されたものであるが、その前月にはすでにドイツ・フランクフルト大学教授、同社会研究所長のアクセル・ホネット氏を招いての国際シンポジウムを実現しており、本センターが世界的な研究者を招いて実施する学術企画としては、本企画は二つ目ということになる。しかし今回の国際シンポジウムは、ジェンダーセンターが単独で開催したものではなく、ドイツ日本研究所との共催企画として、またドイツ学術振興会の支援を得て、実現したものである。なお、全体の企画運営に関しては、ドイツ日本研究所の三名の専任研究員（マーレン・ゴツィック博士、岩田クリスティーナ博士、田中洋美博士）と明治大学同ジェンダーセンターの二名の運営委員（出口剛司准教授、宮本真也准教授）が中心となってかかわった。

今日のジェンダー研究は、世界規模で巻き起こった60年代の異議申し立ての運動、とくに近代の家父長制構造に果敢に挑戦を挑んだ、いわゆる第二波のフェミニズム運動にその起源を遡ることができる。その後現在にいたるまで、フェミニズム運動の影響の下、現実社会の家父長制的構造の破棄が目指される一方で、アカデミズムの世界では、既存のディシプリンの枠組みを超えた女性学、男性学、あるいはレズビアン・スタディーズ、ゲイ・スタディーズ、クイア研究といった新しい横断的知を生産していった。ジェンダー研究をその本務とする本学部ジェンダーセンターの立場からみると、共同国際シンポジウムは、我が国において全面開花した——まさに臨界点を迎えた——ジェンダー研究の多様な成果の上に成立していることは言うまでもない。

しかし本共同シンポジウムは、そうしたジェンダー研究の集大成という意味をもちつつも、決してそれに回収しきれない独自の意義をもっている。それが「ライフコース選択」という視点に集約されているのである。いうまでもなく、日本とドイツは、全体主義、第二次世界大戦、戦後の高度経済成長、低成長下での少子・高齢化という共通の歴史社会的背景を経験してきた。そして現在、両国において既存の慣習や古い規範意識が弱体化するなかで、個人化やライフコースの多様化が一挙にすすんだと言われている。むろん、こうしたライフコース選択という問題は、ジェンダー研究の立場から見ると、近代以降の家父長制的近代家族のもとで、制約されてきた女性の生き方の自由化、多様化という形で主題化されることになる。しかし、現代において女性の生き方の問題は、そのまま男性の生き方、家族のあり方、さらには同時代の政治・経済的構造、社会・文化的背景へと地続きの関係にあることを忘れてはならない。「ライフコース選択の臨界点」とは、そうした狭義のジェンダー研究が積み上げてきた成果を自らの内部に包摂するより広い融合的視座なのであり、そうした文脈でこそジェンダー研究もまた、自身の知のあり方をさらに鍛えあげ、飛躍的に深化させることが可能となるのである。

このような知のあり方はまた、共通のテーマのもと、多様なテーマとアプローチが登場する本共同国際シンポジウムの形式にも刻印されている。そこでは、それぞれが自身の知的営為の限界点まで突き進むことによって、成果の「核・融合反応」が生み出されるのである。たとえば方法論に関して、社会科学、とくに社会学や教育学の分野では、一方の伝統的に統計的、計量的手法をとるものと、他方のインタビューや映像・ドキュメント資料の意味解釈という方法をとるものが存在する。共同国際シンポジウムにおいても、家族の変化、少子化、晩婚化、男性の育児参加をはじめ、ライフコースをめぐるいくつかのデータの統計的検証が行われる一方で、そうした計量的手法が生み出した社会的リアリティが、当事者の語りやメディアの意味解釈という方法で、別の形で検証されている。また女性の生き方、働き方への視座はおのずから、パートナーである男性の生き方の選択という問題群を立ち上げ、それぞれの分野の専門家がそれぞれの立場で男性、女性の生き方の問題を独立して論じている。そしてそのことによって、われわれは、男女のライフコース選択という融合的なテーマへと導かれるのである。またそれと同じように、労働市場に参入しようとする若者の状況や彼らの社会意識という論点は、その対比として高齢者の引退後の社会参加や地域参加のあり方を、まさに差し迫った問題として再提起する。あるいは労働生活や住居空間という社会のハードな問題に対しては、メディア空間における若者の意識形態というソフトな視座が相互反射的な関係を形成し、われわれの知を拡大する。このように、それぞれが独自のテーマと方法論を追求することによって、逆説的にも知の多様性が現実化するまさに臨界点にこそ、共同国際シンポジウムは位置付けられるのである。

しかし、国際シンポジウムの最大の成果は、ドイツ日本研究所という公的研究機関と明治大学という私立の研究教育機関が、共同のシンポジウムを企画、実現した点にある。それぞれの組織が抱える枠組みや限界を相互に補い合うことによって、両研究機関も知の臨界点と融合を経験することができたのである。

なお本報告書は、登壇者本人の承諾を得て、当日の報告原稿をもとに編集されたものである。また報告書という形での編集は、明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部ジェンダーセンターが行ったが、シンポジウムの企画のみならず、報告書の作成においてもドイツ日本研究所の協力があつたことは言うまでもない。

出口 剛司

明治大学准教授。博士（社会学、東京大学）。専門は、理論社会学、文化社会学。

Takeshi DEGUCHI is an Associate Professor at Meiji University. He received a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Tokyo. His research interests are theoretical sociology and cultural sociology.

宮本 真也

明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部准教授。専門は社会学、社会哲学。大阪大学修士（人間科学）。大阪大学大学院人間科学研究科博士（後期）課程単位取得退学。研究テーマは、批判的社会理論。

Shinya MIYAMOTO is an Associate Professor at the School of Information and Communication, Meiji University. He specializes in sociology and social philosophy. He received a Master's degree in Human Sciences from Osaka University, where he completed a PhD program. His research interest lies in critical social theory.

プログラム

●第1日目:2010年10月22日(金)

9:30 受付

【イントロダクション】

司会:牛尾 奈緒美(明治大学)



10:00 開会の挨拶 フロリアン・クルマス (DIJ) / 吉田 恵子 (明治大学)

10:30-11:15 基調講演Ⅰ 「日本におけるライフコース研究—多様化幻想のなかの標準化のゆくえ」
嶋崎 尚子 (早稲田大学)

11:15-12:00 基調講演Ⅱ 「ライフコース、ライフストーリー、社会変動
—ドイツ語圏社会科学におけるバイオグラフィー・アプローチ」
ベッティナ・ダウジーン (ウィーン大学)

《12:00-13:30 休憩》

【セッション①】 仕事とライフコース:仕事をめぐる人生の選択肢の変化

司会:カローラ・ホメリヒ (DIJ) / 水戸部 由枝 (明治大学)

13:30-14:00 「失われた場を探して—ポスト工業化時代の日本における若者とライフコースの崩壊」
メアリー・プリントン (ハーバード大学)

14:00-14:30 「高齢期のライフコース選択—職業能力と定年後の地域参加」
前田 信彦 (立命館大学)

14:30-15:00 「ドイツ労働市場における変化とライフコースの非標準化
—職業生活における自己決定可能性の拡大か？」
ビルギット・アーピチュ (デュースブルク・エッセン大学)

《15:00—15:30 休憩》

15:30-16:00 「30代・40代管理職女性のキャリアデザイン」
牛尾 奈緒美 (明治大学)

16:00-16:30 「『東京ラブストーリー』の20年後—「キャリア女性」のイメージは変化したか？」
アリサ・フリードマン (オレゴン大学)

《16:30—16:45 休憩》

16:45-17:15 総括討論 / 討論者:今井 順 (東北大学), セッション①発表者

●第2日目：2010年10月23日(土)

【セッション②】結婚・家族とライフコース：結婚・家族観の変容と継続

司会：バーバラ・ホルツ（DIJ）／江下 雅之（明治大学）

9:00- 9:30 「日本人の結婚と家族形成—未婚化と自己選択のイデオロギー」
加藤 彰彦（明治大学）

9:30-10:00 「シングル女性の結婚と仕事をめぐるライフコース選択—東京、ソウル、香港を例に」
平田 由紀江（獨協大学）／ 田中 洋美（DIJ）／ 吳 華孔（香港理工大学）

10:00-10:30 「近年の日本のテレビドラマに見る未婚化と晩婚化をめぐる言説」
岩田 クリスティーナ（DIJ）

《10:30—11:00 休憩》

11:00-11:30 「男性稼ぎ主の衰退？家庭における父親の地位の変化—期待、見せかけ、そして社会実践」
ミハエル・モイザー（ドルトムント工科大学）

11:30-12:00 「リスクとしての子育て？—仕事と育児をめぐるサラリーマンの葛藤」
多賀 太（関西大学）

《12:00—13:30 休憩》

【セッション③】住まいとライフコース：住まいから見る新しい生き方

司会：神谷 浩夫（金沢大学）、吉田 恵子（明治大学）

13:30-14:00 「戦後日本の親子・親族関係の持続と変化
：全国家族調査(NFRJ-S01)を用いた計量分析による双系化説の検討」
施 利平（明治大学／ケンブリッジ大学）

14:00-14:30 「若年層の住宅条件とライフコース変化」
平山 洋介（神戸大学）

14:30-15:00 「近代家族後のライフコース選択—住まいによる空間編成／日記による時間編成」
西川 祐子（元京都文教大学）

《15:00—15:30 休憩》

15:30-16:00 「ドイツにおける女性用住居コミュニティとライフコースとの関連性」
ルート・ベッカー（ドルトムント工科大学）

16:00-16:30 「居住履歴に見る高齢者の共生型・参加型住宅の選択」
マーレン・ゴツィック（DIJ）

《16:30—17:00 休憩》

17:00-17:30 総括討論 ／ 神谷 浩夫、嶋崎 尚子、ベッティーナ・ダウジーン

17:30-18:00 基調講演Ⅲ 「現代日本における生きがいとライフコース」
ゴードン・マシューズ（香港中文大学）

18:00 閉 会

Program

●Day 1: Friday, 22 October 2010

09:30 Registration

Introduction

Moderator: Naomi Ushio, Meiji University



10:00 Greetings: Florian COULMAS, DIJ
Keiko YOSHIDA, Meiji University, Gender Center

10:30-11:15 Keynote Speech I: "Life Course Research in Japan: The Illusion of Diversification and the Development of Standardization" Naoko SHIMAZAKI, Waseda University

11:15-12:00 Keynote Speech II: "The Life Course, Life Narratives, and Social Change: Remarks on the Auto-/Biographical Approach in the German Speaking Social Sciences" Bettina DAUSIEN, The University of Vienna

12:00-13:30 Lunch Break

Session 1: Changing Life Courses and Work

Chair: Carola HOMMERICH, DIJ / Keiko YOSHIDA, Meiji University

13:30-14:00 "Lost in Transition: Young Men and Life Course Disruptions in Postindustrial Japan"
Mary BRINTON, Harvard University

14:00-14:30 "Vocational Capabilities and Community Involvement in Post-Retirement Life"
Nobuhiko MAEDA, Ritsumeikan University

14:30-15:00 "Changes in the German Labor Market and the De-Standardization of Life Courses: Towards a Self-Directed Working Life?"
Birgit APITZSCH, University of Duisburg-Essen

15:00-15:30 Coffee Break

15:30-16:00 "Career Patterns of Female Managers in Their Thirties and Forties"
Naomi USHIO, Meiji University

16:00-16:30 "The Television Drama 'Tokyo Love Story' 20 Years Later: Have Images of Career Women Changed?" Alisa FREEDMAN, University of Oregon

16:30-16:45 Break

16:45-17:15 Discussion : Jun IMAI, Tohoku University, Speakers of Session 1

●Day 2: Saturday, 23 October 2010

Session 2: Changing Life Courses and Family

Chair: Barbara HOLTHUS, DIJ / Masayuki ESHITA, Meiji University

- 9:00- 09:30 “Marriage and Family Formation in Contemporary Japan: the Decline in Marriage and the Individualism Ideology” Akihiko KATO, Meiji University
- 9:30-10:00 “Single Working Women in Hong Kong, Tokyo and Seoul: Their Desires and Choices on Marriage and Work” Yukie HIRATA, Dokkyo University, Hiromi TANAKA-NAJI, DIJ & Catherine W. NG, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
- 10:00-10:30 “Discourses on Single Women and Marriage in TV Drama” Kristina IWATA-WEICKGENANT, DIJ
- 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00-11:30 “The Decline of the Male Breadwinner? Father’s Changing Position in the Family – Expectations, Pretensions and Social Practice” Michael MEUSER, TU Dortmund
- 11:30-12:00 “Having Children is a Risk?: Salarymen’s Dilemma between Work and Parenting” Futoshi TAGA, Kansai University
- 12:00- 13:30 Lunch Break

Session 3: Changing Life Courses and Housing

Chair: Hiroo KAMIYA, Kanazawa University / Yoshie MITOBE, Meiji University

- 13:30-14:00 “Continuities and Changes in Parent-Child Relationships and Kinship in Post-war Japan: Examining Bilateral Hypotheses by Analyzing the National Family Survey (NFRJ-S01)” Liping SHI, Meiji University / University of Cambridge
- 14:00-14:30 “Young People’s Housing Opportunities in the Context of Japan’s Homeowner Society” Yosuke HIRAYAMA, Kobe University
- 14:30-15:00 The Life Course Choices after the End of the Modern Family System: The “Construction of Space” by Habitation and the “Construction of Time” from Diaries
Yuko NISHIKAWA, Independent Scholar
- 15:00-15:30 Coffee Break
- 15:30-16:00 “Women’s Housing Communities in Germany and their Relevance for Life Courses” Ruth BECKER, TU Dortmund
- 16:00-16:30 “Older Residents in Communal Forms of Living: What Do their Biographies Reveal about their Housing Decisions?” Maren GODZIK, DIJ
- 16:30-17:00 Break
- 17:00-17:30 Discussion : Hiroo KAMIYA, Naoko SHIMAZAKI, Bettina DAUSIEN
- 17:30-18:00 Closing Keynote Speech: “‘Ikigai’ and the Lifecourse in Japan Today”
Gordon MATHEWS, Hong Kong Chinese University
- 18:00 Closing

第1日目 2010年10月22日(金)

Day 1: Friday, 22 October 2010

■Introduction

Moderator : 牛尾奈緒美

明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部教授。専門は経営学、人的資源管理論。慶応義塾大学修士（経営学）。研究テーマは、人的資源管理論、組織におけるジェンダー問題。

Naomi USHIO is a Professor at the School of Information and Communication, Meiji University. She holds an MBA from Keio University and specializes in management studies, particularly human resource management. Her research interests are human resource management and gender issues in organizations.

■Session1

仕事とライフコース:仕事をめぐる人生の選択肢の変化 **Changing Life Courses and Work**

Chair : カローラ・ホメリヒ

ドイツ日本研究所専任研究員。ケルン大学社会学研究所博士号。専門は社会学。研究テーマは、社会的な不平等、社会的排除、貧困研究、国際比較。

Carola HOMMERICH is a Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo (DIJ). She received a Ph.D. from the Research Institute of Sociology, University of Cologne. Her research interests are social inequality, social exclusion, poverty research and cross-cultural comparison.

Chair : 水戸部 由枝

明治大学政治経済学部専任講師。専門はドイツ近現代史（ジェンダー史）。明治大学博士（政治学）。研究テーマは、セクシュアリティと政治の関係（性道徳、妊娠中絶、売買春）。

Yoshie MITOBE is a Lecturer at the School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, where she received her PhD in politics. She specializes in modern German history. Her research interests are relations between sexuality and politics and issues regarding sexual morals, abortion and prostitution.

日本におけるライフコース研究 —多様化幻想のなかの標準化のゆくえ—

Life Course Research in Japan:
The Illusion of Diversification and the Development of Standardization

嶋崎尚子 Naoko SHIMAZAKI

日本では、1970 年代初頭にライフコースの視点が導入されて以降、社会学を中心に理論、方法論、実証研究が展開してきた。本報告では、日本におけるライフコース研究の動向を以下の 3 点から概観する。第 1 に、日本におけるライフコース論の展開は欧米諸国と比して限定的であったが、21 世紀に入り新たな展開を示している。このことを、戦後の社会コンテクスト（高度経済成長、バブル経済と崩壊、失われた 10 年）から説明する。この点は、第二次世界大戦での敗戦国である日独を比較する際に、整理しておく必要がある。



第 2 に、ライフコース研究において必須である縦断研究への関心とデータ収集をとりあげる。第一点とも関連して、日本では加齢過程に関する研究は、主要には横断的データを用いてすすめられてきた。追跡パネル法による縦断データは、1990 年代にはいってようやく関心が高まり、着手されたところである。短期間の観察ではあるが、いくつかの重要なデータが収集され、注目すべき知見が得られている。

こうした点をふまえ、第 3 に、日本におけるライフコースパターンと個人の伝記的過程との関係を考察する。近年、西側福祉国家で指摘されているライフコースにおける 3 つの変化（ジェンダーをめぐる個人化、ライフコースの新たな制度化、人口成長・年齢構造の変化）をとりあげ、日本における動向を検討する。そこでは、女性のライフコースをめぐる展開した＜多様性幻想＞に焦点をあてる。1980 年代以降、多様化が語られるなかで実態としては標準化・制度化が拡大したが、その後、20 世紀末から脱標準化、新たな制度化の傾向がみられる。具体的には、①教育から労働市場への制度的連結、②家族形成における結婚と親なり順序、③就業と子育て、④長期化する親子関係、の領域で指摘できる。最後に今後の展望をさぐりたい。

嶋崎 尚子

早稲田大学文学学術院教授。専門は社会学。早稲田大学修士（文学）。研究テーマは、ライフコースと社会変動、家族社会学。

Naoko SHIMAZAKI is a Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Letters, Arts and Sciences, Waseda University. She received a Master's degree from Waseda University. Her research interests are studies on life course and social change and family sociology.

要旨／Abstracts

At the beginning of 1970s, there was a move to introduce life course perspective to Japanese sociology. Since then, the major development of this perspective took the course of theory building and conceptualization, and empirical studies. In this report, I will give a short overview of the development of the sociology of the life course in Japan. I will first attempt to explain that process in socioeconomic context after the World War II. In Japan the development of the life course perspective was slow and unique, and there are distinct differences in this aspect in sociology between Japan and Germany, although both experienced defeat in World War II.

The second point I wish to take up is that one feature of Japanese life course study is a methodological issue. Namely, individual aging processes have been pursued mainly by cross-sectional studies. We became aware of the validity of longitudinal studies in life course perspective as late as in the 1990s. Now numerous longitudinal studies are ongoing, and important scientific knowledge is acquired.

Thirdly, recently in western welfare states three changes are discussed regarding life course, first the process of individualization through the loosening of gender definitions of social roles, second life course policy of the welfare state substitutes the normative regulation of the life course, and third the shift in population growth and age structure. Finally, I will attempt to outline the relation of life course patterns and individual biographies in Japan by taking social contexts and their changes into account. I think there is a strong illusion of diversification, especially of female life course, in Japan. In fact, however, since 1980s the life course patterns were standardized and institutionalized in spite of the fact that the society as a whole considered diversification valuable. After the end of the century, new tendency of de-standardization and re-institutionalization can be pointed out, such as the institutional linkage of education and labour force market, the sequence of marriage and parenting, work and child-rearing, longevity of parent-child relation. Finally I wish to address the future trend of life course in Japan.

ドイツ日本研究所日独国際学術シンポジウム
「ライフコース選択の臨界点：生き方はどこまで自由を選ぶのか」
DIJ, International Conference
"Life Courses in Flux: New Opportunities and New Constraints"
Tokyo, October 22-23, 2010
基調講演 Keynote Speech

日本におけるライフコース研究： ＜多様化＞幻想のなかの標準化のゆくえ Life Course Studies in Japan: Diversification or Standardization?

嶋崎尚子（早稲田大学）
Naoko SHIMAZAKI Waseda University

1. ライフコースとは 1. Life Course Paradigm

・社会変動と人間発達を、両者の相互関連性に着目して観察する多元的な説明枠組み

A multi-dimensional framework to examine the interrelationship between social change and human development

・社会学、政策科学、心理学、老年学、社会心理学、文化人類学、歴史学など

Sociology, Policy Science, Psychology, Gerontology, Social Psychology, Social Anthropology, History

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社会変動と人間発達 Social Change and Human Development

社会構造→人間発達・伝記的過程

Social Structure → Human development,
Biographical processes

人間発達・伝記的過程→社会構造

Human development, → Social Structure
Biographical processes

社会変動と人間発達の時間依存的な相互作用過程の理解

Explain how social structure and biographies are interrelated by time-dependent processes

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「ライフコースとは、年齢によって区分された生涯期間を通じての道筋であり、人生上の出来事についてのタイミング、移行期間、間隔、および順序にみられる社会的パターンであり」(Elder1978)、社会制度によって具象化され、また歴史的変動の影響を受ける。

"The life course refers to pathways through the age-differentiated life span, to social patterns in the timing, duration, spacing, and order of events" (Elder1978), it is concretized by social institutions and affected by historical change.

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2. ライフコース研究の2つの潮流 2. Two Approaches to Life Course Study

(1) 人間発達に主軸をおいた研究 1970-

An approach focusing on human development: 1970s

(2) 社会変動に主軸をおいた研究 1990-

An approach focusing on social changes: 1990s

ミクロ水準と、マクロ水準、メゾ水準での社会構造との連結

A growing interest in connecting social structures on micro-social, macro-social, and meso-social levels

(Mayer & Schoepflin 1989, Levy 1996, Krueger 2003)

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


Figure 1. Four Key Elements of the Life Course paradigm

(Giele & Elder 1998, 11)

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ライフコースは、「社会構造の一つの要素であって、それは個人の行為、組織的過程、そして制度的・歴史的諸力の所産である。ライフコースは、個人の伝記物語ではなく、社会的にパターン化された軌道である」(Mayer & Tuma 1990, 6)

"The life course is an element of social structure that is a product of both individual action, organizational processes, and institutional and historical forces. It refers to socially patterned trajectories, not to individual biographies." (Mayer & Tuma 1990, 6)

キーワード：ライフコースの(脱)制度化、個人化、(脱)標準化

Keywords: (de) institutionalization of life course, individualization, (de) standardization

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ライフコースの制度化:

「規範的規則、法的規則、組織体の規則が人生の社会的・時間的組織化を定義する過程」(Bruckner & Mayer 2005, 32)

Institutionalization of life course:

The institutionalization of life course refers to the process by which normative, legal or organizational rules define the social and temporal organization of human lives. (Bruckner & Mayer 2005, 32)

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ライフコースの標準化:

「特定の地位やイベント、それらが発生した継起が、
所与の母集団において普遍的になること、あるいは
そのタイミングがより均一になること」(Bruckner &
Mayer 2005 32)

Standardization of life course:

The standardization of life course refers to the
process by which specific states or events and
the sequences in which they occur become
more universal for given populations or that their
timing becomes more uniform. (Bruckner & Mayer 2005,
32)

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ライフコースの個人化:

「個人のみずからの人生に対する統制力が増大し、
多様な人生設計ならびに人生軌道を追求する過
程」(Bruckner & Mayer 2005, 33)

Individualization of life course:

Individuals are assumed to gain greater control
over their lives, thus pursuing a wider variety of
life designs and life trajectories.

(Bruckner & Mayer 2005, 33)

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3.ヨーロッパにおけるライフコースの変化 3.Changes of Life Courses in Europe

(Heinz, Huinink, Swnder, and Weymann 2009)

(1)社会的役割や人生移行に関する伝統的な年齢定
義やジェンダー定義がゆるやかになることによって
個人化が加速するという変化(たとえばBeck 1992)

1 An accelerated process of individualization
through the loosening of traditional age and gender
definitions of social roles and life transitions. (Beck
1992)

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(2)福祉国家におけるライフコース政策が、ある程度の
範囲までライフコースの標準的規則を置き換えると
いう変化、すなわち新たなライフコースの制度化

2 New institutionalization of life course: Life course
policy of the welfare state replaces the
normative regulation of the life course to an
increasing extent.

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(3)少子化と長寿化によって人口成長と年齢構造に生
じている変化

3 There is an ongoing shift in population growth
and society's age distribution resulting from
declining birth rates and increasing longevity.

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


図2 産業社会の進展とライフコースの変化(ヨーロッパモデル)
Figure 2: Industrial society development and life course
changes: European model

(refer to Mayer & Schoepflin 1989)

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4.日本におけるライフコース研究 4.Life Course Studies in Japan

- ・「家族とライフコース研究会FLC研究会」
Family and Life Course Study
- ・親族世代と暦年齢、コーホート
Family generation, chronological age, cohort
- ・職業社会学、教育社会学
Occupational sociology, educational sociology
- ・SSM調査、NFRJ調査
The National Survey of Social Stratification and Social
Mobility
The National Family Research of Japan
- ・イベントヒストリー分析、配列分析
Event history analysis, sequence analysis

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5.戦後日本におけるライフコースの制度化 5.Life Course Institutionalization in Post-War Japan

(1)企業中心社会と年功序列賃金体系・賃金カーブ

1. Company-oriented society, seniority-based
salary system, automatic annual raise system

(2)国民皆年金・国民皆保険

2. Universal pension coverage system, universal
health care system

(3)教育と労働市場の連結

3. From school to the labour market system

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


図3 産業社会の進展とライフコースの変化(日本モデル)
Figure 3: Industrial society development and life course changes: Japanese model

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- 制度交差的規範: White 1991
職業、家族、教育にまたがった規範が多い。
いずれの規範も職業領域を中心に、家族、教育という制度領域が結び付けられている。
- Cross-Institutional norms (White 1991)
Work, Family, Education
- ジェンダー、年齢を軸に階層化・段階化されている。
- Norms stratified by gender
Age-graded norms
- 背景に、性別役割分業の存在
Division of labour by gender role

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事例1 成人期への移行の集中・標準化 Case 1: Shrinkage and standardization of transition to adulthood

Table 1. Temporal ordering of life course events for birth cohorts of Japanese Males born 1921-1970 and American Males born 1908-1942

Japanese Male birth cohort	標準的 normative	中間 intermediate	非標準的 non normative	American Male birth cohort	標準的 normative	初婚→初就職 First marriage→First job	初婚→卒業 First marriage→School completion
1921-25	84.4	15.0	0.6	1908-12	72.6	18.2	8.2
1926-30	85.2	13.4	1.3	1913-17	71.6	18.3	10.1
1931-35	85.1	14.9	-	1918-22	65.7	18.1	16.2
1936-40	90.8	8.6	0.6	1923-27	61.8	17.5	20.7
1941-45	84.9	5.7	0.3	1928-32	59.5	18.0	22.6
1946-50	90.7	8.6	0.7	1933-37	58.0	19.0	23.0
1951-55	91.2	7.7	1.1	1938-42	58.2	18.9	22.7
1956-60	90.6	7.9	1.6				
1961-65	94.3	4.6	1.1				
1966-70	94.3	5.4	0.3				

Japanese Males: Sawaguchi & Shimazaki 2004.

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事例2「できちゃった婚」 Case 2: "Shotgun marriage"

現代日本社会に固有なライフコース規範:
「妊娠するまではどうであれ、子どもは結婚している夫婦のうちから生まれるべきである」

An unique life course norm in contemporary Japan: "No matter how a pregnancy occurs, a child should be born between a married husband and wife."

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(Total)

図5 年齢別にみた結婚期間が妊娠期間よりも短い出生の比率
Figure 5: Proportion of births where pregnancy preceded marriage, separated by age group

『出生に関する統計の概況 —人口動態統計特殊報告』(2002, 2005)より作成。
Produced from data provided by the *Special Report on Vital Statistics: Outline of Birth-related Statistics* (2002, 2005)

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6. 縦断データへの関心と理解 6. Perceptions about Longitudinal Data

(1)横断データから縦断データへ: 1980~

1 Transition from cross sectional data to longitudinal data: 1980s

(2)追跡パネル法による調査の開始

厚生労働省「21世紀出生児縦断調査」2001

2 Several follow-up panel studies started in the 1990s

Ex.) The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare's *Longitudinal Survey of Babies in 21st Century* (2001)

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


図6 第一子出産前後の母親の就業状況
Figure 6: Employment status of mothers following birth of first child

厚生労働省「第2回21世紀出生児縦断調査」(2003)図2より転載。
Reproduced from the *Second Longitudinal Survey of Babies in the 21st Century*, MHLW (2003)

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7. ライフコースの多様化幻想 7. Illusion of Diversification

ライフコースの多様化幻想: 1980年代
Illusion of life course diversification: 1980s

1960年代出生コホート女性: 「家族生活と職業生活とを個人の責任のもとで組織化することを要請され」た最初のコホート

1960s birth cohort women: the first cohort who were asked "to organize one's family life and work life based on the principle of self-responsibility."

高学歴化 Popularization of higher education

職業における男女雇用機会均等の保障

Guaranteeing equal employment opportunities for both sexes

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- 日本の現状: ライフコースにおける外部からの統制が、自制へと変化する過程

Now Japan faces a transfer process from external social control to internal self-discipline

→個人の社会的構築の過程 (Mayer & Schoepflin 1989)

The social construction of the individual

- 「表面は、主婦という生活が職業人としての生活かという二者択一にみえながら、本当のところはいったい何を二者択一したいのか解らない、不可解な光景」(中沢1999: 122)

"On the surface it appears there is a choice between the two alternatives of life as a housewife or life as a working individual. However, in truth the situation defies understanding, with no knowledge of exactly what should be designated as the two choices." (Nakazawa 1999, 122)

- 「社会一般の理念と個人の生き方の感覚が混同されることに悩んでいる」(中沢1999: 122)

"We are concerned about the confusion between the general ideology of society and the sensation of living as an individual." (Nakazawa 1999, 122)

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8. おわりに

8.Conclusion

- 企業中心社会の崩壊が、個人化の流れの促進要因として作用している。現在日本は、個人が直接的に社会・社会状況にさらされる段階を迎えており、ライフコースの再組織化という課題に直面している。

- The collapse of a company-oriented society drives the individualization of life courses. Japan has now reached a stage of life course reorganization where the individual must be involved in society directly.

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ライフコース、ライフストーリー、社会変動 —ドイツ語圏社会科学におけるバイオグラフィー・アプローチ—

Life Course, Life Narratives and Social Change: Remarks on the (Auto-)Biographical Approach in German-Speaking Social Sciences

ベッティナ・ダウジーン Bettina DAUSIEN

社会変動を研究する方法論的アプローチとしてバイオグラフィー（biography）を使うという考え方はほぼ百年の歴史がある。ウィリアム・トーマスとフロリアン・ズナニエツキが 20 世紀初頭に行った有名な研究である『ヨーロッパとアメリカにおけるポーランド農民』は近代社会学の方法論的議論において先駆的な役割を果たした。それはバイオグラフィーを題材に実質的な分析を試みただけではなく、社会学で初めて社会変動研究のためにバイオグラフィーを用いることの確固たる方法論的概念を示したのである。それ以来、バイオグラフィー研究における方法論的、理論的アプローチは緻密化されていき、新たな理論的問題も浮上しているものの、バイオグラフィーと社会の相互依存関係に向けられる一般的な研究関心は、依然、同一である。この見方を始点にし、本報告ではドイツ語圏の社会・文化研究におけるバイオグラフィー研究のアプローチについて簡単な紹介を行う。「ライフコース」、「ライフストーリー」、「バイオグラフィー」という中核的概念は区別されるべきであり、また、ジェンダーとバイオグラフィーを例に取り、（ポスト）モダン社会におけるバイオグラフィーの社会的構築のパターンの変化に関する近年の理論的論争について議論する。



ベッティナ・ダウジーン

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The life course, life narratives, and social change.
Remarks on the auto-/biographical approach in the German-speaking social sciences

Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues!

First of all, my warmest thanks go to the organizers for the invitation and for the superb preparation of the event. I am honoured and delighted to be able to speak at this conference and to introduce some ideas from the German-speaking sociological context, especially from the area of biographical research. I am aware of the fact that my view might turn out to be an “outside” perspective. I am not familiar with the ongoing discussion on the life course topic in Japanese social sciences. On the other hand, I am convinced that we will have a fruitful discussion by comparing perspectives and sharing similar questions.

Please, let me give a short outline of my speech:

- (1) Introduction: The “life course” in everyday discourses (in Germany)
- (2) The life course as symptom of and methodological approach to social change – the beginnings of sociological biographical research
- (3) The individualized life course – possibilities and limitations of life course research
- (4) Life narratives and the construction of the self
- (5) Closing remarks

1 Introduction: The “life course” in everyday discourses

The theme *Life Courses in Flux* is of current relevance in many respects, and yet at the same time it is an ‘old’ theme. The life course is, as I will shortly discuss in greater detail, a social form for the organization and interpretation of the lives of individuals which has evolved historically with modernity and which includes all areas of human existence. Work, family and housing are the topoi which take centre stage at this conference. Sexuality, politics, education, migration, health, religion ... and many other areas of everyday life could also be scientifically examined using a life course perspective. Further facets emerge when we think about the social relevance of gender, about intercultural and intergenerational comparisons between life courses, or about the current issue of the “ageing society”. Demographic trends, government regulations and economic calculations, such as those becoming relevant in the current issue of pensions (in many European countries), are directly connected with the “life course”. The same goes for the current discourse on the range of possible medical interventions, which not only bring about an extension of the average life span, but also touch on the boundaries of life, birth and death, and throw up new ethical questions. – I could easily continue to list observations and questions associated with the theme of the life course.

The omnipresence of the topic is also reflected in the media: the “battle of the generations”, the discussion about old age and care, the controversial image of the “career woman” who no longer wishes to have children and is therefore blamed for the declining birth rate (“Are the Germans dying out?”), or the new European policy of *Lifelong Learning* are further examples of the fact that many socially regulated matters are based on assumptions and normative ideas about individual life courses.

These norms and images of the life course are not fixed, but are the result of social processes of

negotiation. They differ from one another with regard to institutional contexts, social groups, and situations, and they vary historically with changes in social structures and cultural patterns of interpretation. The media reflect and at the same time actively “promote” these processes.

Alongside the themes mentioned there is evidence in the media of a high level of interest in *individual biographies*, at least in Germany. In diverse formats such as talk shows, chats and internet sites of the Facebook variety, celebrities and lesser celebrities, but also completely unknown individuals present their lives, sometimes with a breathtaking amount of detail and pictures which are entrusted to anonymous internet platforms with no thought for possible consequences.

These brief hints make one thing clear: the life course is a highly relevant concept in the everyday actions and thoughts of individuals and institutions, in politics, the media, and society. There are variable views and controversy, about what it means in concrete terms. What does seem unquestionably “clear”, however, is “the thing itself”, the “fact” *that* we “have” a life course. From the media and at school we learn, *en passant* and explicitly, what possible life courses look like, but also what they should *not* look like, and which life paths are completely “impossible” (in the double sense of ‘not possible’ and ‘unacceptable’). Undoubtedly we need look no further than everyday life to observe that normative ideas about “successful” or at least socially acceptable life courses have undergone long-lasting change in recent decades.

Let us take, for example, the subject of sexual orientation. Until the late 1960s homosexuality was largely taboo and discriminated against in Germany, not to mention the persecution of homosexuals in the national socialist period. Now, however, German pre-primetime TV series such as “Lindenstraße” would hardly be imaginable without same-sex love and life concepts based on it – including marriage and parenthood for homosexual couples. The subject of transsexuality, and biographies which “integrate” a sex change (“transgender identities”), have also made their way into public discourse (even if they still have an exotic flavour). The recent marriage of a German government minister to his same-sex partner, celebrated under the spotlight of media attention, points to an enormous change in and diversification of social norms. At the same time, however, the event demonstrates the continuity and stability of the life course schema, preserving as it does the normative idea *that* one marries and that this marriage is a biographical event with significance for society. This example, finally, also makes visible the asynchrony of social change internationally: what I describe for Germany in 2010 would be unthinkable in other societies, including some European ones¹, while in others it might already have lost its novelty value for the media. After these cursory insights into the media space, which opens up around the concept of the life course, I will return now to my actual theme: The question now is how we as social scientists describe these processes of change in life course models and biographies.

2 The life course as symptom of and methodological approach to social change – the beginnings of sociological biographical research

If we position the theme of our conference historically, in the social sciences, we find ourselves at the beginnings of biographical and life course research. In the early 20th century, up until the late 1930s, a school of qualitative research developed at the University of Chicago, shaped by the theoretical traditions of pragmatism and interactionism, and by a marked empirical curiosity

¹ Thus for example there were violent altercations and counter-demonstrations in Belgrade at the second public “gay parade” on 10 October 2010.

about social changes in the expanding, or indeed “exploding” urban society of the time. This mixture of sociological theory, social research and social reportage was characterized by social commitment and by the idea that it must be possible to control the social world and its problems by means of a “conscious and rational technique” (cf. Thomas/ Znaniecki, 1958, I, 1). The ambitious project of using sociology as a basis for the rational organization of society and a rational social policy was supported by an optimistic belief in the progress of science, the natural sciences particularly:

“The marvellous results attained by a rational technique in the sphere of material reality invite us to apply some analogous procedure to social reality. Our success in controlling nature gives us confidence that we shall eventually be able to control the social world in the same measure” (ibid.).

Significantly, these reflections are expressed at the beginning of the “methodological note” with which William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki prefaced their famous migration study on “The Polish Peasant in Europe and America” (1918-20; 1958).²

In their large-scale study on Polish immigrants in America³, Thomas and Znaniecki work with various materials such as newspaper articles, an extensive collection of letters, reports from social workers, and a written autobiography which the researchers had “commissioned” from a Polish immigrant. The authors set out the theoretical framework for the analysis of these data in the above-quoted “Methodological Note”. This theoretical text laid the foundation for the multi-faceted qualitative social research which evolved in the 1920s and 1930s, and which made particular use of ethnographic and biographical approaches (e.g. Shaw’s (1930) study of a delinquent adolescent). The “biographical method” developed in Chicago became the object of a multi-disciplinary discussion, revolving around the relevance of personal documents, and rules and scope for their use in sociology. Before this discussion could be concluded, however, the Chicago school of sociology dwindled in significance.⁴ Life course and biographical research were not rediscovered until the late 1960s and particularly the 1970s, when they were again used as instruments for researching social change – in the context of new social and cultural upheavals in the Western societies (cf. also Cohler/ Hostetler 2006).

While I cannot go deeper into the history of biographical research here, I would like to note that the “boom” in sociological biography and life course research is closely linked with the historical change in its object. This also goes for the current discussion about life courses in flux. We should bear this in mind and not only ask how life courses are changing in contemporary society, but what social phenomena are causing the current academic interest in life courses.

² The remarks serve to justify a qualitative empirical research method which does not simply pursue the goal of *studying* social change, but which, in a way, has itself *been generated* by the rapid social change and its consequences. The complexity and dynamism of modern societies, shaped as they are by industrialization and migration, require systematic “control techniques” based on well-considered sociological methods and empirical knowledge – so the authors’ argument: “But when [...] the social evolution becomes more rapid and the crises more frequent and varied, there is no time for the same gradual, empirical, unmethodical elaboration of approximately adequate means of control, and no crisis can be passively borne, but everyone must be met in a more or less adequate way, for they are too various and frequent not to imperil social life unless controlled in time. The substitution of a conscious technique for a half-conscious routine has become, therefore, a social necessity, though it is evident that the development of this technique could be only gradual, and that even now we find in it many implicit or explicit ideas and methods corresponding to stages of human thought passed hundreds or even thousands of years ago.” (ibid., 2)

³ “The Polish Peasant in Europe and America” first appeared in several volumes between 1918 and 1920, and was reissued in two volumes in 1958.

⁴ There are several reasons for and was overtaken by a social theory very much dominated by the concepts Talcott Parsons suggested, and concerned not with social upheaval and processes of change, but with the reproduction of a stable social system (cf. Kohli 1981; Fischer-Rosenthal 1991; Alheit/Dausien 2009).

But let us return for a moment to the beginnings. The paradigmatic idea at the heart of the “Polish Peasant” and the biographical method is based on a non-dualistic social theory, developed in the framework of symbolic interactionism, and particularly on the theory of social situations propounded by William Thomas: In order to understand social processes, it is not sufficient to analyse “objective” factors and cause-effect relationships (as in the natural sciences); instead the “subjective” aspects of social behaviour must be taken into account. Social action is not directed by the “objective situation”, but by the interactive “definition of a situation”.⁵

Thomas and Znaniecki argue

“that a nomothetic social science is possible only if all social becoming is viewed as the product of a continual interaction of individual consciousness and objective social reality. In this connection the human personality is both a continually producing factor and a continually produced result of social evolution, and this double relation expresses itself in every elementary social fact” (Thomas/Znaniecki 1958, IV, 1831).

From this reflection are derived both the methodological significance of *personal documents* for the analysis of social changes, and the goal of formulating *general laws* of social change from this.⁶ Even if the biographical experiences and attitudes of subjects differ on an individual basis, they are nonetheless seen as an expression of general structures and conditions, which can be reconstructed “through the individual case”. Let us listen to the authors once again:

“In analyzing the experiences and attitudes of an individual we always reach data and elementary facts which are not exclusively limited to this individual's personality but can be treated as mere instances of more or less general classes of data or facts, and can thus be used for the determination of laws of social becoming. [...] We are safe in saying that personal life-records, as complete as possible, constitute the *perfect* type of sociological material, and that if social science has to use other materials at all it is only because of the practical difficulty of obtaining at the moment a sufficient number of such records to cover the totality of sociological problems, and of the enormous amount of work demanded for an adequate analysis of all the personal materials necessary to characterize the life of a social group.” (Thomas/Znaniecki 1958, IV, 1832-33)

The priority given to biographical materials and the analysis of – well-chosen – individual cases over mass data is thus a logical result of the theoretical assumptions about the constitution of social reality and about the “mechanisms” of social change:

“[...] since the personal element is a constitutive factor of every social occurrence, social science cannot remain on the surface of social becoming, where certain schools wish to have it float, but must reach the actual human experiences and attitudes which constitute the full, live and active social reality beneath the formal organization of social institutions, or behind the statistically

⁵ Social reality is formed – according to the theoretical architecture – in the interplay of “social values”, individual or collective “attitudes”, and the new “situation definitions” arising for each event.

⁶ “The study of human personalities, both as factors and as products of social evolution, serves first of all the same purpose as the study of any other social data — the determination of social laws.” (ibid., 1831)

tabulated mass-phenomena which taken in themselves are nothing but symptoms of unknown causal processes..." (ibid., 1834).

This methodological position was just as controversial then as it is today. On the other hand, the above-mentioned "practical difficulty of obtaining [...] a sufficient number" of life-records is no longer an issue today. Biographical data and interview transcripts are available in large numbers and are now also systematically archived. The methodological concepts have been systematically refined and developed in recent biography and life course research. Qualitative mass data can be managed and coded with the help of electronic programs. Does this mean that we have come closer to the idea of a sociology based primarily and systematically on the empirical analysis of "life records"?

I think not. And there are good reasons for this. The methodology of the Chicago School did provide enduring arguments for the view that social analysis can hardly be justified without taking into account the logic of biographically structured action and thought. On the other hand, the ideas of a "nomothetic social science" (Thomas/Znaniecki) and a "rational social technology" have a rather strange ring to them today.

One reason for this is that the idea of being able to find general laws has become obsolete following the critical debate on positivism in the 1960ies, the feminist critique of science, and de-constructivist discussions of methodology in the social sciences and cultural studies. The claim to validity has become more modest and more open: the aim is to generate "thick descriptions" (Geertz 1973), interesting, heuristically productive modellings and "local concepts" whose connection to particular historical-social contexts can be reflected but not undone.

Furthermore, the idea of bringing about social reform through rational social technology, regardless of its emancipatory intention, can no longer be formulated without reservation after the historical experience of totalitarian social regimes, which controlled the lives of individuals and groups to the extreme point of destruction. The relationship between power, control and subject constitution is, as shown not least by Michel Foucault's works, far more complex and more complicated than that envisaged by the Chicago School's interactionist theory.

Lastly, the methodological concept of the "life record" set out in the Polish Peasant seems too simplistic from a present-day point of view. Biographies or "life courses" are considered in this context to be "social facts" which are continuously produced and changed in an everyday interactive practice in the interplay between objective reality and subjective consciousness. "Life records" and other "personal data" are considered to be documents of this practice. This relation between "life course" and "life record" contains on the one hand already the constructivist thesis that social reality is produced, but on the other hand also the positivistic idea which understands life stories as "reports" on a life which has been lived, and, fundamentally, assumes the story to be a more or less "true" representation of the life. The search for "representative" life stories confirms this idea.

In recent biographical research this relationship has been called into question methodologically, and there is a broad consensus that life stories should be considered of not as "records", but as complex "narrations", which in turn bring their own layer of construction and constructedness into play. Before I go into this aspect, I would like to briefly summarize the previous reflections and relate them to the current state of research:

3 The individualized life course – possibilities and limitations of life course research

In the long run the theoretically grounded idea of the Chicago School, that life records represent excellent materials for the analysis of social change, has proven extremely productive. Especially since the 1970s, in the German social sciences two strands of research have developed from this tradition, which coincide at some points but represent two different scientific “observation perspectives”, working with different theoretical references and methods (cf. also Sackmann 2007, 12): *life course research* and *biographical research*. Both schools contribute in their own way to the empirical and theoretical differentiation of the general – and often only superficially asserted – “individualization thesis” (following Beck 1983, 1986; Beck/Lash 1996). Allow me to make a few remarks on the state of research.

Central to both research strands is a theoretical understanding of the *life course* as a *social institution*. In modern societies, as the Swiss sociologist Martin Kohli (1985, 1986) has convincingly argued, this institution takes on the function of integrating individuals into society in a rational way and providing orientation for their actions. In the light of the increasing complexity and fluidity and the increasingly rapid changes in social structures and rule systems in modern societies, a mode of socialization and integration is needed which fixes the rights and obligations of the members of society directly “onto the individual” or even better “in the individual”, and “accompanies” the individual through all transitions between life stages and all the vicissitudes of life. This can only be achieved, according to Kohli’s well-known thesis, by a *temporal schedule* (cf. Kohli) such as the life course. To be more precise, Kohli understands the life course as an “institutional program regulating one’s movement through life both in terms of a sequence of positions and in terms of a set of biographical orientations by which to organize one’s experiences and plans” (2007, 255). This highly functional “program” is “one of the major institutions of contemporary societies” (Kohli 2007, 253), and in a certain sense it is the *prerequisite* for the process we usually call “individualization”. Regardless of the nuances and variations in the way “the flexible person” (to quote Sennett) is used by society and positions him or herself in society (or on its margins), the life course provides a sort of normative and functional framework which individuals and institutions can use as a point of orientation – affirming the model, modifying it, or contrasting themselves against it.

The rich *empirical* findings of life course research, mainly statistical and longitudinal studies, prove the individualization thesis at a large-scale level, but they leave a lot of questions open:

One concerns international differences. These findings were first developed mainly on the basis of “western” societies, organized on capitalist principles, it becomes increasingly relevant to ask how life course patterns diversify and/or become standardized in different cultural, national and social contexts, and how the opposing processes of institutionalization *and* de-institutionalization of the life course interlock. What will happen with the “western model” of the life course in a globalized world?

Kohli’s theory and associated empirical research have shown that the capitalist labour market functions as the “core” of the life course program, and that changes in economic conditions thus directly affect the organization of individual biographies – whether it is in the form of internationally standardized career patterns which take root, for example, in the slipstream of international corporations, or, on the other side of the coin, in the form of precarious or

“precarized” life courses in which occupational demands for flexibility and redundancies lead to “predetermined breaking points” in biographies.

Furthermore, criticism of the institutionalization thesis, coming especially from gender studies, has made it clear that life course theory has long ignored certain *structural* differences, and that it manifests, in particular, a “gender bias” (cf. Krüger 1995, Dausien 1996 and others).⁷ The empirical analysis of women’s biographies even in the “old European world” has shown that life course patterns have to be differentiated according to gender positions, since the “normal biography” organized around the axis of continuous paid employment does not apply to the majority of “female life course patterns”. On the other hand, it has *not* been possible to empirically corroborate the assumption that there are two “typical patterns”, a “female” and a “male” normal biography. There are increasing numbers of women whose life courses approach the ideal-typical model of a continuous full-time professional career, and there are a not inconsiderable number of men whose biographies are marked by “time offs”, changes in career and interruptions, periods of unemployment or full-time parenting etc. Further studies on the historical change in women’s *and* men’s life courses have been able to show that generational affiliation, education and milieu, welfare systems, career and labour-market structures also have a considerable impact on the shaping of life course patterns and standardized status passages.⁸

In the gender research of the 1980s and 1990s these findings promoted an alternative conceptualization of the life course. As the German Sociologist Regina Becker-Schmidt and others suggested, the life course functioned as a program of a “double socialization” (cf. Becker-Schmidt 1987; Krüger/Born 1990; Dausien 1996). According to this idea, life courses are shaped by two conflicting societal structures: by the *labour market’s logic of exploitation*, but at the same time by the *logic of reproduction* in private life resp. in family forms – and finally by the contradictory reciprocal effects *between* the two system structures.

In the context of the individualization discourse, the question of how gender roles and gender relations change, shift and diversify is therefore by no means just a fashionable peripheral phenomenon. On the contrary, it strikes the very centre of current changes in the mode of socialization and life course pattern – both as symptom and as structuring factor with great social momentum.

The criticism of the “normal biography” model has a further layer of significance, however. If it is true that the diversification of life course patterns in modern societies is a *symptom* of a historical surge in individualization, a surge with dimensions never before imagined, then this also has consequences for research methodology. Please, let me illustrate this briefly.

Ulrich Beck writes, in a much quoted phrase, that the individual in modern society has become his or her “own biographical planning office” (Beck 1996, 42; cf. 1986, 217). Taking into account that this catchy phrase is perhaps designed for dramatic effect and knowing that there are serious empirical objections we nevertheless have to admit that life courses have tended to become more

⁷ With reference to Alfred Schütz’s (1963, 242) *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, one can say that the theorem of the institutionalization of the life course does not merely connect to constructions from the everyday world in the sense of a “second-degree construction”, but that it is “taken in” by them, i.e. reproduces them unreflectingly.

⁸ In the German-speaking social sciences the research carried out over a period of 13 years by the ‘Collaborative Research Centre 186’, “Status Passages and Risks in the Life Course”, is especially significant (cf. Heinz et. al. 2000; Heinz, W. R. 1992, 2006). Many essays and grey papers by sfb 186 are available on the internet platform SSOAR (www.ssoar.info).

flexible. This does not mean, however, that life courses have become random or have been left to subjective whim. Empirical individuality is not the direct outcome of designs made in planning offices, and it is not the same as individual power to determine biographical processes. The individuality and diversity of empirical life courses is in the first instance a surface phenomenon, a symptom whose underlying structuring must be reconstructed carefully.

Here, however, current life course research focused on “external” data hits a barrier which had already been seen by Thomas and Znaniecki, and which had lead to the methodological establishment of biographical research, which engages with the “inner” logic of life courses. This brings me to my forth point:

4 Life narratives and the construction of the self

How do social actors fill in that institutional framework of norms and requirements for action called “life course”? What experiences do they have or *make* and how do they interpret their experiences? What rules do they apply and what material do they use when they withdraw into their “biographical planning office”? And what do they actually *do* when they are working on their biographies? What stories do they tell, and how do they create a meaningful context out of these – a context, which they then understand as their own “life story”, the horizon within which they organize their actions and reflections?

These questions referring to the “inside” of biographies are not less important than the previously discussed structural dimension, which was already postulated by Thomas and Znaniecki. Martin Kohli (1986) also talks about “biographization” as a process being closely linked to the institutionalization of the life course. According to Kohli, the modern life course allows scope for individual interpretations, actions and decisions, but at the same time also relies on the active effort of the social subjects who fill the institutional framework with their “own meaning”. And Regina Becker-Schmidt also assumes, in her theoretical concept of double socialization, that “external” social structures and the “internal” psychological structures of individual identity are dialectically related to each other. Life courses can therefore not be adequately understood without an elaborated concept of the biographical work and the resulting constructs which we usually call life stories, life narratives or, simply, “biographies”. The more we follow the individualization thesis, the more this applies.

These arguments, however, have consequences for the *methodologies* of social research: In the early days of biographical research, but also in the phase of its rediscovery in the 1970s, there was an unquestioning assumption that everyone “had” a biography and that all one had to do was find the right *method* to give it a voice. In more recent biographical research, since the 1990s, the focus has shifted. The concern was no longer primarily the biographical *method*, instead, *the construct of “biography” itself* becomes the object of theoretical and empirical analyses.⁹ Biographical research is centred not on the individual personality but on the social construct of “biography” (cf. Fischer/Kohli 1987). This implies a series of further assumptions about object and methods.

- 1) *Firstly*, within this constructivist notion of biography I would like to distinguish two perspectives. One is focusing on the *process* of *biographical constructing*, which can be

⁹ Here the *double nature* of the concept of biography must be taken into account: on the one hand it is a construction of the everyday world by which individuals orient themselves and of which they themselves keep producing new versions in diverse contexts and media, and on the other hand it is a scientific concept which theoretically reflects on and empirically examines those everyday construction processes and construction patterns.

conceptualized as an ongoing interactional practice of presenting and reflecting oneself and the other, situated in certain social contexts. The other perspective is focusing on the “products” of this complex biographical work, which take on various forms of life stories, written and oral, comprehensive biographical narratives (Schütze 1976, 1981, 1984) and “small stories” (Bamberg 2007), “collages”, letters, artistic constructions etc. The term “biographical work” thus means the practice of using, modifying and inventing forms of biographical self-constructions in everyday life and, from time to time, in specific situations such as life course transitions or personal crisis which are explicitly arranged for or used as “biographical reflection”.¹⁰

The individual biographical work, thus, is anything but a simple “record” of a “lived life”. It has to be considered of as a multilayered and plurivalent accomplishment which exceeds the activity and capacity of the individual.

- 2) *Secondly*, the constructivist approach implies a specific relation between the individual and the social. Although biographical work can only be performed by individuals in the horizon of their “unique” biographical meaning structure, it is, at the same time, an interactive and collective work. The *individuality* of biographies is a *social form of presenting identity*, typical for modern societies, and the form itself is culturally pre-scribed in all aspects of social positioning (and to their intersections).
- 3) *Thirdly*, according to Alfred Schütz’ (1963) the methodology of biographical research is a *re-constructive* one, which means that the material of our research, namely biographies, are already socially constructed when we start analysing them. The scientific “reconstructions” are therefore “constructs of the second degree” (Schütz 1963, 242)¹¹. In order to reflect the process of reconstruction systematically, we can distinguish between different perspectives or focuses of analysis. In biographical research to my opinion at least *three angles of reconstructing* came into play:
 - *The first* refers to the collective *biographical patterns* which are brought up in certain historical and cultural contexts and which provide the framework for individual biographical work. The German cultural sociologist Alois Hahn (1988, 2000) e.g. has done much research on cultural patterns for the presentation of the self in an historical perspective.
 - *The second* angle of reconstruction refers to the subject’s activity of constructing his or her life story out of the virtually unlimited stream of biographical events, i.e. the complex process of biographical work consisting of remembering, storytelling and reflecting. Through their *biographical work* individuals create experiences and meaning, mostly in interaction with others. This is probably the mostly addressed perspective of biographical research. It focuses on the individual’s life story in its own structure and “logic”. We try to understand how individuals create, transform and transcribe experiences and meaning and how they are building biographical knowledge and reflexive self-constructs.
 - *The third* angle of reconstruction therefore focuses on the process of storytelling *in concrete situations of interaction*, such as interviews or family talks. (Here we

¹⁰ The latter are often embedded in professional frameworks of education, counselling or psychotherapy.

¹¹ “Thus, the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behaviour the social scientist has to observe and to explain.” (Schütz 1963, 242)

reconstruct the “definition of the situation” and the interaction order (Goffman 1983) operating in the background of the individuals’ interaction while they are mutually presenting their selves in biographical communication.

I come to my forth and last point:

- 4) The three aspects mentioned above can be grasped with a theoretical concept of narration and a *narrative approach*. The rediscovery of biographical research at the beginning of the 1970s was closely linked to the renewed debate on qualitative research methods and the interpretive paradigm. In this context, sociolinguistic perspectives were also widely discussed. In Germany, proponents of biographical research such as Fritz Schütze, Wolfram Fischer, Gabriele Rosenthal, Peter Alheit and others elaborated in this context concepts of narrative theory and developed methods for *narrative analysis* which were particularly attuned to autobiographical narration.¹² Whereas Thomas and Znaniecki had not enquired closely into the conditions, the situations, and the “textual” and social rules in which life stories were produced, these aspects now became central, and a constructivist understanding of the practice of narrating and the resulting “text” came strongly to the foreground.

Biographical narratives are by no means subjective copies or mere “records” of a person’s life history “as it really was”. Instead they are complex meaning constructions, which refer to experiences (which the subject has had or has made), but reshape these at every telling in the context of the current situation and of the operative social and cultural frameworks. In this the “logic” of the life story is not structured by the “objective” events and conditions, but by the individual biographical meaning structure.¹³

Nonetheless, the material for the construction of the life-narrative and the scope for interpretations of events and experiences is not arbitrary, but tied to the social and historical space of an actual “lived” life. This has been shown for example by the disparities between life narratives of men and women who were born in the first decades of the 20th century (cf. Dausien 1996; Engelhardt 1996). Despite all the differences in social class affiliation, in political, religious and social positions, these generations still reveal typical “patterns” of autobiographical narration which offer insight into gender differences in the biographical range of possible actions and interpretations. In younger generations this is no longer so clearly the case. Nonetheless, positioning within social gender relations also plays a role here. Its relevance does not, however, arise from a general (binary) social gender role system; instead, “gender” is “produced” by the narrating subjects themselves – in the context of their construction of the life-narrative’s meaning. The question, then, is not: how are social gender differences “documented” in individual biographies, but how do gendered subjects narrate “their” life stories and how do they thereby make reference to social constructions of gender?

That means, in short: biographical narrators have a – limited but not irrelevant – “power” to interpret gender norms, to change their meaning, and to alter them through their actions. We can ask, with Jerome Bruner (cf. 1987): do we narrate our lives, or do we live our narratives?

¹² The narrative interview developed by Schütze (cf. 1976, 1981, 1984; Dausien 1994), along with reconstructive methods of narrative analysis, proved suitable for making the meaning constructions of biographical subjects empirically accessible.

¹³ Peter Alheit also calls this productive logic “biographicity”, a term which has become particularly popular in educational science (cf. Alheit 1995; Alheit/Dausien 2002). Others speak about the accumulated “biographical knowledge” (cf. Alheit/Hoerning 1989).

The various analyses of life stories which biographical research has brought forth suggest that individuals, even in restrictive conditions, have a considerable potential to develop their own biographical meaning and thereby shape, and even “create”, reality. The more societies rely on this constructive effort on the part of their members, the more significant this “biographical work” becomes.

5 Closing remarks

Let us return to our initial diagnosis: currently observable structural changes in modern societies, which are described in terms such as individualization, flexibilization, precarization, globalization... etc., do not simply affect the biographies of individuals and their cultural interpretations. Rather, within these changing conditions, individuals form new biographical “self-relations” which in turn affect social patterns of action and interpretation. In abstract terms: biographies are not only socially constituted, they are also – as actually lived life narratives – resources, “media” and “formats” for the *construction* of society.

Having this in mind, it seems to me that existing contemporary diagnoses are often too quick to assume a connection between the numerous empirical indicators of social change on the one hand and the subjects’ biographies and ways of life on the other. Clearly, individuals react to the complexity and contradictions imposed on them by society with biographies and self-descriptions which seem more “fragmented” and “flexibilized” than the normative biographical models of previous generations (not their actual life courses!). However, in order to understand the complex processes which produce these effects, it is more relevant to ask how subjects, given the “external” breaks and fissures, nonetheless “narrate” a life story which preserves continuity and coherence. How, despite the breaks, differences, and changes in social contexts, do they manage to create some sort of “biographical meaning”?

It seems to me that the real drama of the currently observable social change lies in this increased effort of self-construction and self-reflection on the part of the subjects. When we know more, empirically and theoretically, about this effort by the subjects to construct narrative identities we will undoubtedly be closer to Thomas and Znaniecki’s original theoretical idea of understanding social change through biographical research. This step, however, is ambivalent. The progress in understanding the individuals’ biographical work also bears possibilities for social control mechanisms and technologies of the self which could be even far more powerful than those Thomas and Znaniecki had in mind. This problem indeed must be left for another discussion. Thank you for your attention and patience!

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失われた場を探して —ポスト工業化時代の日本における若者とライフコースの崩壊—

Lost in Transition: Young Men and Life Course Disruptions in Postindustrial Japan

メアリー・ブリントン Mary C. BRINTON

1990年代の「失われた十年」、もしくはそれ以後に成人期に達した世代は、彼らの親の時代とは全く異なる労働市場に直面してきた。正規で雇用保障のある職を確保することはますます得難い夢となり、多くの若者が仕事が見つからないまま、またはパート、臨時雇用の仕事にしかあり付けないう状態で学校を卒業している。不安定な雇用は男性、女性に同様の影響を与えており、他の社会的な影響も加わって、晩婚化や出産の高年齢化を招いている。

本報告は経済不況やリストラによって引き起こされた日本の若者の生活における崩壊に焦点を当てる。そして、パート、臨時雇用などの不安定な雇用形態の危険性を示しつつ、「失われた世代」が労働市場に参入した初期段階の雇用履歴と、彼らの父親世代の雇用履歴を比較する。また、1990年代後半に学業を終えた日本人の若者に対して行った詳細な聞き取り調査を利用する。この聞き取り調査の結果は日本の若者がどのような職業観を持っているのかを明らかにしている。とりわけ、彼らは不安定な労働状況を個人の落ち度と考える傾向があるのか、それとも経済や雇用構造における外的な変化によるものとする傾向があるのかを精査し、彼らが家庭を持つ段階に移行するのに必要な能力をどのように考えているのか明らかにしたい。

Japanese who reached adulthood in the “lost decade” of the 1990s or beyond have faced a very different labor market than their parents did. Securing a full-time job with employment security has become a much more elusive dream, and many young people graduate from school without a job or with only a part-time, temporary job. Insecure employment has affected young women and men alike, and together with other social forces has led to an increasing age at marriage and delayed childbearing.

This paper focuses on the disruptions in the lives of young Japanese men that have been caused by economic recession and employment restructuring. I compare the early employment trajectories of men in the “lost generation” with the early employment experiences of men in their fathers’ generation, showing the heightened risk of part-time, temporary, and other forms of insecure employment. I also draw on in-depth interviews with young Japanese men who finished schooling in the late 1990s. These interviews illuminate how young men are thinking about their work lives. In particular, I probe whether young Japanese men are tending to attribute their unstable work live to personal failings or to the external changes in the economy and employment structure, and I also probe how men are thinking about their capacity to enter the family formation stage of their lives.

Lost in Transition: Young Men and Life Course Disruptions in Postindustrial Japan

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2

Central questions for today's talk:

What are the social and economic forces that produced a "lost generation" in Japan (the cohort that came of age in the 1990s)?

How is Japan's lost generation of young people distinctive from the lost generation in other postindustrial societies?

Why is it important to pay particular attention, even as gender scholars, to how the lives of young Japanese *men* have changed?

3


Labor economists in the 1980s did not predict that young people would fare so badly in postindustrial economies in the early 21st century

- They predicted that rising educational levels (supply side) and rapidly aging populations would create greater demand for young people's labor (demand side)

→ Overall, a rosy prediction for young people's employment and wages

4

In Japan, a large increase in the 1990s in the rate of advancement to university




5

...and a very low birth rate→
a rapidly aging population, and the prediction of a future labor shortage

6

Change in Unemployment Rates for Men Age 15-24: Japan and Various OECD Countries



7

Comparison of Unemployment Rates for Younger and Older Men: OECD Average




8

Comparison of Unemployment Rates for Younger and Older Men: Japan



9

Change in the Percentage of Japanese Employees Engaged in Irregular Work



10

Early Employment Experiences of Japanese Men: Comparisons across Three Generations


	Postwar Generation		High Economic-Growth Generation		Lost Generation
Employment status in first job (%):					
Regular full-time employee	80.9	***	87.1	***	76.5
Temporary or part-time employee	5.0	*	7.2	***	16.0
Employee dispatched by agency or contract employee	.6		.4	***	3.4
Self-employed, freelance, or working in family business	13.6	***	5.3		4.1
Among employees only:					
Regular full-time employee	93.6		91.9	***	79.8
Temporary, part-time, dispatched, or contract worker	6.4		8.1	***	20.2

11

Japan experienced a "double hit" of severe economic recession beginning in the early 1990s and, at the same time, movement into being a mature postindustrial economy (expansion of the service sector, strongly bifurcated between "good" and "bad" jobs)

12

Changes in job applicant/job opening ratio for Japanese high school graduates



13

Labor market institutions characteristic of Japan's high economic-growth period from the 1960s to the 1980s:

- 1) "Permanent employment" for a segment of male workers (employment protection for "core" workers in large enterprises)
- 2) Strong school-work system, especially for the less-educated (high school graduates)

A focus on moving new graduates into full-time jobs in companies, where they could acquire on-the-job training and skill development

- 3) A labor market highly segmented by age: the most vibrant labor market was the one for new graduates; a separate market for mid-career hires was much more limited

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So...an intergenerational trade-off has developed in Japan's "lost decades"

→ There are large numbers of young people in unemployment, in part-time and insecure jobs, or in the state of being NEET (young people who are not in education, employment, or training).

→ But full-time employment for male middle-aged "core" workers has been largely preserved/protected by employers.

15

In sum:

The lost generation has been produced by fundamental institutional changes brought about by Japan's post-bubble economic recession and by employment restructuring

16

What are the implications for Japanese society?

An increase in income inequality in the young generation

Increasing disparity between the economic "haves" and "have-nots," based on whether young men are able to secure a stable job immediately after graduation

17

What are the implications for young people?

Increases in job mobility and in periods of non-employment

Lengthening of the transition to adulthood

Intergenerational misunderstandings and conflict

Loss of *ba* for young people in their 20s and 30s: psychological consequences for young *men* are arguably more severe than for young women

18

More and more young Japanese men are unable to fulfill the strong normatively-prescribed prerequisites of postwar Japanese male adulthood:

Entry into secure full-time employment after graduation

↓

Marriage

↓

"Responsible fatherhood" (male breadwinner model)

As a result, we have the current situation:

Anomie (loss of *ba*) for many young men

Japan as a "lowest-low" fertility society

19

What are some possible solutions?

A labor market in Japan that creates more "second chances" for both men and women

Greater focus in the educational system on teaching young people to be able to move across *ba* during their adult work lives

20



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高齢期のライフコース選択—職業能力と定年後の地域参加—

Vocational Capabilities and Community Involvement in Post-Retirement Life

前田信彦 Nobuhiko MAEDA

この研究では、高齢者の地域参加と彼らの現役時代に培われた職業能力との関連をライフコース・パースペクティブから検討する。

全国の定年退職者（サラリーマンとして働いていた 65 歳以上）の男性を対象としたデータ分析の結果、定年後のフォーマルな地域参加は、現役時代の職業能力の高さと強く関連していた。また現役時代に培った職業能力が高い高齢者ほど、定年後のインフォーマルなサポートの授与（利他的行為）が増大する傾向がみられた。この研究から得られた知見は次のようである。



第一に、シニア期の地域参加はそれまで培ってきた（現役時代の）職業能力に強く規定される点である。つまり高齢化する日本において、地域コミュニティの活性化は、企業の人材育成とも密接にかかわっているといえる。企業内キャリアで培われる能力が「会社」という空間を超えて、われわれの日本人の生活に色濃く反映している。日本においては「企業社会」と「高齢社会」という二つのキーワードは相互に深い関連があるといえよう。

第二に、定年後の生活は、高齢期の生活環境によってのみ規定されるのではなく、若年期から中年期までの職業人生の生活習慣や能力形成と深くかかわっている。この点で、高齢期の生活についてはライフコースの視点から明らかにする必要がある。

第三に、ジェンダーの視点から見ると、今後はリタイアしたシニアの女性の地域参加も増えることが予想される。男性を対象とした分析結果の傾向が女性にもあてはまると仮定するならば、正規雇用であった管理職経験のある女性労働者ほど、地域コミュニティでのリーダーシップ発揮の機会は増大すると推測される。この観点から見ても、これからの地域コミュニティは、女性の職業キャリアの形成や職業能力形成のありようと密接にかかわることになるだろう。

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要旨／Abstracts

This paper examines the relations between elderly people's community involvement and their vocational capabilities developed prior to retirement, from the perspective of life course.

Data analysis of retired people in Japan (former office workers aged 65 or over) shows a strong relationship between elderly people's active community involvement in the post-retirement life and their vocational capabilities developed prior to retirement. It was also found that the elderly with higher vocational capabilities developed prior to retirement tend to obtain more access to "informal support" (unselfish actions). From this study, three key findings were obtained.

First, the degree of senior citizen's community involvement is largely determined by their vocational capabilities developed prior to retirement. It means that in the graying Japanese society, human resource development by companies plays an important role in revitalizing the local community. People's capabilities developed through their careers at the companies they work for have significant influences on their everyday lives, beyond the boundaries of "companies." It can be said that in Japan, there are a lot of connections between two keywords: "corporate society" and "aged society."

Second, post-retirement life is not only determined by living environment at the later stage of life. It is also closely related to the lifestyle and capability developed during the working life phase from early years to middle-aged years. From this aspect, the issue of post-retirement life should be considered from the perspective of life course.

The last finding is that the local community is expected to see the involvement of more retired women. If the assumption is made that analysis results of research conducted on men can be applied to women, it can be said that women who retire from their career as regular workers in managerial positions tend to have more opportunities to play a leadership role in the local communities where they live. It follows from 'gender' perspective that we will see a close relationship between the future development of local community and women's career formation and vocational capability development.

ドイツ労働市場における変化とライフコースの非標準化 —職業生活における自己決定可能性の拡大？—

Changes in the German Labour Market and the De-standardization of Life Courses : Towards a Self-directed Working Life?

ビルギット・アーピチュ Birgit APITZSCH

失業率の上昇、労働市場の規制緩和、および非典型的な雇用形態の広がりといったドイツ労働市場における今日の変化は、国内に浸透している標準的な雇用関係に疑問を投げかけている。これらの変化により、終身雇用制や、これまで「職業訓練」「労働市場の流入」「失業」という明確な段階的な流れによって規定されていた働き方は変化を迫られている。また、これまでは被雇用者にあたって雇用者側の主張は団結交渉等により一定の制限があったが、この点も変化しつつある。



本報告では、労働と雇用の流動化が個人のライフコース、人生観 (biographical perspectives) にいかなる影響を与えるのかをより良い理解のために、ドイツの労働市場の中でも特に規制緩和の進んだメディア産業に焦点を当てる。そしてこの業界に新たに参入した労働者と、熟練労働者のこれまでの生き方や履歴に関するナラティブ (biographical narratives) を分析し、仕事等に関する人生観、理想、選好—とりわけ労働と雇用における「柔軟性対安定性」との関連で—が長い時間の中でどのように変化してきたのかを示す。さらに、流動化する労働市場に労働者が取り込まれる点を分析することで、労働、雇用、および労働市場参入の規制緩和は、変化しつつある市場の要求、同じく変化しつつある自身の理想や好みに対し、個人の自由裁量を大きくしているのかという問題を分析する。本報告は、労働および雇用の広範な規制緩和が、労働者の自立性の高まりにつながってはいないことを主張するものである。むしろ労働市場にはインフォーマルかつ極めて堅固な形で閉鎖性が見られるようになっており、雇用と失業、および労働と生活といった、個人の力が及ばない領域の間の境界が曖昧になりつつあることを指摘する。

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**Presentation „Changes in the German labor market and the de-standardization of life courses:
Towards a self-directed working life?“ (Speech manuscript)**

Introduction

Thank you very much for your invitation and this excellent opportunity to exchange and to learn about ongoing changes in life course regimes in Japan and Germany in comparison.

In my presentation I aim to shed light on recent changes in the labor market and life courses in Germany, and, in particular on the question of how the deregulation and flexibilization of work and employment shapes careers. In the following I will (1) give a brief overview on contemporary changes of the labor market and the life course in Germany. (2) I will take a closer and empirical look at an extreme case of deregulated employment in the German media which helps to understand the ramifications of labor market flexibilization. (2.1) I will briefly introduce the case and (2.2) present empirical results on flexible workers' life courses, their perception of risks and uncertainty, and life-course-related changes in their preferences. On this basis, I will argue that flexible labor markets which lack not only regulation of work and employment, but also professional control of the labor process and of the labor market access do not increase workers capacities to adapt to changing market demands and changing preferences.

1. Labor market transformations and changing life courses in Germany

In international comparison, the German labor market is viewed as strongly regulated. It is structured by a highly stable arrangement of industrial relations, training institutions, labor law and social insurance which allow for long-term, high-quality production strategies and which limit both inter-firm and inter-occupational mobility of workers (Streeck 1995; 1996). This arrangement has contributed to the institutionalization of the so-called standard employment relationship - life-long, dependent, full-time employment in one occupation and in the same firm, subject to social insurance and regulated by collective agreements and labor law (Bosch 2004). This arrangement also allowed for the institutionalization of a life course pattern which consists - at least for the majority of the male working population - of a tripartition into three clearly delineated, work-centered phases (training, labor market participation, retirement). For women, however, employment interruptions have always been more widespread. This institutionalized life course enabled for predictability of life time, income and employment and hence of individual planning also of non-work-related life course events (Kohli 1985; 2003; 2007).

However, in light of the labor market changes in the last decades in Germany, it becomes clearer that the institutionalized life course and the "normal biography" correspond to the historically specific circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s (Kohli 2007: 257f). Since then the German labor market and the specific institutional configuration that structured it underwent significant changes:

- Collective agreement coverage declined and collective bargaining underwent processes of decentralization (Lehndorff, Bosch, Haipeter, and Latniak 2009: 121f).

- In the course of labor market reforms of the early 2000s entitlement to unemployment benefits has been restricted to one year (Lehndorff, Bosch, Haipeter, and Latniak 2009: 122f).
- Spread of atypical forms of employment (part-time and marginal part-time, solo-self-employment, agency work, fixed-term contracts) ¹⁴
- Finally, unemployment grew from below 2% in the 1960s and early 1970s to 13% in 2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt and Bundesagentur für Arbeit in Mayer, Grunow, and Nitsche 2010: 381).

The degree to which these labor market changes become visible in the life course patterns is still highly disputed. A recent life course analysis of birth cohorts born between 1929 and 1971 suggests that there was no overall increase in occupational changes, but that younger cohorts changed their occupation more frequently after an interruption of employment (which is conceptualized as indirect and, supposedly, involuntary occupational mobility) (Grunow and Mayer 2007; Mayer, Grunow, and Nitsche 2010). Mayer and colleagues argue that while there was little evidence for an overall “de-standardization” of the life course regarding labor market participation, age variation of some life course events, such as leaving school and completing training, increased. Also, there is an increase of employment mobility over cohorts¹⁵ and a decrease of firm-internal careers and an increase of inter-firm mobility and unemployment, especially for lower educated employees and (Giesecke and Heisig 2010). Regarding household and family formation, over cohorts non-marital unions as well as divorces spread (Brückner and Mayer 2005).

Let alone the quantitative degree to which we can observe a destandardization of the life course and the erosion of the standard employment relationship, we still know little about individual consequences of labor market changes. Interpretations of recent changes vary between growing precariousness (Dörre 2005) and growing autonomy in biographical decisions (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1993). The latter assumption is also supported by current theorizing in the German sociology of work and studies on creative or post-fordist industries. There, much of the contemporary reasoning agrees in 1) that there is a current trend towards market-driven, flexible forms of work and employment, and 2) that this trend results in workers’ strategies of self-adjustment to changing market demands, in self control, self-marketing and the economization of life (Kratzer and Sauer 2003; Sauer 2002; Voß 1998), and an instrumentalization of networks (Eikhof, Haunschild, 2007, Faulkner, Anderson, 1987, Haunschild, Eikhof, 2009, Jones, 1996, 2002; see for a more theoretical elaboration of the argument Blair, 2009). Do these changes

¹⁴ In 2004, one third of all employees and half of employed women was employed atypically. The share of agency work and of the so-called Ich-AGs (subsidized forms of solo-self-employment) remained around 1% of the working population. The share of fixed-term contracts rose from 6.4% in 1991 to 8.1% in 2004. In the same period, part-time employees’ share of the whole working population grew from 14% to 23%, thereby representing the largest part of atypically employed. Following the labor market reforms in the early 2000s, the share of marginal part-time jobs (Minijobs) rose from 2.6 million to 6.7 million, and in 2005 14% of the working population held only a Minijob. Consequently, while in 1970 84% of all employed West Germans was employed full-time and with unlimited duration, in 1996 only 67% had a “normal” work contract (Kohli 2007: 263).

¹⁵ with an increase in the number of jobs held by men and women born in 1971 at the age of 27 and with an increase in the rate of job shifts for men born in 1971 which is explained with a rise in unemployment at that time (Brückner and Mayer 2005: 41)

lead to growing uncertainty and precariousness, or to more autonomy and a better fit to workers' preferences for flexibility?

2. Changing aspirations and structural constraints on biographical risk coping strategies in German media

2.1 The case & data

To address these questions, this paper studies an extremely flexible labor market segment. Employment in the German media industry deviates markedly from standard employment. Work is organized in projects. Employment is limited to project duration, thereby endangering the entitlement for unemployment benefits along with highly uncertain employment and career perspectives. Interest representation of workers – unions and professional associations – is rather weak and fragmented, collective agreements are rare and hardly enforced. Training on-the-job coexists with a variety of media-related training courses in higher education and vocational training, thereby making the skill supply highly heterogeneous. Another peculiarity is the separation of the role of employers and those who recruit: Production firms – who formally employ or commission services – delegate both the control of the labor process and the hiring decisions to the head of departments of a film crew. Recruitment is based almost solely on informal communication in personal networks. This is due to the absence of professional control and also to the importance of extra-functional criteria such as “liking each other” or humor for the cohesion of teams, and this specific ‘skill demand’ is also due to the interactivity of the work organization. These criteria can hardly be evaluated from outside a team and without personal knowledge.

I interviewed 33 project workers in the television and film industry (mainly camera crew members, along with video camera operators, and members of departments such as costume and set design, administration, cutting, and production company management) as well as 16 experts, such as representatives of professional associations, unions, and employers on the general labor market situation, the interest representation as well as organization and employment practices in the field.

2.2 Findings - From perfect match to disenchantment: Careers and biographical orientations in media

I will present the findings on careers and biographical preferences according to the life course phases labor market entry, maintaining employment and career, and labor market exit.

Labor market entry

Professional skills for the film industry are traditionally learned on the job. Media workers work their way up from assistant to leading positions. Even those who are trained at film school or in vocational training programs frequently continue working in film projects alongside. Thus, the boundary between training and labor market entry remains fuzzy.

Networks that are established during training on the job or in formal training programs matter

crucially for labor market access. However, graduates were hardly asked for credentials in recruitment processes. The first jobs were uniformly landed through recommendations or direct recruitment by former colleagues, supervisors, other students or teachers (who are often involved in film productions, too). In contrast, cold calls were not successful except for getting access to internships. The persistent importance of informal networks for getting access to employment seems to even discourage investment into formal training; many of the interviewees dropped out of training and worked in assistant positions.

At the first contact it was those peculiarities of the organization of work that stand in stark contrast to the standard employment relationship which seemed to be especially attractive:

- the involvement into the production of a unique, non-standard cultural product,
- the short-term, but intense cooperation of “like-minded” people,
- spatial flexibility,
- the limited duration of work and employment which was viewed as giving the possibility to follow intrinsic interests and to facilitate self-realization,
- the interactive nature of work and
- the absence of formal rules in the production process.

Especially appealing for labor market entrants was the intensity of project involvement which allowed for personal exchange and the development of friendlike relations to colleagues, as is illustrated by this quote:

“As I worked as a clapper loader [the lowest hierarchical position in the photography department; BA] for the first time I found it fascinating, these groups, this big family. How it was like, all those completely different people who you got to know quickly.” (Focus puller 25)

Maintaining employment and career

These friendlike relations, however, rest on informal selection processes. While resulting in well-attuned teams of “like-minded people”, relying on networks is a risky strategy:

- diffuse and particularistic criteria are by definition hardly transparent or calculable.
- networks cannot be instrumentalized too openly and too extensively without threatening their emotional basis—the use of social capital always has to be obscured (see Bourdieu 2001). Thus the support for gaining access to projects by recruitment or by the recommendations of former supervisors is neither guaranteed nor transparent.

Only at first sight, getting in contact with future employers and assistants is an unavoidable by-product of project work. Rather, in addition to meeting the aforementioned criteria, it requires efforts such as regularly visiting award ceremonies and local industry-related events, going out and hanging out together after work despite 10 to 15 hour-work days.

The following interview statement illustrates the importance of informal leisure activities with colleagues for employment prospects:

“And if they are people I like having a beer with at night, then I made the right

decision.“ (DoP 31)

Despite such irregular activities outside of work, vertical relations are stabilized mainly at work, because the flexibility and intensity of project inclusion does not allow for regular activities and meetings, even between projects.

The stability of teams leads to career structures that resemble vacancy chains. Therefore, career advancements depend heavily on the mobility of the respective supervisor.

In addition, work- and non-work-related activities and commitments are hard to balance because of the lack of predictability of working time and the intensity of project involvement: family, hobbies, further training, relationships with persons outside the film industry were hard to maintain:

“Everything that could distract you, be it friends, family, children, is counterproductive.”
(Focus puller 7)

The same constraints affect alternative strategies to secure income. One such strategy is the often-proposed option of "diversification" (Menger 1999; O'Mahony and Bechky 2006), i.e. working in different parts of the film and television industry, in different positions or occupations and departments. Another is to form weak ties (Granovetter 2002) or intensify contacts to other supervisors. Finally, investing in training to open up alternative employment opportunities could be regarded as a rational strategy in these flexible labor markets (Voß 2001a; Voß 2001b). Any interruptions to the regular cooperation – be it paternal leaves, vacation, training, or working somewhere else - endanger the existing recruitment networks. Supervisors start working with substitutes who might become regular collaborators and thus might crowd out those willing to return.

Labor market exit

The acceptance of these demands for commitment, life-style adjustments and flexibility vary with age and depending on the family situation of media workers: The short-term nature of employment was appreciated early in the career. In contrast, the uncertainty of employment and income as well as the demands for availability became more salient and were viewed as problematic by those with longer working experience.

This change in the perception of risks is illustrated in the following quote:

“Nothing was ever certain. This kind of life was great for me, as a single in a large city. It went quite well, I made five movies a year and I earned quite some money at that time, and I appreciated having a break in between. I had more leisure time than any permanent employee. I think you see the downsides only when you get older, having no security and no pension.” (focus puller 16)

In addition, also the viewing of project involvement as being part of a “big family” that was enthusiastically described by labor market entrants becomes more routine with more project experience. This disenchantment is expressed exemplarily by a camera assistant:

“During a production, I do not really commit myself to this, say, „substitute family“. [...] It was interesting in the past, but at some point, after the 20th movie, it is nothing special anymore to get close to each other for five or six weeks, and then to part.” (focus puller 22)

This interesting change in the perception and valuation of the flexibility of project work and of intensity of project involvement since labor market entry became apparent in the narratives of all interviewees with a longer working history.

However, exit from the specific labor market of the television and film industry is difficult due to the restricted transferability of formally – and, especially, informally – acquired skills and social capital. Still leaving the television and film industry was considered by most of the respondents. However, respondents with considerable work experience in the television and film industry who lacked formal vocational training and considered leaving the industry stayed there in the end or returned. They were particularly prone to interpret their working history and think about future prospects in terms of “accidents,” “luck,” and “destiny”. This is illustrated by one focus puller’s elaboration on the unpredictability of career and employment:

“Exit – this question has occupied me. [...]. I can’t imagine me becoming a locksmith or electrician; it has to be something related to media. I could imagine. But I don’t really know. I think this is a situation where you have to be alert to what is happening around you. And you have an idea. There is an opportunity. I believe in luck, you have to be in the right place at the right time.” (Focus puller 1)

Conclusion

I hope to have demonstrated that life course analysis - especially in flexible labor markets – has to take the interaction between labor market institutions, forms of control in the labor process as well as the development of social relations and preferences into account.

On the basis of my findings I would argue that preferences for flexibility appear highly specific to age and career stage.

This is especially important as voluntary commitment early in the career, together with structural constraints can result in a paradoxical phenomenon: total inclusion and vacancy chains in fluid structures - without compensating the demand of total commitment with any form of security.

30代・40代管理職女性のキャリアデザイン

Career Patterns of Female Managers in Their Thirties and Forties

牛尾奈緒美 Naomi USHIO

日本では、少子・高齢社会の到来による急速な労働力人口の減少、団塊世代の大量退職に伴う人材確保の必要性が高まり、これまで基幹的な労働力としてみなされることのなかった女性を組織の中核に取り込んでいくことが、企業の存続に向けて不可欠な選択であるとの認識が広まりつつある。また、内外の既存研究から、女性の活躍と企業業績の向上との関連性が示されたり、人材の多様性によって生み出される新たな価値創造の可能性が示唆されたりと、女性の活躍を促進することにより企業経営に何がしかのプラスがもたらされるという研究事例が着々と積み重ねられてきており、経営者の女性登用に対する考え方を変化させるひとつのきっかけとなってきた。とはいえ女性の参画レベルはなかなか改善されていない。そこで本発表は日本の女性就労の実態を紹介し、企業の女性管理職比率の低さとその原因を指摘する。そのうえで、30代、40代を中心とする管理職女性にインタビュー調査を行い、彼女らのキャリア形成過程を精査することにより、今後、働く女性の能力発揮を促進するための鍵を提示していく。なお、本調査対象者は組織の経営トップあるいは中間管理職以上の役職に昇進した女性に限定した。日本ではこれまで中間管理職以上の女性のみを対象とした研究はほとんど行われていないが、高いレベルの意思決定階層にまで昇進した女性の体験を通じて導き出される知見は、女性個人のキャリア形成のみならず、組織運営上も重要な指針を与えるものと確信する。個人と組織の win-win 関係を構築するためには、今、日本の組織に何が求められているのか。本研究は女性の管理職昇進は困難とされる日本企業に対して、何らかの処方箋を提示することを目指したい。



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要旨／Abstracts

The size of Japan's labour force is decreasing as its graying society persists and birth rates remain low. With the baby-boomer generation nearing retirement age, the need for stable human resources is on the increase, and key industries are increasingly acknowledging the important role of integrating female workers into their organization in order to ensure their perseverance. From existing research, it is apparent that there is a relation between the active participation of female workers and their corporate advancement, and that the diversity of talent and resources has the possibility of leading to the establishment of new values. Research such as the above highlighting the positive benefits of nurturing female participation at work are steadily increasing, and are also becoming a factor in the changing mentality towards the appointment of female managers. However, despite this the role of women in decision-making has yet to be changed. This presentation takes off on this note, and introduces the current status of female in the work-force today, and looks at the low rate of female managers and the possible reasons for this. Interviews with female managers in their thirties and forties were conducted, and a close examination of their career patterns will be provided. This will be followed by an exploration of the means of effectively promoting and nurturing the skills of female workers. The women interviewed in this study are all at the level of top management in their organizations, or have positions above the middle-management level. In Japan, research focusing on women in positions above middle-management is scarce. By examining the experience of women who have an active role in decision-making in companies one can not only gain an insight into their career patterns, but also the operational structure of organizations. In order to attain a win-win situation for both the individual and the organization, what paths are the organizations of Japan pursuing? With this in mind, this research seeks to look at how the promotion of female managers can aid ailing Japanese companies.

30代・40代管理職女性の キャリアデザイン

On "Career design" for
Female Managers in their 30's and 40's

牛尾奈緒美
Ushio Naomi



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- ・ ジェンダー・マネジメント(企業経営における人の問題をジェンダーの視点で考える)
- ・ 主な研究課題: 女性の就労やキャリア、企業内の女性の活躍を促進するアファーマティブ・アクションや ダイバーシティ・マネジメント、若年層の就業意識、大卒者や転職者の就職行動と就業意識
- ・ 公職: 内閣府「男女共同参画推進連携会議」有識者議員を務める

2010.10.22

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本日の発表内容

既存研究から

- ・ 日本の女性就労の現状
- ・ 継続就業を阻害する”仕事と私生活の両立”
- ・ 女性管理職が少ない理由

本調査から

- ・ 30代・40代管理職女性へのインタビュー調査を行い、キャリア形成のあり方を分析
- 考察: ★女性が管理職に昇進するために何が必要か
★女性の活躍を促進する企業の要件とは

2010.10.22

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
日本の女性雇用: 厳しい現状

- ・ 女性の就業率の低さ
- ・ 女性特有の就労形態(M字型就労)
- ・ 特に低い高学歴女性の労働力率(出産後の職場復帰の少なさ)
- ・ 女性の非正規雇用者比率の高さ(53.3%)
- ・ 賃金格差(100:69)
- ・ 極めて低い女性の管理職比率

2010.10.22

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M字型就労の国際比較




(備考) 1. 「労働力率」: 15歳以上人口に占める労働人口(就業済+完全失業者)の割合。
2. 各国の「15歳以上人口」は「15歳以上人口」。
3. 日本は総務省「労働力調査(詳細集計)」(平成21年)。その他の国は「LABORSTA」より作成。
4. 日本は平成21年(2009年)。韓国は平成19年(2007年)。その他の国は平成20年(2008年)時点の集計。

2010.10.22

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企業の管理職に占める女性割合



(備考) 厚生労働省「賃金構造基本統計調査」より作成。

2010.10.22

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世界のトップ200社における 女性取締役比率(フォーチュン誌)

国名	女性取締役比率
アメリカ	17.5%
イギリス	12.5%
ドイツ	10.3%
オランダ	8.6%
スイス	7.7%
フランス	7.2%
イタリア	1.8%
日本	0.7%

2010.10.22

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女性管理職比率が増加しない理由 (既存研究で指摘される問題点)

- ・ 女性に対する偏見、ステレオタイプ
- ・ 女性管理者は孤独で敵対的で支援が得にくい差別的状況に置かれている
- ・ 男性ばかりの均質的なメンバー間のほうが仕事はスムーズに運ぶ
- ・ 女性はキャリア計画が甘い
- ・ 女性管理者は組織内で取るべき態度・行動がわかっていない
- ・ 女性は仕事と私生活の両立が難しい

2010.10.22

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グラス・シーリングが生じる要因

1、内生的要因

女性自身の個人的要素、特性、
社会心理学的要因、ジェンダー要因、
個人的問題・ハンディー・キャップなど

2、外生的要因

女性を取り巻く職場環境や組織の構造的
問題、組織文化、家族状況など

2010.10.22

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内生的視点からの打開策 1

1、時間の確保

- ①昇進の候補者となるまでに必要となる 期
間(勤続年数)の確保・・・継続就業
- ②地位を勝ち取るために猛烈に仕事に打ち込
まなければならないという意味での 密度の
濃い就労時間の投入
- ・・・キャリア形成過程とライフ・コースとの折り
合いをつけながら、仕事への時間投入に緩
急をつける必要

2010.10.22

10

内生的視点からの打開策 2

2、能力の高さ

(頭脳・体力・精神力、勤勉さ、ストレス耐性、人間関係能力
、専門的知識、組織内での振舞い方に関する知識・サヴィ
ーなど)

- ①コンピテンシー(当該分野で活用可能な能力、
経験・知識)
- ②成果(実力を示すような実績・組織への貢献)
- ③人間関係能力(組織の内外、階層を超えた
関係構築、信頼感の獲得)

* 中間管理職層では①②* 経営トップ層は③が重要

内生的視点からの打開策 3

3、意欲の高さ

- ・女性は人生のプライオリティーの置き方が男性に比
べ多様。仕事へのモチベーションが相対的に低く、
昇進意欲も乏しい傾向がある？
- しかし、意欲の多寡と性差の関係は科学的根拠無
- * いずれにせよ昇進には意欲の高さが重要
- ・ただし、意欲の多寡は個人の素質や性別によって
のみ規定されるものではなく、外部環境のあり方によ
り影響される面も大きい

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外生的視点からの打開策

* 女性の継続就業を促進する組織・職場環境

- 1、女性の能力発揮に肯定的な企業風土・慣行、男女
平等の人事制度、将来のキャリア上の発展が望め
る環境:「均等処遇」の確立
- 2、出産・育児・介護など、家庭責任との両立を支援す
る制度や体制が整っていること。
:「ワーク・ライフ・バランス」への配慮

* 就業継続を後押しする家庭環境

親との同居、夫の意識、夫の転勤、子の有無、子
の年齢などの要因から影響を受ける可能性。

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研究のフレームワーク

$$\text{女性の昇進} = f(\text{外生要因} \times \text{内生要因})$$

(意欲 × 能力 × 時間)

(外生要因: f=職場・組織の環境や個人の生活環境
に関する要因)

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女性管理職へのインタビュー調査

<研究の目的>

- ・大組織で働く女性が管理職への昇進を果た
し、キャリア上の発展を可能にするためには
何が必要なのかを究明する。
- ・グラス・シーリングの解消に有効とされる
要因を内生面と外生面から検討する
 - 1) 女性自身がすべきこと
 - 2) 組織に求められること

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研究の方法と対象

- ・民間企業で中間管理職ないし役員、社長職に就く
25名の日本人女性に対する半構造化面接
 - * 17名は在日、8名は在米企業に勤務
- ・30代中盤から40代中心(2名は50代)
- ・7割は外資系企業。産業別では、金融、情報、マスコミ
などサービス業が主体。
- ・既婚者15名、独身者10名
- ・子供のいるものは12名(うち3名は独身)
- ・転職経験者は23名
- ・調査時期は2005年から2008年

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調査対象者の属性

対象者番号	年齢	性別	職歴年数	職種	勤務地	勤務年数	学歴
J 1	40代	既婚	0	主婦(専業主婦)	会社	20年	MA (2コ)
J 2	50代	既婚	0	サービス(外資)	会社	10年	MA (2コ)
J 3	40代	既婚	0	通商	会社	10年	
J 4	40代	既婚	1	メーカー(外資)	役員	6年	HBA
J 5	50代	既婚	2	マスコミ	役員	24年	
J 6	40代	既婚	1	サービス(外資)	役員	19年	HBA
J 7	40代	既婚	1	金融(外資)	役員	16年	HBA
J 8	40代	既婚	1	金融(外資)	役員	2年	
J 9	40代	既婚	0	マスコミ(外資)	役員	3年	MA
J 10	40代	既婚	0	金融(外資)	役員	15年	HBA
J 11	40代	既婚	0	サービス	役員	2年	
J 12	40代	既婚	0	マスコミ	役員	17年	
J 13	40代	既婚	2	マスコミ	役員	26年	MA
J 14	40代	既婚	0	マスコミ	役員	26年	
J 15	30代	既婚	2	金融(外資)	役員	3年	
J 16	30代	既婚	1	金融(外資)	役員	5年	
J 17	40代	既婚	2	マスコミ	役員	5年	
A 1	30代	既婚	0	金融(外資)	COO	1年	HBA
A 2	40代	既婚	2	金融(外資)	役員	1年	HBA
A 3	30代	既婚	0	金融(外資)	役員	4年	HBA
A 4	30代	既婚	0	金融(外資)	役員	5年	MA
A 5	30代	既婚	0	サービス(外資)	役員	2年	MA (2コ)
A 6	30代	既婚	0	サービス(外資)	役員	5年	MA (2コ)
A 7	40代	既婚	1	マスコミ(外資)	役員	7年	HBA
A 8	40代	既婚	1	サービス(外資)	役員	1年	

注) Jは勤務地が日本(東京)、Aはアメリカ(ニューヨーク)が勤務地である。
学歴の空欄は大学(うち1名は短大)卒業を表す。

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時間 I

＜勤続年数＞

- ①一つの企業で10年から15年以上の職務経験を積み重ね昇進したもの: 76%
- ②2年から7年の期間で転職しつつキャリア・アップを果たしたもの: 24%

* 配偶者or自身の転勤(居)は離職原因にはならず
...お互いのキャリアを尊重しあい、その結果別居になったとしても仕方がないという考え方

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時間 2

＜仕事への時間投入＞

- 対象者全員が管理職に到達する前後に、猛烈に働く時期を経験していた。
- 年齢的には20代後半から30代前半にかけて
「昇進を勝ち取るには、誰もが一度は奴隷の時期を乗り越えなければなりません。あまりに辛すぎてやめてしまう人もいますが、とにかく上にあがるのは並大抵なことではないんですよ。(J15)」
「今は役員として重い責任を負っていますが、今までで一番働いた時期といえば、やはりM&Aのチームで奔走していた頃(25歳くらい)でしたね。本当に毎日が大変で、朝から夜中の2時、3時まで働いて、今思えば、あの頃はほとんど寝ていなかったですねえ。(J6)」

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時間 3

＜仕事と私生活の両立＞

- 20代後半から30代前半にかけて猛烈な仕事ぶり
⇒M字の谷と合致
- 難しい時期にあっても、離職やマミートラックへの転向を選ばなかった。彼女らの対応策は、
①独身でいる: 32%
②結婚するが出産は見送る: 20%
③あらゆる手段を駆使し育児を両立: 44%
④両立しやすい会社へ転職: 4%

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子育て女性にみる仕事と育児の両立法

- 実家の両親の援助
- 配偶者やその両親が協力して分担
- 同業の外国人配偶者からの物心両面の支援
- 高収入であることを背景に外部の育児サービスを最大限に利用
- * 会社との交渉力: 社内で一目置かれる存在
+ 自らの働く時間に裁量権をもつ立場を確保
- * 出産時期の選定もキャリアの進捗状況で判断

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能力 I

- ＜洞察力＞最適な職場と配偶者を見抜く力
- キャリア発展に最適な職場を選ぶ。場の選択力
- 能力が最大限に生かされ正当に評価される場所
- 所属組織内でのキャリアの行く末を予見し成否を判断
- 理想の職場は、自らの力が存分に試され、性差など属性による差別がなく、心から尊敬できる優秀な人材が集まる場所(ex)カースト制のような身分制度のある組織だと出世するのに余分な努力と運が必要。非効率)
- 私生活上の洞察力として、妻のキャリア形成に対して肯定的で物心両面の支援を惜しまない夫を選ぶ。

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能力 2

＜専門的知識＞

- 専門的知識や資格の取得に積極的
- 取得した知識を仕事上の成果や独自のコンピテンシーに結び付けていく力
- 高学歴を得るだけの知能、旺盛な向学心
- 本来の業務に必要な不可欠なため仕方なく学ぶのではなく、自ら積極的に学びたい分野を開拓し、休職を願い出ても、教育の機会を得ようとするもの
Ex)出産後に1年間育児休暇を取得するにあたって、上司の特別な計らいによりその期間中、大学の客員助教授を務めることを承認された。○ 2010.10.22

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能力 3

＜人間関係能力＞

- 対顧客、上司、職場仲間、あらゆる次元で良好な人間関係
- コミュニケーション能力と人間的魅力(感じがよく、奢らず、礼儀正しく、自信に満ちた態度)
- 信頼関係の構築のためには、勤勉、責任感、着実な成果、根気強さ
- メンターとの出会いから組織内のサヴィーを学ぶ
Ex)「本気で育ててくれる上司に出会えた」
「単に教えていただくのではなく自分もメンターが欲するものを提供できる存在になる事で信頼関係が続く」

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能力 4

- <精神的・肉体的耐久力>
- 大きな精神的・肉体的負担を伴う重責と多忙さ。
- 月に二回の欧米出張。出張から帰って来たらその足でビジネスディナー、翌朝は6時起床でお弁当を作り、子供を送り出した後、通常勤務。
- 人が働かない時間まで働いて顧客からの信頼を勝ち取らなければならない毎日。仕事以外は全て子育てに費やし、自分の楽しみの時間は全くありませんでした。
- 毎年、人事評価の時期が近づくと、不安で不安で悪夢に魘されてしまうことも。
- いかにせん仕事が厳しすぎて、私は奴隷なの？

意欲

- 出世欲、金銭欲、支配欲、権力欲に基づくのではなく、自己実現欲求の充足に重きを置いた向上心の高さ。
- 能力の開花・成長欲求、他者への貢献により称賛をうける喜び・有能感・充実感が主たる要因。
- 役員レベルの昇進者からは、女性が上位の地位を勝ち取るためには、「決して負けない」という強い意志や、着実に成果を出し続けることへのこだわりが重要。
- 社長昇進者：想定外。ただ顧客を喜ばせたい自分の仕事で120%の成果をあげ、周りの人や会社に利益を齎したという一念で懸命に働いた。社内での名声が首脳陣の目にとまり昇進。日頃から経営者の視線を意識し自分の仕事・役割を全社的視点で問う姿勢が重要。

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女性が大組織で昇進する秘訣

- 120%の成果で社内で一目置かれる存在になる
- 仕事への集中的時間投入が可能な時期(若年期、健康期、独身時など)に最大限の努力を傾け頭角を現す。
- 独自能力(特技、専門的知識、人脈)を生かした象徴的な業績・成果を残すよう心がける
- 組織のキーマンや上層部との人間関係の構築に努める
- 組織の内外に信頼できる複数のメンターをもつ
- 日頃の仕事振りで組織・仲間から信頼を得て協力関係
- 変化を恐れず、組織のニーズに合わせた自己変革
- 苦境にあっても屈せず、明るく前向きな態度。
- 長い目でキャリア構築。大きなビジョンをもつ

女性の活躍を促進する組織(1)

- 働きやすい職場づくりで離職を防ぐ
- ワーク・ライフ・バランスを考えた制度・施策
- 長時間労働を評価の軸とする慣習を排除
- 個人個人の生活状況に合った働き方を随時提供できる柔軟な体制(e-work、短時間勤務などの利用がマイナス評価にならない)

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女性の活躍を促進する組織(2)

- 女性が意欲を持って仕事に臨める職場
- やりがいのある仕事、挑戦の機会、昇進可能性、能力の伸長、成長可能性
- 真の機会均等の実現で女性管理職の増大を
- 男女平等の考えを徹底させるよう組織内の意識改革
- 評価基準の明確化と透明性
- 特に部長以上の上層管理職への昇進構造は不透明。
- 同質的な男性ネットワーク内での候補者選定を見直し公正な昇進プロセスの構築を
- 何よりトップの明確な意思表示とコミットメント重要

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ご清聴
ありがとうございました。

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『東京ラブストーリー』の20年後 —「キャリア女性」のイメージは変化したか?—

The Television Drama Tokyo Love Story 20 Years Later: Have Images of Career Women Changed?

アリサ・フリードマン Alisa FREEDMAN

日本のゴールデンタイムのテレビドラマでは、1990年代初頭に今日の形態で放送されるようになって以来、「働く女性」が常に描かれてきた。こうしたドラマ番組は視聴者に現実の問題を教え、また女性に関するメディア言説を劇的に表現している。これまでに様々なタイプの働く女性が登場してきたが、彼女達を描くストーリーはどれも人々の基盤である家庭を支えること、結婚し、母親になることを女性の主要な目的として奨励している。それと同時に、職業と家庭により多くの選択肢を持つ世代は増加しており、この世代の女性はテレビの中に他の視聴者とは違う理想像を求め始めたのである。



過去二十年を振り返り、この世代に影響を与えた働く女性像の起源を理解するため、筆者は1990年代初頭のテレビドラマを鑑賞した。当時、最も人気があったドラマ・シリーズは恋愛と仕事を求めて上京する（もっとも後者は前者を達成するための手段であったが）、聡明で自立した女性を軸としていた。その好例が『東京ラブストーリー』（1991年）で、これは日本で最も良く知られたドラマであり、また初めて海外でもファンを獲得した作品でもある。同シリーズは視聴者が期待する女性像に合致しており、新しい観点から女性を描いたものであったが、このドラマは自らのキャリアを優先させる女性は性的にリベラルで、妻や母親には向かないとのイメージを助長させた。なぜテレビドラマは依然としてこうした見解を覆そうとしないのであろうか。過去20年のテレビ放送の中で、何がこういったイメージを変えさせなかったものであろうか。このことは働く女性に対する一般的な態度について何を意味しているのか、そして女性は自分の人生の選択をどのように認識しているのであろうか。『東京ラブストーリー』は日本におけるジェンダー平等を考察するための一手段を提供してくれる。

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“The Television Drama *Tokyo Love Story* 20 Years Later: Have Images of Career Women Changed?”

Since their development in their current format in the early 1990s, primetime television dramas – known commonly as “*dorama*” – have featured workingwomen. Even police procedurals, medical dramas, and serials based on “*shôjo manga*” (graphic novels for girls) depict women working outside the home. The *dorama* most watched by Japanese audiences older than age twenty-five and those that continue to attract global fans present daily lives of young, independent women working in Tokyo. The protagonists of *dorama* enact fantasies about female professionals while depicting real issues facing the larger generations they represent. Viewers may not want to be these characters, but they can see aspects of themselves in them.

While various categories of workingwomen have emerged, the narratives through which they have been portrayed all support the notion of the family as the nations’ backbone and promote marriage and motherhood as women’s main goals. By examining popular *dorama* and the media discourses around them, we can better understand public attitudes about workingwomen and how women perceive their life choices. Because television attracts large audiences at home and abroad, it is a good way to view social values and to access national images. *Dorama* are means to dispel stereotypes of Japanese women as merely oppressed housewives and to show the breadth of cultural depictions of middle-class workers.

Today I will present a broad overview of workingwomen on Japanese dramas. My talk is an annotated outline, raising topics for future discussion. First, I will provide historical context. Then I will survey commonalities in fictional workingwomen, especially between 1990 and today. What has not changed is as illuminating as what has: both reflect the real situation of women in the workplace and family. Lastly, I will discuss *Tokyo Love Story* (*Tokyo rabu sutori*, 1991), one of the best-known *dorama* and first to attract global fans. By watching this series with twenty years of hindsight, we can see the genesis of workingwomen characters. *Tokyo Love Story* was popular because of its protagonist, Akana Rika (played by Suzuki Honami), who succeeds at work and fails in love. Whether intentional or not, Rika furthered beliefs that women who prioritize their careers are sexual liberal and cannot be wives and mothers. The ending of the series is telling in this regard. My talk is part of a new book. Your feedback is appreciated.

Since the start of regular television broadcasting on all five networks in 1959, Japanese dramas have idealized the stability of the home. They presented in a good light characters who maintain ideals of family. Japan’s first television drama, aired on NHK in 1940, established two tropes of later series – the dominant mother figure and depiction of meals to show a family’s social status and emotional health.

Three kinds of serials – home dramas (*homu dorama*), morning television novels (nicknamed “*asadora*”), and *taiga* historical dramas – developed in the early years of television broadcasting and perpetuated gender norms for women. Especially popular during the 1950s and 1960s, home dramas show the daily lives of good people from the lower classes but did not mirror reality as lived. For example, several dramas portrayed large families centered around a patriarch during the Tokyo construction boom leading up to the 1964 Olympics, a time when many youth were moving on their own to cities and the number of nuclear families living in apartments was increasing. The broadcasting period was lengthened from thirty minutes to an hour; extended families provided more plotlines. Home dramas showed strong, usually widowed, mothers, who cared for the family’s business, mostly restaurants or bathhouses, in addition to their homes. At a

time when middle-class families could afford more than one television set, especially in the bubble economy days of the 1980s, characters with whom the different family members could identify were created.

Since 1961, NHK morning dramas have focused on young women from undistinguished backgrounds who come of age by overcoming hardships, including those caused by poverty, war, and urbanization. Set in either the historical past or the present moment, the struggles of the heroine often parallel those of the nation. These dramas also exemplify the “*gambaru*” ethic that hard work will always be rewarded that propels Japanese society. Most of the heroines train for traditional service professions or to master classical Japanese arts. No recent *asadora* has depicted a university-educated career woman in contemporary Japan. The only one to center on a female doctor was *Ohanahan* (1966) set the Meiji period.

Yearlong *taiga* historical dramas, airing since 1964, are fictionalized biographies of men who helped Japanese growth before the twentieth century. These men are supported by women. This is evident in *Princess Atsu* (*Atsuhime*), the most popular television series of 2008, about women of the Tokugawa Shogunate and “worked” through their involvement in politics.

Primetime commercial dramas dropped in popularity in the mid-1970s; ratings fell to an all-time low of 2.7% in 1982. Based on successful earlier dramas about youth in the city, commercial networks developed so-called “trendy dramas” (*torendi dorama*) in the late 1980s. Trendy dramas depicted intricate webs of lateral relationships of love and friendship rather than hierarchical family relationships. The emphasis was on fashionable lifestyles believed possible in Tokyo. After a few 1990 and 1991 flops, producers, including Fuji network’s Ôta Tôru who created *Tokyo Love Story*, revised the genre to focus more on love than consumer culture. The resulting formula has remained generally unchanged.

Dorama air for around eleven episodes on nighttime slots that carry certain connotations. *Tokyo Love Story* helped associate Monday 9:00 on Fuji (or “*gekku*”) with love stories. Especially in recent years, dramas that depict women’s problems at work air on NTV on Thursday at 10:00. *Dorama* all have theme songs that climb the pop charts. Their ties to tourism, book publishing, and film exemplify the dominant marketing strategy of cross-media promotion. Most are set in Tokyo; characters have a favorite restaurant where they have heart-to-heart talks with friends. Tokyo’s impact upon the characters’ mindsets is evident in the titles and the establishing shots, which often feature urban panorama. *Dorama* are successful because of the star power of their casts, who are usually hired before scripts are written. This is a reason why actresses tend to be typecast in similar roles. For example, Suzuki Honami, Amami Yuki, Shinohara Ryoko, Kanno Miho, and Mizuki Arisa have played strong workingwomen. To the best of my knowledge, all female leads have been heterosexual Japanese citizens, showing how mainstream television producers have chosen to depict Japan’s population. Made for domestic audiences, *dorama* have been popular in neighboring Asian countries. They have inspired and have been influenced by similar programs in Taiwan and Korea. More than entertainment, *dorama* educate viewers about social issues and shape global images of Japanese women.

Importantly, the development of *dorama* has paralleled the growth of a generation, now around age forty, with more opportunities in education, employment, and the family than women had before. Especially those working fulltime face unprecedented problems, such maintaining a “life-work balance” and caring for elderly parents with little support outside the family, issues discussed in this conference. These women came of age during high economic growth of the 1970s and entered the workforce shortly after the passage of the 1985 Equal Opportunity Law. While

praised for setting standards in work, this generation has been scorned for having fewer babies. Having no living precedents, women around forty have found television to be a centralizing force, in ways different from younger generations who are more accustomed to watching television alone online. They, along with their counterparts in Taiwan and Korea, have bonded in conversations about *dorama*, just as women worldwide have over *Sex and the City*.

The evolution of *dorama* over the past twenty years has reflected media discourses on workingwomen of this generation in particular. Characters working in businesses comment on women's negative stereotypes and adverse treatment and reveal unexpected positive ways women have supported corporate structures underpinning the Japanese economy. To give a few examples – “OL” or “office lady secretaries” characters of such series as *Shomuni* (1988, 2000, 2002) enacted plots of revenge to satirize workplace hierarchies and to lightheartedly expose darker sides of companies during economic recession. The spate of dramas that pit established anchorwomen against younger rivals portray regrets of prioritizing careers over family and friendship. This is evident in *Newswoman* (*News no onna*, 1998) and *Top Caster* (2006). Especially since the 1950s, flight attendants have been promoted as model workers and ideal marriage partners. In dramas, they are shown to gain self-worth through helping others and by maintaining attractive appearances. This notion romanticized in *Stewardess Story* (*Stewardess monogatari*, 1983) and parodied in *Perfect Woman* (*Yamato nadeshiko*, 2000) and *Attention Please* (2006). The proliferation of renegade female detectives working on their own or leading a force of women or male misfits, as exemplified in *Unfair* (2006) and *Boss* (2009), give women a powerful role outside the company but show how they are less respected and more poorly compensated than their male colleagues. In many cases, these women do not fit into usual corporate models and chose their jobs because of failures in love.

Especially after 2005, there has been a proliferation of romantic leads who pursue success in both their high-level careers and personal lives. Before, most female professionals were cast in supporting roles or as main characters forced to choose between career and romance. Although these recent heroines embody progressive transformations in corporate structures, educational institutions, and attitudes toward workingwomen, their appearance during national concern over low fertility rates does not subvert the belief that women should prioritize becoming wives and mothers. Characters, particularly those in *The Man Who Cannot Marry* (*Kekkon dekinai otoko*, 2007) and *Around 40* (2008), react to media discourses that make single women turning forty seem a social problem. The protagonist of *Woman Workaholic* (*Hatarakiman*, 2007) fosters ties with colleagues, who replace the family she cannot have. These recent *dorama*, airing during economic restructuring, encourage women to love their careers. Unlike earlier characters, these professionals are integral parts of their companies. Still, they are not corporate leaders and instead hold jobs with elements of freelance or which are associated with creativity.

Recently, *dorama* react to the breakdown of the lifetime employment system by showing new kinds of workers, such as “*haken*,” or “*temps*.” More women have been able to enter corporations as *haken*, while men have been forced into part-time tracks once reserved for women. An example is *Dignity of the Temp* (*Haken no hinkaku*, 2007) about a “*haken*” with superpowers, created after a 2006 government report revealed that Japan's proportion of temporary to fulltime employees had doubled in eight years. While the fictional series presents real problems, it does not offer solutions but advocates coping with the status quo. It teaches that work gives women's lives meaning and that they must unite with their coworkers to ensure corporate Japan's survival. Female temps gain acceptance, but they are still seen as fungible.

I have noticed other similarities among female characters who prioritize careers. For

example, they are paired with younger female characters who are less devoted to work and seek their advice. Their love interests are younger men, whose careers they foster. These men, in turn, teach them that there is more to life than work. Marriage always these women's end goal, but it not often reached. These are all true in *Tokyo Love Story*.

Tokyo Love Story aired from January to March 1991 and was watched by a respectable average of 23% of the national audience. (The most popular program that year was *101st Proposal* (36.7% viewer average).) Arguably, the fame of *Tokyo Love Story* increased in Japan after it spread to other parts of Asia.¹⁶ On Valentines Day 1993, a special – a *dorama* convention that reviews the plot through flashbacks and shows what has happened to the characters – was watched by 30% of Japan's viewers, showing how influential *Tokyo Love Story* had become.

Tokyo Love Story had many firsts for Japanese television. It was one of the first adult programs adopted from manga, at a time when the global fad for Japanese manga was beginning. Created by Saimon Fumi (1957-), the manga was serialized from 1988 in *Big Comic Spirits* (*Biggu komikku supirititsu*), a weekly magazine targeting men in their twenties. It was published as a four-volume book in 1990, which sold more than 2.5 million copies. *Dorama* based on Saimon Fumi's manga became a staple of Fuji television. Her first was *Classmates* (*Dokyûsei*, 1989). Later series included *Women's Company* (*Ohigoto desu*, Fuji, 1998, 19.5 % peak rating).

Tokyo Love Story was one of the first dramas to portray characters who came to Tokyo and were not raised there. In a way, the series put a new spin on the literary narrative, dating back to the Meiji period, of youth moving to the capital for their emotional coming-of-age and financial futures. In *dorama* that followed, women moved to Tokyo seeking love and work, the latter a means to the former. The series tagline was "In Tokyo, everyone becomes the star of a love story." (*Tokyo de wa dare mo rabu sutori no shujinko ni naru*). This notion was reinforced by Oda Kazumasa's theme song "A Love Story Comes Suddenly" (*Rabu sutori no totsuzen ni*), which sold more than 2,580,000 copies and still ranks as the eighth bestselling single in Japanese music history. (The theme song sequence, a convention of *dorama* and a means to convey the characters' thoughts, presents Tokyo at work and play and then fashionable technology, including Toyota sports cars, a major sponsor.) Several scenes displayed Tokyo under construction at a time when the real estate bubble was bursting. Rika gazes at the city when she needs to think. Her important conversations with Kanji occur on roofs of buildings or in parks.

The plot follows one year in the romantic relationships of three women and two men, a formula adopted in later series. *Tokyo Love Story* grabbed media and viewer attention because of the main character Rika. Through camerawork, especially close-ups of her face, Rika is made the focus of viewers' empathy. Rika, who grew up in Los Angeles, is an important employee of the First Sales Division of Heart Sports. The story begins as she greets her new junior colleague, Nagao Kanji (played by Oda Yuji), at Haneda Airport. "Kanchi," as Rika nicknames him, has moved from Ehime and feels unsure of his Tokyo future. From the start, Rika advises him in matters of love and work. Although she is having an affair with her married section head Waga, Rika soon falls for Kanji, who still has feelings for his former classmate Sekiguchi Satomi (Arimori Narimi), now a nursery school teacher. Satomi first chooses Kanji's classmate and rival Mikami Ken'ichi (Eguchi Yosuke), a medical student who is more concerned with seducing women than going to class. Ken'ichi soon becomes enamored with his classmate Nagasaki Naoko (Sendo Akiho), who is engaged to a man chosen by her parents. Through coincidences possible only on *dorama*, the

¹⁶The 1992 Korean program *Jealousy* (40.1% viewer average) was rumored to have taken its premise from *Tokyo Love Story*, an accusation denied by producer Seung-Ryul Lee (Dong-Hoo Lee: 267).

characters become friends and seek each other's love advice in their apartments, a shot bar, and a favorite restaurant. Kanji and his classmates turn from twenty-three to twenty-four; Rika's age is undisclosed, but it is implied that she is older. (I cannot help thinking of parallels with Sôseki's *Sanshirô*. Career women of later series were also older than their love interests, as seen in *Around 40* and *Ohitorisama*.) Much of the story revolves around Kanji's decision of whom to love and marry – Rika or Satomi. There are many differences with the manga, which is told from Kanji's perspective. Rika, mostly drawn angry at or trying to seduce Kanji, is a less sympathetic character. Having grown up in "African wilds," she cannot adjust to Tokyo manners. She and Kanji work at an eight-person advertising firm, owned by Waga. Kanji and Satomi become a couple while Rika is studying abroad in the United States.

Previous romantic leads were like Satomi. Their rivals were like Rika. Producer Ôta decided to do the reverse in *Tokyo Love Story*. He instead made the two women a pair of opposites (as is true of Kanji and Ken'ichi), a notion reinforced through parallel scenes. Rika becomes more independent, as Satomi hesitates to make her own decisions and asks Rika and Kanji for advice. Both women initiate relationships with Kanji, who was cast in the role, usually given to female characters, of having to choose between suitors. Rika seduces Kanji after he sees Satomi kissing Ken'ichi. Her scandalous proposition – "Let's have sex." (*Ne, Kanchi, sex o shiyo.*) – made media headlines. (*Tokyo Love Story* has more sex than dramas do today. Nothing racier than kisses are shown, but the characters sleep and live with each other. Rika is drawn topless in the manga, while Satomi is fully covered.)

Tokyo Love Story launched a fad for "junai," or "pure love," stories in which all characters try to find true love, a goal that proves unobtainable to at least one of them. Ôta's aim was to entice viewers by making them cry for Rika. Aomori Narimi, who played Satomi, received threatening letters from viewers. Ôta remarked that many dramas between 1991 and 1996, included characters like "Kanji the indecisive guy, Satomi, the hateful woman, and Rika, the poor adorable woman" (Ôta 2002: 74 and Ito 2002: 29-30). The concept also appeared in such bestselling novels as Murakami Haruki's 1987 *Norwegian Wood* (*Noruei no mori*).

Like other female leads, Rika meets her love interest through work, and much of the *dorama* is shot at Heart Sports. (Heart Sports appears in later *dorama* starring Oda Yuji, including *Last Christmas* and *Loss Time Life*.) Rika balanced viewer expectations for female characters consumed with love but depicted them in a new light – as more competent at work than men. Rika is the one everyone at Heart Sports turns to in times of crisis. She works overtime alone and fixes Kanji's mistakes. She goes on business trips, while Kanji remains in the Tokyo office. No men challenge her authority. Customers request her. Kanji, however, suspects that she was able to secure a sales contract for him because she slept with the business owner. Yet the story focuses more on how a man becomes a high-level salaryman in a prospering company. As I will explain, Rika quits the company, but Kanji becomes an integral member.

The key to understanding workingwomen is in ending (watched by 32.3% of the national audience), which went against precedent and was not happy for female lead in terms of love. In the manga, Rika becomes pregnant with Waga's baby. At Kanji's urging, she marries Waga, who leaves his family for her. Kanji celebrates by lighting fireworks with Satomi. All of the five main characters of the story marry, which tames Ken'ichi as well as Rika. Rika is the only one who does not marry the person she loves. Years later, Rika and Kanji meet again by chance in front of the hospital where Satomi has just given birth to Kanji's son. Rika has changed: now a wife and a mother of a son, she is demure and nurturing. On the last page, Kanji speaks directly to the reader,

explaining that Rika has finally become a “Tokyoite.”

In the drama, Rika, sensing Kanji has chosen Satomi, accepts a transfer to the Los Angeles branch, making it easier for him to marry woman who it is implied will be a fulltime wife and mother. Rika feels she belongs more in the United States, where she believes people are as cheerful and frank as she is. Women who chose work over love in 1990s *dorama* were often transferred to the United States. The ability to speak English has been a shorthand way to indicate sophistication on Japanese television since around the 1980s, but this plot device also shows that the kind of women they represent was not an accepted norm or would face difficulties in Japan. Rika, however, wavers in her decision, not wanting to leave Kanji. She asks him to convince her not to go. Kanji refuses, telling her that he does not want to impede her career. (Satomi deters Kanji from meeting Rika to discuss his future with her.)

Living in Tokyo provides opportunities for freedom in love and marriage on most *dorama*, but the romantic couples usually leave the city during the key turning point that determines the fate of their relationship. Rika takes an emergency vacation from work and goes to Ehime to carve her name next to Kanji’s on the storehouse at his elementary school. Kanji joins her, and the two enjoy a nostalgic tour of important places from his youth. Rika intentionally returns to Tokyo on a train earlier than the one she told Kanji she would take with him. (She writes good-bye on a handkerchief and ties it to the station fence, a gesture later mimicked by fans. After giving Pretz (Glico product placement throughout the series) to a child, showing motherly nature, Rika sobs on the train, the sunset over the Inland Sea shown in the window behind her. This is the only time she cries.)

In a coda to the last episode, a common post-trendy drama convention, three years have passed. Waga compliments him, saying he is finally ready to bear the weight of Rika’s love. Through their conversation, viewers learn that Rika quit the Los Angeles office after only six months for an undisclosed reason and has not been in touch with the company since. Later that evening, Kanji and Satomi meet Rika after Kenichi and Naoko’s wedding ceremony. As Satomi squats down on the sidewalk to tie Kanji’s shoelaces, he spots Rika walking toward him in the urban crowd. Rika calls him “Nagao-kun,” showing their relationship has grown distant. She is not surprised that he and Satomi have married. Satomi allows Kanji and Rika a private reunion.¹⁷ They talk on a rooftop. Rika states, with a reassuring smile, that she has gotten used to being on her own and will treasure the memories of their time together. She refuses to give Kanji her contact information. She merely suggests that someday they will meet again by chance, for Tokyo brings everyone together. (They play their good-bye game (Yoyogi Park).) Kanji is more reluctant than Rika to part. Rika affectionately calls him “Kanchi” one last time. She then confidently strides through Tokyo, swinging her briefcase, as the theme song plays. In the end, she gazes down at the city from the roof of Shinjuku’s Nihon Seinenkan. After an extreme close-up of her content face, the camera cuts to a panorama of West Shinjuku under construction. This shows that Rika realizes the possibilities for her in the city. In the special, Rika, still single, takes a business trip to Ehime with junior male colleague (played by Tsutsui Michitaka) and revisits Kanji’s elementary school. Memories of her relationship with Kanji flood back to her, but she voices no regrets.

As for a conclusion, I would like to contrast the ending of *Tokyo Love Story* with that of the 2007 *dorama Woman Workaholic* (*Hatarakiman*, TBS, Wednesday at 10:00), which, in many ways, seems an updated version and a measure of women’s acceptance into the company. *Woman Workaholic* was based on a 2004 manga by Anno Moyoko and was adapted into an anime series in

¹⁷Kanji and Rika enact their common routines, but this time, Rika seems more self-assured.

2006. The story depicts the busy life of the twenty-eight-year-old journalist and editor Matsukata Hiroko at the Gotansha company (a play on Kondansha) who is trying to balance career and a relationship with her five-year boyfriend Shinji. She always chooses the former over the later. Shinji, an engineer at a construction firm, becomes disillusioned with his job during the course of the *dorama*. When she becomes most busy, Hiroko is able focus single-mindedly on work, even for days without bathing. Her colleagues call these moments her switch into “male mode.” Hiroko eats *nato*, fermented beans supposedly rich in female hormones, to balance these so-called masculine work habits. Most of the action takes place in the office, and the viewer is invited to have an intimate look at a family of coworkers. On one hand, the female lead is depicted as a positive role model, promoting a lifestyle for young viewers. Hiroko is confident and has an exciting life. Through the use of voiceovers, she talks directly to viewers telling them of her thoughts. On the other hand, she portrayed as needing male colleagues to help her through emotional crises. It is implied that she cannot have a family of her own if she continues to pursue a high-powered career.

These notions are reinforced in the last episode, which takes place on Hiroko’s twenty-ninth birthday. Hiroko has a few choices. She is being recruited to be chief editor of a new magazine for workingwomen. She could follow Shinji, who finally begins to enjoy his job when he is transferred to a big construction site in Kyushu. (Men rarely get transferred abroad on Japanese dramas.) Hiroko instead decides to remain at the tabloid magazine, working as she has been since her early twenties. Hiroko dashes to Haneda Airport to say good-bye to Shinji, who has broken up with her. Their good-bye is cut short when Hiroko receives a phone call about a story. Shinji gives her an encouraging push and laughs as she runs, as usual, back to work. In a final voiceover, Hiroko tells the viewer that being a workaholic is perhaps a lonely lifestyle and may damage her and Japan’s future, but she is not ready to give up the life she has at the company and with her colleagues. The scene ends with Hiroko and her coworkers walking through Tokyo at night on their way to sing karaoke, business socializing as a common part of Japanese work life. The series encourages women to love their careers and be satisfied with their lives. They can find meaning in work. Unlike Rika, Hiroko remains important to the company. Both characters acknowledge – Rika to Kanji and Hiroko to the audience – that they will remain single as long as they keep their current priorities. Both are shown content with not having it all, feeling expressed in both cases while the viewer is shown the expanse of Tokyo.

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■Session2

結婚・家族とライフコース：結婚・家族観の変容と継続

Changing Life Courses and Family

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日本人の結婚と家族形成—未婚化と自己選択のイデオロギー—

Marriage and Family Formation in Contemporary Japan: the Decline in Marriage and the Individualism Ideology

加藤 彰彦 Akihiko KATO

【概 要】

未婚化の趨勢

未婚化の2つの主因

階層格差の拡大

共同体的結婚システムの弱体化

結論と考察



未婚化をめぐって、これまで数多くの要因が指摘されてきた。過去の議論をひとことで要約するならば「この現象にはさまざまな要因が絡み合っており複雑である」ということになるだろうか。しかし、社会全体の未婚率を継続的に上昇させるためには、巨大な社会的力が働く必要がある。いいかえれば、未婚化の要因には主要なものと、そうでないものとが存在する。

実際、全国レベルのライフコース・データを用いてイベント・ヒストリー分析を行うと、未婚化をもたらす2つの主要な要因が浮かび上がる。1つは「マクロ経済の成長力低下にともなう階層格差の拡大」であり、もう1つは「近代核家族（とくに個人主義）イデオロギーの普及による共同体的結婚システムの衰退」である。

【未婚化の趨勢】

図1に示したように、2005年の時点で、30歳代前半の男性の47%、女性の32%が結婚を経験していない。実にこの年齢層の男性の二人に一人、女性の三人に一人という水準である。男性の未婚化がはじまったのは1970年代半ばである。これに対して、女性の未婚化が始まったのは1990年頃からである。男性の未婚化が女性に先行して進展してきたのであって、その逆ではない。

私は2001年以来、全国家族調査のライフコース・データを用いて、日本人の結婚・出産と家族形成の要因分析を行ってきた。ここでは、その結果を紹介して、「ライフコース選択の臨界点」について考察したい。

分析に使用するデータは、日本家族社会学会による「全国家族調査 National Family Research of Japan」（略称 NFRJ）のデータである。この研究プロジェクトは、日本全国からの代表性のある標本によって家族に関する基礎的なデータを収集することを目的に、これまでに4回の全国調査を実施した。これらの調査データのうち、「第1回家族についての全国調査 National Family Research of Japan 1998」（略称 NFRJ98）と「戦後日本の家族の歩み全国調査 National Survey: "Trails of Families in Post-War Japan"」（略称 NFRJS01）のデータを使用する。調査の詳細は、全国家族調査のウェブ・サイトを参照してほしい。

図2・3は、「第1回家族についての全国調査（NFRJ98）」の結婚歴のデータを用いて、年齢別の結婚経験（累積結婚確率）の軌跡を出生コホートごとに描いたものである。このグラフは、横軸に示された年齢までに何割の者が結婚を経験するかを示している。なお、以下では「結婚」という言葉を、とくに断らないかぎり初婚を指す言葉として用いる。

この図からは、年長コホートほど、若い年齢で結婚した様子を容易にみとることができる。

1930 年代生まれの男性は、約 90%が 30 歳までに結婚しており、1930 年代から 1940 年代生まれの女性は、30 歳に達する前にほぼ皆婚の状態になっている。

結婚がはっきりと遅れはじめるのは、男性では 1950 年代前半生まれからである。この世代が 25 歳に達するのは 1976 年から 1980 年だから、未婚化が始まったのは、1970 年代半ばであることを確認できる。(1940 年代生まれでも 30 歳ぐらいから結婚の遅れが認められ、これもまた 1970 年代半ばに当たる。)これに対して、女性の未婚化は 1960 年代生まれにおいて一挙に進んだ。

このことは、未婚化が女性主導ではなく、男性主導で進んできたことを示唆している。

「女性が経済的に自立したために結婚を選択しなくなり、その結果、男性がなかなか結婚できない」というような議論が、かつて盛んになされたが、この議論は図 1～図 3 の統計事実と一致しない。

【未婚化の要因：階層格差の拡大】

表 1 は、20 世紀後半に成人した世代が、20～34 歳の間に経験した年平均の実質経済成長率と名目賃金増加率を示したものである。この表から、成人前期におけるマクロ経済の状況が、何年に生まれたかによってどのくらい異なるかがわかる。1940 年代生まれまでは、毎年給与が 10%以上増加するなかで結婚していった。これに対して、1950 年代後半生まれは 5%成長の時代、1960 年代生まれは 3%成長の時代、そして、1970 年代生まれは、ゼロ成長の時代に卒業・就職して結婚期をむかえたのである。

もちろん記述的な統計だけでは、擬似的な相関の可能性を排除できない。マクロ経済状況と未婚化の間に実質的な関連があるかどうかを知るためには、多変量解析の手法により、経済成長が若者自身の社会的・経済的地位にどのような影響を与えて、結婚に影響するのか、その因果経路を特定する必要がある。

私は 2001 年に、こうした観点から結婚のイベント・ヒストリー分析を行って、1970 年代半ば以降の経済成長の減速・低迷にともなう階層格差の拡大が、未婚化の主要な原因であることを見いだした。おそらくこれが、日本の若い世代の間で結婚のチャンスに格差が生じていることを、はじめて計量的に実証した研究である。

図 4 は、推定結果をもとに、経済成長率が 0%、3%、あるいは 9%になった場合に、「大企業」に勤める男性と「中小企業」に勤める男性の結婚確率の違いが、どう変化するかをシミュレートしたものである（大企業は従業員数 500 人以上、中小企業は 500 人未満）。この図からは、経済成長率が上昇するほど、両者の結婚確率の格差が縮小する様子がよくわかる。9%程度の成長が続けば、中小企業の男性でも、大企業の男性と同等以上の結婚のチャンスを享受することができる。

このように経済成長には、結婚に対する社会階層の効果を緩和する効果がある。1970 年代半ば以降、マクロ経済の成長力低下にともなう、この緩和効果がじょじょに衰えていったことが男性の未婚化の主因である。

一方、女性では、職業階層の効果がほとんど統計的に有意になっておらず、男性の分析結果と対照をなしている。これは、いわゆる「女性の経済的自立仮説」を反証する結果である。

では、女性の未婚化の主因は何であろうか。

私は、男性の未婚化が女性の未婚化に先行したという事実（図 1～図 3）から、それを男性の未婚化による、女性側の結婚相手の選択可能性の低下にあると考えている。すなわち、マクロ経済成長の鈍化にともなう、相対的に低階層の男性で未婚化が進むと、経済的に容易に結婚することのできる男性の人口規模が漸進的に縮小する。これが女性の配偶者選択の幅を狭めて、女性の間に結婚難の状況をもたらしたということである。

実際、ジェームズ・レイモと岩澤美帆は、とくに高学歴女性（短大卒・大卒）の間で結婚相手の供給不足が生じていることを実証している。

【未婚化の要因：共同体的結婚システムの弱体化】

未婚化のもう 1 つの要因は、近代核家族のイデオロギーの普及によって、従来の結婚システムが弱体化したことにある。

近代核家族イデオロギーとは、夫婦家族と個人主義を進歩的な価値として強調する思想である。

すなわち、このイデオロギーは「配偶者の自由で個人的な選択」「恋愛結婚」「夫婦家族」「子どもの早期の自助・独立」を進歩的かつ普遍的な価値とみなす。

高度成長期に導入された近代核家族イデオロギーは、バブル経済崩壊後の 1990 年代にはよりラディカルに、性と結婚の「自己選択」「自己決定」「自己責任」を主張する個人主義のイデオロギーとして喧伝された。

かつて結婚は、若者自身の責任であるとともに、家族・親族の責任であり、地域社会や職場などの共同体の責任でもあった。いいかえれば、適齢期に達したにもかかわらず結婚相手がみつからない若者には、身近な大人たちが、つり合いのとれる配偶者の候補をつぎつぎと紹介してメイティングしたのである。

しかし、バブル経済以降の個人主義イデオロギーの普及は、日本人の結婚を個人の自己選択・自己決定の問題として再定義した。このイデオロギーのもとでは、若者の結婚に対して積極的に関与することは、個人の自由の侵害という意味合いを帯びてしまう。その結果、若者の結婚を社会的に支援する慣習的システムが否定されることになった。より簡潔に「見合い結婚 arranged marriage」の衰退といってもよい。

実際、図 5 に示したように、見合い結婚の割合は 1950 年代の約 60%から 1990 年代の 10%へと減少した。その一方で、恋愛結婚の割合は 1950 年代前半の 33%から 1990 年代の 89%へと増え続けた。もっとも、バブル経済までは、恋愛結婚とはいっても会社内での恋愛が主流だったので、個人主義的というよりも、その実態は、会社共同体によって半ばアレンジされた恋愛結婚であったといってもよい。

日本的経営のもとでは、会社はある種の共同体として、若い男女のメイティングの役割を引き受けてきた。若手男性社員の将来の配偶者候補として、新卒の女性社員を雇用する会社も多かった。こうした会社では、職場の上司が結婚式において仲人の役割を担い、新夫婦の後見人となるのが一般的であった。

「仲人 go-between」とは、マッチメイカーの役割を担う個人や夫婦のことである。世話をした男女がうまく結婚に至れば、仲人は結婚式において儀礼的な役割を担い、また結婚後は社会的（擬制的）な親子関係を結んで、後見人として新夫婦を公私にわたって支援する。新夫婦の側は、仲人に対して定期的に贈り物をしたり、仲人に何か問題が生じたときには、何らかの支援をすることが期待される。「仲人親」の慣習は、村落社会で発達したものではあるが、日本的経営下の企業においても広く行われた。

しかし、すでに述べたように、バブル経済の崩壊以降、「自己選択」「自己決定」「自己責任」を強調する個人主義イデオロギーが広まった。その結果として、地域社会のなかで仲人を務める年長者は減少し、会社が社会的な親として若い社員の結婚の支援をすることも少なくなった。また「能力主義」・「成果主義」のイデオロギーによって終身雇用慣行が否定されるなかでは、たとえ会社内で出会って結婚に至ったとしても、職場の上司が部下の結婚式の仲人を引き受けることはむずかしくなる。いいかえれば、将来首を切ることになるかもしれない部下の後見人を引き受けたい人は、ほとんどいないということである。さらには、実の親でさえも息子や娘の結婚に対して意見や支援をすることがやりにくくなった。

実際、図 6 に示したように、仲人をともなう結婚の割合は、1980 年代の半ばまでは 90%程度で推移してきたが、バブル経済崩壊後に急減して、1990 年代後半には 51%になった。こうした仲人をともなう結婚の急減は、社内結婚の衰退を示唆している。

この点に関して、次のような興味深い事実が確認されている。岩澤と三田（2005）は「出生動向基本調査」のデータを用いて、1970 年代以降の初婚率の低下量を、夫婦の出会いの経路別に分解した。その結果、全低下量の約 5 割が見合い結婚の減少によること、4 割近くが職場や仕事の関係での結婚の減少によることが判明した。その他の出会い——学校、友人の紹介、趣味サークル、街中や旅行での出会い——による恋愛結婚の発生確率は 40 年間にわたってほとんど変わっていない。

岩澤たちの分析結果は、共同体の有するメイティング機能の衰えが、未婚化の主要な要因であることを示唆している。

そこで、この仮説を検証するために、図 6 の「仲人をともなう結婚」の年次別比率を、結婚に対

する社会的支援のレベルを表すマクロ・レベルの指標として、前述した分析モデルに社会経済的要因とともに追加投入して、結婚に対するその効果を検討した。

表 2 をみると、結婚の社会的支援は、男性では 20 歳代前半と 30 歳代前半の結婚確率を、女性では 20 歳から 34 歳の全期間の結婚確率を有意に上昇させている。予想通り、社会的結婚支援には男女とも結婚を促進する効果が存在する。

逆にいえば、「仲人あり結婚」のような共同体を基盤とする結婚システムが弱体化するほど、結婚確率が低下して未婚化が進展するということである。表 2 の結果は、共同体的結婚システムが 30 歳を目前にした女性においてより重要であることを示唆している。

「成長の時代」が終わり、経済的に魅力のある男性が減少していくなかで——それゆえ客観的にはマッチメーカーの必要性が高まる状況のなかで——「半ばアレンジされた結婚」が否定された。女性の未婚化が 1960 年代生まれで一気に進んだのは（図 3）そのためである。

表 3 に示したように、21 世紀初頭の日本では、30 歳代前半の未婚男女の過半数（無回答を含めれば約 60%）が恋人はおろか異性の友人すらもっていない。2005 年の 30 歳代前半の未婚率は男性で 47%、女性で 32%だから、既婚者を含む同世代の男性全体の 4 人に 1 人、女性全体の 5 人に 1 人が、私生活において異性との交流がまったくないという計算になる。日本では、個人主義的な結婚イデオロギーの導入は、もっぱら共同体的なメイティング・システムを解体して、パートナー形成を阻害する方向に働いたのである。

【結 論】

未婚化をめぐる、これまで数多くの要因が指摘されてきた。過去の議論をひとことで要約するならば「この現象にはさまざまな要因が絡み合っており複雑である」ということになるだろうか。しかし、社会全体の未婚率を継続的に上昇させるためには、巨大な社会的力が働く必要がある。いいかえれば、未婚化の要因には主要なものと、そうでないものが存在する。

今回の分析結果は、未婚化の主因が「マクロ経済の成長力低下にともなう階層格差の拡大」と「近代核家族（とくに個人主義）イデオロギーの普及による共同体的結婚システムの衰退」の 2 つであることを示している。

【考 察】

未婚化を大きく進めた 1960 年代生まれでも、結局は 80%以上の者が結婚している。彼らは、結婚時には親と同居せずに核家族世帯を形成するが、その後少しあいだをあけて親と同居していく。

図 8 は、全国家族調査の同居歴データを使って、結婚後に夫方親または妻方親と同居している夫婦の比率（各年の分母はいずれか一人の親が生存している者）の経年変化を示したものである。妻の出生コーホート（出生世代）ごとに 5 本のグラフが描かれている。結婚時の同居率を比較すると、1920 年代生まれの 50%から 1960 年代生まれの 20%まで低下している。とはいえ、1960 年代生まれが親と別居するのは結婚初期に限られる。このコーホートのグラフをみると、結婚当初の同居率は 20%程度しかないが、その後漸進的に上昇し結婚後 10 年には 30%を超えて他のコーホートと変わらぬ水準になる。

また、図 9 に示したように、長男夫婦の夫方同居に限定してグラフに描くと、結婚時の同居率は図 8 と同様に低下しているが、途中同居の傾向は鮮明かつ力強く、最終的な同居率は 50%強に収斂していく。

結婚の分析と同じく、イベント・ヒストリー分析を行って親との同別居の要因を検討すると、結婚時の同居率低下の主因は近代核家族イデオロギーの普及であること、途中同居の主因は親からの持ち家（土地／家屋）の継承・相続という伝統的な要因であることがわかる。前者のイデオロギーの効果は結婚時には強く働くが、結婚後まもなく消失する。一方、直系家族を形成する内発的な力は、依然として強力に働いている。

こうした直系家族形成への回帰は、近代核家族イデオロギーが輸入されたイデオロギーにすぎないことを示している。

同様に、未婚化（さらには少子化）の分析から見えてくるのは、性と結婚の自己選択・自己決定

のイデオロギーが、若い世代の性と結婚に大きな不自由をもたらしているという事実である。

表3は、30歳代の未婚男女の7割が、異性との性関係を全くもっていないことを示唆している。個人主義イデオロギーのもとで「われわれははたして、幸せになれるのだろうか」問い直す時期に来ている。

その意味では、現在起きている事態は、「ライフコース選択の臨界点 (Life Courses in Flux)」という、無方向的な流動化を含意する表現よりも、より明確な方向性をもった「ライフコース選択の転換点」(Japanese life courses in transition) という表現で捉える方がよいかもしれない。

実際、2000年代半ばに、若い世代の性別役割分業意識や「家」意識、さらには共同体的な会社意識は、それまでの否定的な評価傾向から肯定的な評価傾向へとトレンドが逆転した(国立社会保障・人口問題研究所「家庭動向調査」や統計数理研究所「日本人の国民性調査」による)。

私は、2010年代の日本が全体として「共同体のなかのライフコース」を再評価する方向に向かうと予想している。

要旨／Abstracts

A large number of factors have been cited behind the marriage decline. A summary of the past arguments may be that “various factors are mixed and complicated behind the phenomenon.” But huge social forces are required to continuously push up the never-married rate for the entire society. This means that there are major and minor factors behind the falling marriage rate.

In fact, an event history analysis using nationwide life course data found two major causes. One is the expansion of disparities between social classes accompanying a decline in Japan’s macroeconomic performance. Economic growth can work to ease the force of social classes that causes disparities in marriage opportunities. The easing effect declined on an economic growth slowdown since the mid-1970s, reviving the potential force of social classes to discourage men from getting married. As the marriage rate has fallen for men in relatively lower social classes, the population size of economically marriageable men has decreased gradually. Then, a squeeze of marriage partners for women emerged, leading to a general decline in the marriage rate.

Another factor causing the marriage decline is the decay of the community-based marriage system on the diffusion of the individualism ideology. Even at present, people select spouses basically within familiar communities—through arranged or workplace-based meetings. The probability of marriage through other meeting paths has remained almost unchanged since the 1970s. It suggests a large number of young people lack the ability or skill to choose their spouses without support. The modern nuclear family (conjugal family and individualism) ideology was introduced into Japan in the high economic growth period and publicized as a more radical ideology of self-choice and determination in the 1990s after the burst of economic bubbles, denying the community-based marriage system. For women faced with a shortage of economically competent men, the decay of the community-based marriage system has meant a further increase in costs for looking for marriage partners. This is the reason the marriage rate for women fell quickly in the 1990s.

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日本人の結婚と家族形成 Marriage and Family Formation in Contemporary Japan

未婚化と自己選択のイデオロギー The Decline in Marriage and the Individualism Ideology

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概要 Outline


- 未婚化の趨勢
Trend toward Later and Less Marriage
- 未婚化の要因
Two Major Causes of the Marriage Decline
 - 階層格差の拡大
Expansion of Disparities between Social Classes
 - 共同体的結婚システムの弱体化
Decline in Community-based Marriage System
- 結論と考察
Conclusion and Discussion

2

未婚化の趨勢 Trend toward Later and Less Marriage

3

Figure 1. Proportion of Never-married Men and Women between 1920 and 2005



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全国家族調査データ NFRJ Data

- ライフコース・データの分析
Life course Analyses
- 日本家族社会学会による全国家族調査プロジェクト
National Family Research Project
by Japan Society of Family Sociology
 - 第1回家族についての全国調査
National Family Research of Japan 1998 (NFRJ98)
implemented in Jan & Feb in 1999.
 - 戦後日本の家族の歩み調査
National Survey on "Trails of Families in Post-War Japan"
(NFRJS01) implemented in Jan-Mar in 2002.
 - Website: <http://www.wdc-jp.com/jsfs/english/nfrj.html>

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全国家族調査データ NFRJ Data

I gratefully acknowledge the permission for the use of NFRJ98 and NFRJS01 data by the National Family Research Committee of the Japan Society of Family Sociology.

For this reanalysis, the datasets were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo.

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Figure 2. Cumulative Probability of First Marriage by Birth Cohort, Men

Men

Age

Source: National Family Research of Japan (1999)
Note: Kaplan-Meier Estimation.

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Figure 3. Cumulative Probability of First Marriage by Birth Cohort, Women

Women

Age

Source: National Family Research of Japan (1999)
Note: Kaplan-Meier Estimation.

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未婚化の要因 Two Major Causes of the Marriage Decline

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階層格差の拡大 Expansion of Social Class Disparities

- マクロ経済の成長力低下
Decline in Japan's macroeconomic performance
 - 経済成長率と賃金増加率の低下〔表1〕
Decreasing GDP growth rate and wage growth rate [Tab.1]
- 結婚に対する社会階層と経済成長の効果
Effects of social disparities and macroeconomic growth on marriage
 - イベント・ヒストリー分析（離散時間ロジット・モデル）
Event history analysis (discrete-time logit models)
 - 推定結果の詳細は付表1・2を参照
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for estimation results

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Table 1. Macroeconomic Conditions in Early Adulthood (%)

Birth year	Calendar year at age 20 to 34	Average annual economic growth	Average annual wage growth
1930	1950-64	9.6	8.5
1935	1955-69	9.8	9.1
1940	1960-74	9.2	13.7
1945	1965-79	6.8	13.7
1950	1970-84	4.5	11.1
1955	1975-89	4.1	5.7
1960	1980-94	3.3	3.3
1965	1985-99	2.6	2.0
1970	1990-04	1.5	0.7
1975	1995-08	1.2	-0.1

Sources: National Accounts, Monthly Labor Survey

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階層格差の拡大 Expansion of Social Class Disparities

- マクロ経済状況と男性の結婚の階層格差〔図4〕
Effects of occupational classes on marriage for men by economic growth Level [Fig.4]
 - ゼロ成長下では、「中小零細企業」の男性の結婚確率は、「大企業」の男性の約50%。
The likelihood of marriage for small and medium-sized company employees is limited to about 50% of the level for employees at large companies when the economic growth is zero.


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階層格差の拡大 Expansion of Social Class Disparities

- 経済成長には、男性の結婚の階層格差を緩和する効果がある。
Economic growth can work to ease the force of social classes that causes disparities in marriage opportunities.
- 一方、女性自身の職業階層は、結婚にほとんど影響しない。
Occupational classes have little effect on women's marriage, in contrast to strongly significant effects on men's marriage.

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Figure 4. Effects of Occupational Classes on Marriage for Men by Economic Growth Level



Note: Odds ratio of "small/medium-sized company/organization, self-employment" to "large company/organization"

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階層格差の拡大 Expansion of Social Class Disparities

- 結婚可能な男性の絶対数の減少 → 女性の未婚化
The population size of economically marriageable men decreases gradually.
↓
The range of potential marriage partners for women narrows, bringing about a marriage squeeze for women.
- 結婚相手の供給不足 → 高学歴女性の未婚化
 - Raymo & Iwasawa (2005) による出生動向調査の分析
They demonstrated that potential marriage partners are in short supply for highly educated women using the JNFS data.

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近代核家族イデオロギーの普及 Spread of Modern Nuclear Family Ideology

- 近代核家族イデオロギー
Modern nuclear family ideology
 - 夫婦家族と個人主義を進歩的な価値として強調する思想
Ideology emphasizing conjugal family and individualism as progress
 - 「配偶者の自由で個人的な選択」「恋愛結婚」「夫婦家族」「子どもの早期の自助・独立」
Individual freedom to choose one's spouse, love marriage, conjugal family, early independence for children
 - 性と結婚の「自己選択」「自己決定」「自己責任」
Self-choice, self-determination, and responsibility on sexual relations and marriage

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個人主義イデオロギーの過剰: 1990年代 Widespread of individualism Ideology in 1990s

- 個人主義イデオロギーによる結婚の再定義
Redefinition of marriage by individualism ideology
 - 家族・地域・会社の社会的責任から個人の自己責任へ
Not a matter of social responsibility of families, regional communities and workplaces
But a matter of individuals' self-choice, self-determination
 - 結婚に対する積極的関与は個人の自由の侵害
Proactive intervention seen as an infringement on freedom
- 結婚を社会的に支援する慣習的システムの弱体化
Weakening of a customary system for social support for marriages


17

共同体的結婚システムの弱体化 Decline in Community-based Marriage System

- 恋愛結婚の普及と見合い結婚の衰退 [図5]
Increase in love marriages and decrease in arranged marriages [Fig.5]
- 社内結婚 Workplace-based marriage
 - 1980年代までは、恋愛結婚のほとんどが社内結婚
Until the 1980s, most love marriages had been semi-arranged by companies as some kind of matchmaker.
Many companies recruited new female graduates as candidates for marriage partners of young male employees under the Japanese management.
 - 半ばアレンジされた結婚: だから上司が仲人を務める
Bosses serve as their go-betweens at wedding ceremonies and guardians for new couples.

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Figure 5. Arranged and Love Marriages: 1950–2000



Source: Japanese National Fertility Surveys


19

共同体的結婚システムの弱体化 Decline in Community-based Marriage System

- 1990年代における仲人のいる結婚の急減 [図6]
Falling the number of marriages accompanied by go-betweens in the 1990s [Fig.6]
- 仲人とは Go-betweens are
 - マッチメイカー
Individuals and couples serving as matchmakers playing a ritual role in wedding ceremonies
 - 結婚後は仲人親 (社会的親) として若い夫婦の後見人を務める
The go-betweens form social parent-child relations with new couples to serve as guardians to provide private and public support across the life course.

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Figure 6. Marriages with and without Go-betweens: 1950–2000



Source: National Survey "The Post-war Japanese Family" (2002)

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共同体的結婚システムの弱体化 Decline in Community-based Marriage System

- 社内結婚の減少
Decrease in not only arranged marriages but also semi-arranged marriages by companies
 - 1970年代以降の初婚発生率の低下は、その5割を見合い結婚の減少によって、その4割を社内結婚の減少によって説明できる (岩澤・三田 2005年)
About 50% of the falling marriage rate since the 1970s was attributed to a decrease in arranged marriages and nearly 40% to a drop in workplace- or job-based marriages (Iwasawa and Mita 2005).

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共同体的結婚システムの弱体化 Decline in Community-based Marriage System

- 結婚に対する共同体的結婚システムの効果 [表2]
Examining effects of community-based marriage system on marriage [Tab.2]
- イベント・ヒストリー分析 (離散時間ロジット・モデル)
Event history analysis (discrete-time logit models)
 - 結婚の社会的支援は、男性では20歳代前半と30歳代前半の結婚確率を、女性では20歳から34歳の結婚確率を有意に上昇させる。
Social support for marriage increases the marriage likelihood significantly for men in their early 20s and early 30s and for women in their 20s and early 30s.

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Table 2. Effects of Marriage Support Indicator on Marriage

		Entire age range	20–24	25–29	30–34
Men	Marriage support indicator : Share for marriages with go-betweens (at age t)	1.02 ****	1.04 *	1.01	1.02 **
	Marriage support indicator : Share for marriages with go-betweens (at age t)	1.02 ****	1.05 ****	1.02 ***	1.02 *

****p<0.0001 ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05

Note: Odds ratios from the discrete-time logit model are presented.

(At age t) refers to a time-varying variable.

See Appendix Table 3 for detail.

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共同体的結婚システムの弱体化 Decline in Community-based Marriage System

- 恋人・配偶者の個人主義的選択能力の欠如〔表3〕
Lack of a disposition to individualistically find partners for marriage [Tab.3]
- 30歳代未婚者の半数以上は、恋人はおろか異性の友人すらもっていない。
Majority of unmarried men/women in their 30s have neither girl/boy friends nor female/male friends.
- 共同体的結婚システムが弱体化するほど、結婚確率が低下して未婚化が進展する。
As the community-based marriage system weakens, the marriage probability declines.

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Table 3. Relationships with the Opposite-sex for Never-married: 1997–2005 (%)

婚約者がいる			恋人がいる			異性の友人がいる			交際相手はいない			不 明			
Men	Have a fiancée			Have a girl friend			Have female friends			Have no female friends			No Answer		
Age/year	97	02	05	97	02	05	97	02	05	97	02	05	97	02	05
30–34	4.3	4.5	3.0	16.6	14.0	18.9	15.7	12.4	14.8	52.2	55.3	55.5	11.2	13.7	7.8
35–39	2.8	1.5	2.4	10.5	10.8	12.4	15.3	9.0	13.1	64.1	63.5	65.3	7.3	15.2	6.8
cf. 40s	0.5	1.1	1.1	5.5	7.9	7.5	12.2	11.0	10.0	68.2	65.2	68.3	13.7	14.8	13.1

Women	Have a fiancé			Have a boy friend			Have male friends			Have no male friends			No Answer		
Age/year	97	02	05	97	02	05	97	02	05	97	02	05	97	02	05
30–34	3.8	4.0	5.4	22.4	27.0	23.7	17.2	12.9	12.4	50.9	45.1	51.2	5.8	11.1	7.4
35–39	2.7	2.4	2.7	18.1	20.4	17.6	14.1	9.5	12.5	57.0	51.2	55.3	8.1	16.6	11.8
cf. 40s	12.1	0.9	0.8	18.1	9.4	11.0	18.1	10.3	12.5	49.2	59.2	66.3	12.4	20.2	9.5

Source: Japanese National Fertility Surveys

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結論と考察

Conclusion and Discussion

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結論

Conclusion

- なぜ未婚化が進展したのか？
- 「成長の時代」の終焉 → 男性の階層格差の拡大
→ 女性の未婚化
- 近代核家族（夫婦家族と個人主義）のイデオロギーの普及
→ 共同体的結婚システムの弱体化
- What are the major factors of the marriage decline?
- Decline in the macroeconomic growth potential
→ Expansion of social disparities for men and shortage of economically marriageable partners for women
- Spread of the nuclear family (conjugal family and individualism) ideology
→ Decline in the community-based marriage system

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
考察

Discussion

- 結婚した人々のライフコース
Life course of married couples
- 未婚化を大きく進めた1960年代生まれでも、結局は80%以上の者が結婚している。
More than 80% of those born in the 1960s get married eventually.
- 直系家族形成への回帰〔図7・8〕
Return to stem family formation [Fig.7,8]
- 結婚時の親との別居・結婚後の途中同居
They tend to begin living in nuclear family households apart from their parents after their wedding, but they start living together a couple of years later.

29


Figure 7. Proportion of Couples Living with Husbands' or Wife's Parent(s) by Wife's Birth Cohort



Note: The sample is restricted to couples who have at least 1 of 4 parents alive.

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Figure 8. Proportions of Couples Living with Husband's Parent(s), When Husband is the Eldest Son, By Wife's Birth Cohort



Note: The sample is restricted to couples who have at least 1 of 2 parents alive.

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考察

Discussion

- 近代核家族イデオロギーの限界〔図7・8〕
Limits of Modern nuclear family ideology [Fig.7,8]
- 自己選択・自己決定イデオロギーの限界
Limits of self-choice and self-determination ideology
- それで、私たちは幸せになれるのだろうか？〔表3〕
Can we be happy under individualism ideology? [Tab.3]
- ライフコース選択の臨界点か、それとも転換点か？
Japanese life courses in flux or in transition?
- 共同体のなかのライフコースを再考する
Re-evaluating life courses in communitarian society

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シングル女性の結婚と仕事をめぐるライフコース選択 —東京、ソウル、香港を例に—

Single Working Women in Hong Kong, Seoul, and Tokyo: Their Desires and Choices on Marriage and Work

平田 由紀江 Yukie HIRATA

田中 洋美 Hiromi TANAKA-NAJI

吳 華孔 Catherine W. NG


近年、東アジアの主要な国・地域において未婚化・晩婚化が進行している。日本を含めて東アジアの場合、それは年齢層や性別に関わらず起きているものの、「結婚」「親なり」という二つのライフコースイベントの順序自体に大きな変化は見られない。こうした未婚化・晩婚化の傾向は特に都市部で顕著であり、とりわけ女性の方に著しい未婚率の上昇が見られる。そしてそれに呼応するかのように、都市で暮らし働く女性の生き方やライフスタイルに社会的関心が寄せられている。本報告は、近年の東アジアの未婚化・晩婚化について、都市部で働くシングル女性に焦点を絞り、比較の視点を交えて論じるものである。東京、ソウル、香港で実施した20代後半から50代の働くシングル女性を対象とする半構造化インタビューの結果を基に、彼女たちの結婚・家族形成および仕事に関する意識や願望についてライフコース選択の視点から考察する。報告では、近代化の過程で強まったとされる「伝記的自由」(biographical freedom)の視点から働くシングル女性のライフコース選択を論じ、その「自由」が完全な自由ではなく社会規範等の制約を受けていることを明らかにする。

The past decades witnessed intensified tendencies of less and later marriage among younger generations of women in East Asia, particularly in urban spaces. In some cities, some non-traditional ways of life (e.g. singlehood) are emerging rapidly; yet at the same time, some conventions remain largely unchallenged (e.g. no children outside wedlock). Our study attempts to connect patterns of individual decision-making with new and old socio-structural institutions. It is a qualitative, comparative research on single working women in Hong Kong, Seoul, and Tokyo. We hope to shed light on the factors that shape our informants' life course choices. We conducted semi-structured interviews with about 20 women aged around 30 to 50 in each city. We were interested in learning how these women perceive their singlehood status and to what extent their desires and decisions about work and marriage are influenced by the socio-cultural context they are in. In this paper, we will discuss some preliminary findings. In particular, we will address the question of biographical freedom, which is said to have increased in the present modernity. But it appears that modern Asian city women's choices are not as free as what their socio-economic status actually awards them. Rather, their 'biographical freedom' seems to be much constrained by social norms, conventions and attitudes that are slower to change than economic restructuring.

日独国際シンポジウム・ライフコースの臨界点
2016年10月23日 於 明治大学東横校

働くシングル女性の 結婚と仕事をめぐる ライフコース選択 東京、ソウル、香港を例に

Single Working Women in Tokyo,
Seoul and Hong Kong: Their Desires
and Choices on Marriage and Work

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Hiromi Tanaka-Naji

平田由紀江 
Yukie Hirata

吳華孔 
Catherine W. Ng

アウトライン Outline

- I はじめに Introduction
- II なぜ働くシングル女性なのか Why single working women?
- III 収集データ Collected data
- IV 調査結果 Findings
- V おわりに Conclusion

1

I はじめに

Introduction

- 女性の結婚行動の変化（未婚化・晩婚化）
Changes in women's marriage behavior (less and later marriage)
 - ライフコース選択の視点から、どのような説明が可能か？
How can we explain these changes from a life course perspective with respect to the individuals' subjective perception of desire and actual practice in one's life (Tanaka-Naji 2009)?
 - 「個人化」？ライフコースの「脱標準化」？
Individualization (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002)?
De-Standardization (Brückner & Mayer 2005)?

2

本調査(1)

Our Research

- 都市部で働くシングル女性
Single working women (Gordon 1994) in East Asian cities
- 結婚観、仕事観、独身であることについての意識
Their perception of marriage, work and their singlehood status
- 結婚と仕事をめぐる願望や自らの取ったライフコース選択についての考え
Their desires and choices on marriage and work
- 日本・東アジア、東アジア内での比較の視点
Comparison between Japan and East Asia/within East Asia (cf. Hofstede 1997, Matsuo 2001, Ochiai et al 2007)

3

本調査(2)

Our Research

- 理論発見型の質的調査
Theory generating empirical research based on qualitative data collection and analysis
- 社会理論、特に個人化理論との対話の試み
Attempt to have a dialogue with social theory, particularly the individualization theory (Beck & Gernsheim 2002, Honneth 2004)
- 女性の仕事と結婚に関するライフコース選択について新しい知見を提示、脱標準化に関する議論への貢献
Aim to offer new insights on the new patterns of women's life course choices and by doing so, contribute to discussions on the de-standardization

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II なぜ働くシングル女性か

Why unmarried working women?

- 増えるシングル女性
Unmarried women: Once minority, now increasing in number
- 著しい未婚化～特に都市部の女性
Less / no marriage: Regardless of age and gender, but particularly among women in urban areas
- シングル女性への社会のまなざし
Old and new discourses on unmarried women
- 公／私二分への挑戦としての働くシングル女性
Single working women as a challenge to the public/private dichotomy

5

III データ

Collected data

- 働く独身女性を対象とした半構造化インタビュー
Semi-structured interviews with unmarried working women
- 東京 Tokyo 19名、ソウル Seoul 11名、香港 Hong Kong 19名
- 年齢層 Age: 29歳～50歳前後、主として30代、40代
- 雇用形態: フルタイム(正規／非正規、フリーランス含む)
Employment status: fulltime, including free-lanced
- 居住形態: 一人暮らし／親と同居 living arrangements: alone or living together with parents and/or siblings/relatives
- 高卒以上(大半は大卒) Educational attainment: high school diploma or more (mostly with college degree)

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IV 調査結果

Findings

• 東京、ソウル、香港 基礎情報

Backgrounds: Basic information on Tokyo, Seoul, Hong Kong

- 長い労働時間 long working hours
- 高い女性の労働力率 high labor participation rates
- 平均初婚年齢: median age at first marriage (2008):
Tokyo (Japan): 29.6 (28.5), Seoul (Korea) 29.3 (28.7), Hong Kong 28.4
- 未婚率: the percentage of the never marriage:
e.g. 30-34歳 age cohort 30-34
Tokyo (Japan): 19.5% (10.4%)(1985) → 42.9% (32%) (2005)
Seoul (Korea): 6.5 (4.6%)(1985) → 29.3% (19.1%)(2005)
Hong Kong: 14.8% (1986) → 33.2% (2005)/35.7% (2008)

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働くシングル女性～東アジア都市比較(1)

	東京(日本) Tokyo (Japan)	ソウル(韓国) Seoul (Korea)	香港 Hong Kong
生活満足度	高	高	高
職業意識	仕事にやりがい感じ、きちんとこなしたい(職種関係なし)。スキルアップに関心あるが上昇志向なし。一生仕事を続けたい	仕事にやりがい感じ、プロ意識あり。スキルアップに関心あり。	仕事はきちんとこなしたい。仕事に満足、プライドもある。プロ意識あり(専門職多い)
結婚観	結婚に肯定的。結婚願望あり(19人中16名)	結婚願望あるが、多くの場合、結婚相手に望む条件をめぐり親世代との葛藤あり。	全員結婚に肯定的。将来結婚する可能性は否定せず。
子どもについて	親なり願望あり。子どもを幸せを結びつける。	親なり願望あり。	なくはないが、姪甥がいる場合、彼らに愛情を注ぐ。

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働くシングル女性～東アジア都市比較(2)

	東京(日本) Tokyo (Japan)	ソウル(韓国) Seoul (Korea)	香港 Hong Kong
フェミニスト意識	弱	弱	弱
交友関係	同性の友人、 特にシングル女性	同性の友人、 特にシングル女性	同性の友人、 特にシングル女性
趣味	ある／なし 仕事が生きていくという 人も。	あり。そこでシングル 女性のネットワークが 形成される例も。	あり
その他 →親子関係	同居の場合、親(特に 母親)と仲が良い。独 り暮らしでも親の近くに 暮らす者あり。一人暮 らしの場合、家族とは 疎遠の場合も。	定位家族(親子関 係)・親戚の重要性、 生活への介入度強い	一人暮らしであっても親 等、家族は近くにおり、 頻繁に会うが、自立。

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①「仕事も結婚も」

Desire both work AND marriage

- 結婚を拒否する者はほとんどいない
Our informants do not necessarily reject the idea of marriage
- 仕事にやりがいを感じる、続けたい
Wants to work and do a good job, continue to work
- どちらか、ではなく両方
Not "either or" but both work and marriage
- 理想の相手についての注文あり
Rather "demanding" in terms of preferences for a marriage partner

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②働くシングル女性＝「普通の逸脱」

Single working women as a "normal deviance" development

- 独身生活について On current single life
→「幸せ」、でもどこか外れていると感じている
(「普通の逸脱」)
Overall happy, but feel somewhat off the track ("normal deviance"
[Forsyth and Johnson 1995])
- シングル女性に対する世間のまなざし
Some perceive specific gaze at single women
→違和感を感じながらも挑戦することは稀
Though feeling uneasy about the gaze, few challenge it (the question of
agency)

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③仕事中心の生活(1)ー調査都市間の差

Centrality of work - but variations within East Asia cities

- 普段の生活→仕事中心、しかしその文脈はさま
ざま Centrality of work in every day life, variations between East Asian cities
- 香港: 仕事に打ち込む→ デートの時間の減少
Hong Kong: Committed workers → Less time to date or meet potential partners
- 東京、香港: 出会いの機会が少ない
Tokyo, Hong Kong: Less meeting opportunities

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③仕事中心の生活？(2)ーソウルの場合

Centrality of work? — The case of Seoul

- 労働時間: OECD加盟国中最長の韓国、しかし人
間関係において仕事を言い訳にしない
South Korea: longest work hours among OECD countries, but work can be no
excuse in personal relationship
- 家族等プライベートが仕事に介入しがち
Intervention of family in private life as a norm
- 都市間の差→仕事中心の生活の多様性？
Varieties of work-centered life in East Asia?

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④完全に自由ではない伝記的自由

Biographical freedom – not entirely free

- 「個人化」: 規範や経済、文化、社会状況に
より制約を受ける
Individualization: constrained by social conventions and conditions
- ライフコースの希望はあるが、達成のため
に動くことにはどちらかといえば消極的
Passive in fulfilling desires

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V おわりにーライフコース選択の臨界点？(1)

Conclusion – A critical point of life course choices? (1)

- 結婚行動の変化、ライフコースの脱標準化
Changes in marriage behavior and the de-standardization of life courses
→結婚願望と実際の行動の乖離
Gap between the desire to marry and actual practice
- 社会的制約と個人の行為力
Social constraints and individual agency
→消極的「伝記的自由」 Passive "biographical freedom"
→伝記的リスク Biographical risks

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V おわりにーライフコース選択の臨界点？(2)

Conclusion – A critical point of life course choices? (2)

- 東アジア都市比較: 共通・類似点、相違点
East Asian comparison: commonalities and differences
→結婚規範の程度、家族主義・仕事中心社会の多様性
Differences levels of rigidity of marriage norms, varieties of familism and
work-centered life across East Asian urban societies

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近年の日本のテレビドラマに見る未婚化と晩婚化をめぐる言説

Discourses on Singlehood and Late Marriage in Recent Japanese Television Dramas

岩田 クリスティーナ Kristina IWATA-WEICKGENANT



過去数十年の間に日本人の未婚化や晩婚化が進んでいる。この結果、独身者数は過去最大水準に達した。日本では婚外出産率が極めて低いため、こうした結婚に関する行動様式の変化は少子化に直接関係している。近年には「アラフォー」と「婚活」という新語が流行した。「アラフォー」は、40歳前後の（独身）女性を指す言葉で、彼女たちの結婚や出産に対する願望と結び付けて使われることが多く、この言葉自体は2008年にTBS系列で放送されたテレビドラマ『アラウンド40～注文の多い女たち～』を通して広まったものである。他方、配偶者探しを意味する「婚活」は社会学者の山田昌弘と作家の白河桃子による造語で、2009年にはテレビドラマでも取り上げられている。山田、白河によれば、今日のグローバル化社会において結婚することは職探し（就活）同様の目的意識を持った努力が必要であり、それ故、キャリアと幸せな結婚を関連付けながら論じている。一見すると婚活は日本に長く根差すお見合いの現代版のように映る。しかしながら、出生率の低下という点に注目すると、婚活は男女の交際をより公的な問題にしており、特にそれは自治体が婚活の場を設けるなどの取り組みに関与する場合に顕著である。本報告では『アラウンド40』と『婚活カツ！』（フジテレビ、2009年）といったテレビドラマを例に挙げ、こういった傾向がテレビドラマの中でどのように表象されているのかを考察していく。とりわけ、こうしたドラマの中で結婚・仕事・幸せは関連付けられているのか、またそうであるならばどのように関連付けられているのかを問い、またその根底にあるジェンダー規範について分析していく。社会—政治的な文脈が変化した21世紀初頭の日本にとって、いかなる性役割が提示されているのであろうか。

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Discourses on Singlehood and Late Marriage in Recent Japanese Television Dramas

Introduction

This paper looks at discourses on singlehood and late marriage in recent Japanese *dorama* or television dramas. I ask if and how marriage, work and happiness are linked, and by doing so hope to throw light on the underlying gender norms. My central question is thus what gender roles are proposed for the changed socio-political context of early twenty-first century Japan. Especially in respect to gender roles, *dorama* can be regarded as a rather conservative genre – and it has to be as it is a true mass media catering to an audience which is very heterogeneous in respect to gender, age and social class, and all tastes must be accommodated for. It would therefore be naïve to expect subversive messages or hope to for a revolutionary portrayal of gender roles. Still, within the given limitations of the genre there certainly is room for interpretation, and that is what I hope to show through the analysis of two rather different *dorama* that aired in 2008 and 2009 respectively.ⁱ

In order to understand the cultural setting in which the *dorama* were produced and watched, it is necessary to begin with a brief synopsis of socio-cultural trends and discourses on marriage. As has been explained in more detail in other papers presented during the conference, for the past decades the Japanese have been marrying less and later in life. As a result the number of singles across all age groups has rapidly increased.ⁱⁱ This change in marital behavior is certainly not limited to Japan but can be observed in other OECD countries as well. However, as childbirth out of wedlock is uncommon in Japan, the trend towards a postponement of marriage is directly linked to the declining fertility rate, making socio-cultural change a source of concern for the government and the wider public.ⁱⁱⁱ This is also the reason why it makes sense for us to look at how these trends are represented in the hugely popular and influential genre of *dorama*. Along with the family, education, and peers, the media are an extremely important agent of socialization, and given the speed of technical development, there is no doubt that its importance will continuously increase in the future. Perceptions of the world are largely shaped through the media, factual as well as fictional, and therefore looking at how *dorama* position themselves in the discourse on marriage is highly relevant.

In 2008, two terms aptly describing the trends towards less and later marriage became omnipresent buzzwords.

a) “*Arafō*”

Short for “around forty”, this term refers to (single) women born between 1964 and 1973 and is often used in connection with their desire to get married or have children. The word was popularized through the highly successful *dorama* *Around 40: Demanding Women* (“Around 40: chūmon no ōi onna tachi”) broadcast on TBS in spring 2008. **The fact that *arafō* was voted top new word of 2008 and the flood of publications on women around forty which came out later that year exemplifies the great influence the *dorama* exerted on (self-) perceptions of women belonging to this generation. These women came of age in the Bubble Era and entered the labor market as the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) was being implemented. At least in theory, *arafō* women have more choices in work and family than women of ever had before; they are the first generation for whom marriage and childbearing became one of many options. Especially the single members of this generation who work fulltime have been viewed as a measure of gender equality and personal happiness, political issues during a time of concern over falling birthrates and an aging society. At the same time, *arafō* women have also been associated**

with the difficulties of balancing the opportunities and constraints emerging from increased individual freedom – issues that we are focusing upon in this conference.

b) “*Konkatsu*”

Coined by sociologist Yamada Masahiro and freelance writer Shirakawa Tōko in their bestselling book *‘Konkatsu’ no jidai* (2008; “The Era of ‘Spouse Hunting’”), *konkatsu* is an abbreviation of *kekkon katsudō*, meaning the organized search for a spouse. The term was modeled after *shūshoku katsudō* (*shūkatsu*), the highly formalized process Japanese graduates undergo to obtain jobs. The authors hold that finding a spouse today requires the same goal-oriented effort as securing a job, thereby linking career and marriage happiness. *Konkatsu* often but not always includes registering at a dating service and attending organized dating events in a variety of locations. Spouse hunters typically have a list of criteria they expect their potential partner to meet: love alone is not regarded as a sufficient basis for marriage. *Konkatsu* thus appears as the latest type of matchmaking which has a long tradition in Japan. Yet in light of the declining birthrate, *konkatsu* makes dating more of a public issue, especially in cases where local communities are involved.

Recently, a number of *dorama* depicting “women around forty” as standing at a crossroads in their lives and dealing with *konkatsu* activities have aired.^{iv} While each *dorama* focuses on a different aspect of marriage and the search for a partner respectively, there are similarities in the storylines as well as the modes of representation. For the purpose of this paper I will focus on two *dorama* which take a distinctly different stance toward marriage, namely *Around 40*, the most popular of all dramas in question, and *Konkatsu!* (“Spouse Hunting!”).^v *Konkatsu!* was broadcast on Fuji TV a year later than *Around 40* and deals with spouse hunting from a male perspective.

The individualization of happiness: *Around 40*

The *dorama* *Around 40* focuses on the difficulties *arafō* face balancing the opportunities and constraints brought about by increased individual freedom. The pursuit of individual happiness (as opposed to that of the family/ children/ husband/ etc.) is the main theme. The narration follows a few important months in the lives of Ogata Satoko (played by Amami Yūki) who through narration and camerawork is shown to be the lead, and her two friends Morimura Nao (played by Ōtsuka Nene) and Takeuchi Mizue (played by Matsushita Yuki). By shortly discussing their fates one by one, I will show that although they represent very different *arafō* types, forty equally becomes the age of self-realization.

As housewife, the 39-year-old Takeuchi Mizue represents the largest group of women around forty. Although leading a seemingly happy life, she suffers from a lack of recognition both from her family as well as from greater society. Initially, leaving her family appears as the only possible way to self-realization; Mizue secretly resolves to get a divorce. In order to prepare for single life, she takes up a part-time job and is soon offered a permanent position. However, while she proves successful at work, she fails to adequately involve her family and as a result, her home life deteriorates. Yet, the family eventually overcomes this crisis. While Mizue remains a part-time worker, her husband and son start helping with housework. Improved communication and compromise by all parties rather than radical measures like a divorce or, for that matter, a choice of a fulltime career, prove to be Mizue’s self-improvement. Mizue is finally able to reconcile her three roles of housewife, mother and working woman.

Fashion journalist Morimura Nao (who at age 35 is the youngest of the three friends) has repeatedly ruled out marriage but quickly changes her mind when she experiences a professional

setback. She marries a famous lifestyle producer, who uses her to maintain press attention, and strives to make her appearance of having a happy home the premise for a new magazine. However, Nao soon realizes that happiness is not based appearance but that what is inside counts. In spite of her pregnancy, she resolves to get a divorce, knowing that by doing so she will most likely lose her job. The fact that Nao consults her boss before informing her husband shows that, from the beginning, her marriage had little to do with love but was motivated by career considerations only. Her failure thus reinforces the idea that “pure love” is the only thinkable base for a family’s foundation. The final episode shows Nao as a happy single working mother, skillfully juggling various new jobs and childrearing. While Nao demonstrates the belief that women should prioritize having children, she represents a non-traditional notion of the family and shows that marriage is not necessarily the key to happiness. This character also shows that the three friends are ideal types as the ease with which Nao masters her new life is a far cry from the harsh emotional and economic realities single parents face in real life.

Ogata Satoko, the *dorama*’s main character, is an acknowledged psychiatrist who has not dated for five years. She feels fulfilled and is proud of her achievements, but then realizes that people around her pity her because she is unmarried and childless. Intimidated by their warnings it could soon be “too late,” she unsuccessfully attempts to find a marriage partner through a dating service. Instead she falls in love with her assistant Okamura Keitarō (played by Fujiki Naohito) who is six years younger and only earns a fraction of her salary; the *dorama* thereby refers to reports of booming relationships between older women and younger men. While their differences in social status and gender norms initially pose an obstacle, they are eventually overcome. However, shortly after Okamura proposes, both of them are offered their dream jobs at far away hospitals. In the end, they decide in favor of their careers and against marriage but still plan to continue their relationship. Like Nao they have learned that happiness is not based on social appearances and feel that they do not need to be formally married or even live in the same place to be together.

Considering that Japan’s fertility crisis can be regarded as the main reason why the trend towards late or no marriage is being regarded as problematic by in greater society as well as in *dorama*, it seems interesting that, in contrast to Nao, Satoko and Okamura are not charged with egoism for prioritizing their jobs, even though the decision suggests that Satoko who has just turned forty will never have children. It becomes apparent that *Around 40* ranks some careers as more socially productive than others. While Nao works with fast-lived exteriors, Satoko and Okamura take care of people’s innermost conflicts and by fulfilling their dreams are contributing to society in their own way. What defines a happy ending then becomes up to the viewer, just like the characters’ happiness is up to them to decide.

For the benefit of the community: happiness as social issue in *Konkatsu!*

The second *dorama* I will briefly discuss, *Konkatsu!*, was broadcast on Fuji TV in spring 2009 and deals with the difficulties of getting married from a male perspective. Interestingly, the narrative focus is slightly different from *Around 40* and other *dorama* portraying single women at that age. Whereas the dramas centered on women usually posit age (and with that the ability to bear children) as a crucial factor, *Konkatsu!* is overtly premised on the connection between male employment and marriage. At the most basic level, the messages of both *dorama* can thus be considered fairly conventional.

Similar to *Around 40* and a great number of other *dorama*, the story revolves around one

lead and two supporting characters who each represent a different type. Different from his best friend Fukazawa Shigeru (played by Satō Ryūta) who would be more than happy to marry if only he could find a spouse, the 34-year-old main character Amamiya Kuniyuki (played by SMAP member Nakai Masahiro) is a staunch single. In order to get a position reserved for married applicants, Kuniyuki lies during his job interview, saying that his sudden unemployment torpedoed his wedding plans. He promises to quickly marry his (non-existent) girlfriend upon appointment and thus ends up having to present a wife within three months time to keep his new position. He half-heartedly begins *kekkon katsudō* or spouse hunting. Meanwhile it turns out that his 61-year-old new colleague Sakurada Shūgorō (played by Hashizume Isao) is also secretly single and in need of a wife. In order to be able to participate in dating events without risking their scam to be exposed, Kuniyuki and Sakurada adopt “assistance with spouse hunting” as main project of the newly founded but poorly staffed and underfinanced *shōshika taisakuka*, the department in charge of battling the declining birth rate they both work for. As is the case in a growing number of local community offices in real life, Sakurada and Kuniyuki set up a helpdesk for marriage-minded singles and their relatives and start organizing dating events.

Different from *Around 40* which is focused on individual happiness and does not overtly refer to state concerns, *Konkatsu!* draws an explicit connection between the growing number of singles and Japan’s low fertility. These trends are further connected to the problem of weakening community ties and dying inner cities when plans to restructure the declining Sakura Jizō shopping area where Kuniyuki was born and raised are put forward by another department of the city office. Kuniyuki and his colleagues propose an alternative plan, envisaging the area’s revival as “*konkatsu town*”; the *dorama* thus alludes to the practice of *machi zukuri*, the revitalization of ailing cities along a common theme, often relying on residents’ activities. In this case, the resident shop owners will join forces to facilitate people’s spouse hunting activities. The collective promotion of marriage and the nuclear family eventually proves to be the key to commercial success: For the time being, Sakura Jizō shopping area will be preserved in its present shape.

The trend away from marriage has often been explained by a change of values among women who are said to have switched to weighing individual wants over social expectations.^{vi} While this reasoning shifts the responsibility for Japan’s low birth rate almost exclusively to women, recently changes in male attitudes have also caught attention. *Konkatsu!*, too, focuses rather on negatively framed trends among young men, in particular on the so-called “herbivorous men” or *sōshoku (kei) danshi*. The term was coined by Fukazawa Maki in 2006 but only gained wide popularity a few years later; in 2009 it was voted one of the top ten “new words” in the U-CAN poll.^{vii} Herbivorous men are described with adjectives usually reserved for characterizing women such as *yasashii* or gentle-minded; they are said to have many female friends but be extremely passive when it comes to love relationships. Having grown up during the recession, they are reluctant spenders who diverge from the consumption patterns traditionally perceived as male (drinking alcohol, buying cars, etc.). Herbivorous men show unwillingness to self-sacrifice for a company that can no longer guarantee life-time employment; their relative satisfaction with an often financially unstable status quo astounds elder generations. Last but not least, their reported liking for cake and other sweets – food traditionally reserved for women in Japan – also adds to the effeminate image of *sōshoku danshi*.

Kuniyuki is cast as typical *sōshoku danshi*^{viii} but in his new job at the city office ironically ends up explaining the advantages of marriage to other “herbivores”, one of whom soon finds a girlfriend when he participates in one of the *konkatsu* events organized by Kuniyuki. The *dorama* ends with Kuniyuki’s complete conversion: In the last episode, he publicly proposes to a childhood friend, thereby giving a boost to Sakura Jizō Shōtengai as “*konkatsu town*” and ensuring that his

contract at the city office is renewed. The message that marriage is the only way to true happiness is further underscored by his elderly colleague Sakurada's eagerness to find a wife. Sakurada used to be a corporate soldier who due to his devotion to the company never found the time to entertain love relationships. However, when he was fired short before retirement, he finally realized that true fulfillment is only to be found in partnership. In *Konkatsu!*, employment, marriage, and personal happiness are thus intricately linked to each other and serve as symbols of male adulthood. This latter aspect is further emphasized when Kuniyuki's and Sakurada's boss who used to be rather chicken-hearted suddenly turns assertive and self-confident when he learns he will soon be a father.

Summary

As I have shown, the trend toward singlehood and late marriage is evaluated rather differently in the two *dorama* discussed. Certainly, Mizue's successful reconciliation of her three roles as mother, housewife and working woman can be read as a promotion of the nuclear family over the alternative family model chosen by Nao and Satoko's ultimate choice to stay single. However, even though they do not achieve everything they desire, both Nao and Satoko do find their own happiness. Happiness in *Around 40* is depicted as something individual and ultimately private, as is obvious in Satoko's mantra: "I am the one to decide whether or not I am happy".

This individualization of happiness implies that there are several paths to happiness, including single parenthood and relationships to younger men. Work, too, is equally represented as enabling a fulfilled life. According to *Around 40* then, happiness can be achieved through freeing oneself from social expectations and being true to oneself. This message is reiterated in theme song "The Measure of Happiness" (*Shiawase no monosashi*) by Takeuchi Mariya, the refrain of which goes: "Count what you have now. Don't count what you don't have. Find that you have so much." This call for modesty and contentment is antithetical to achieving happiness through consumption, a notion prevalent in Japan at least since the postwar period. The promise of a bright future has become uncertain because of economic downturn in the 1990s, problems caused by an aging society, and the breakdown of nuclear family models, among other factors. Thus, the call for a positive reevaluation of the status quo as means to finding happiness may not come as a surprise.

While *Around 40* proposes a wide array of role models for women now around forty, *Konkatsu!* on the other hand seems exclusively focused on the promotion of traditional postwar nuclear family values. Unsurprisingly, happiness in this *dorama* appears less as an individual issue but is closely tied to the wellbeing of the community (as represented by the desolate but then revived Sakura Jizō shopping area) and, in extension, to the nation. However, this rather traditional promotion of the group over the individual appears far removed from the social realities of contemporary Japan. One can only speculate that this distance may have been responsible for the relatively low average viewing rate of 10.5%.^{ix} Possibly, the *dorama's* appeal to individual responsibility towards greater society in general and the strong promotion of marriage in particular were too one-sided and normative to meet the taste of an audience living far more pluralized lives.

男性稼ぎ主の衰退？家庭における父親の地位の変化 —期待、見せかけ、そして社会实践—

The Decline of the Male Breadwinner? The Changing Position of Fathers in the Family: Expectations, Pretensions and Social Practice

ミヒャエル・モイザー Michael MEUSER

過去二十年、三十年の間、多くの西洋諸国において父親らしさの文化は、根本的ではないにせよ、大きく変化した。伝統的なジェンダー秩序の一つの支柱であった「男性稼ぎ主」としての父親像は、もはや当然視されなくなったばかりか、ますます疑問視されている。こうした中、家事や子育てに参加する「新しい」または「より関与する」父親という文化的理想像が形成されてきた。近年、ドイツを含む多くの欧州諸国において、こうした新しい父親像が家族をめぐる政治に影響を与え、また、この新しい父親像に沿って自らを表現する（若い）男性も増えている。しかし、「統計」データを見てみると、少なくとも大多数のドイツ人家庭においては、一家の大黒柱は依然として男性であることに留意しなければならないことが分かる。本報告では父親らしさの新しい文化と、それに部分的にしか合致しない父親の実際の行為との間に存在する緊張関係を取り扱う。文化と行為の間に生じる差は、なぜ家事に参加したい男性の希望は極めて低いレベルでしか実現しないのかという疑問を提起する。筆者自身が進めている研究を含めた、実際に家事に参加している男性に関する質的研究の考察を通じて、男性の家庭への参加を阻害する構造的要因、および男性の家庭参加を促す条件を特定する。最後に、男性の家族内における立場の変化を理解するために、これまで以上に家族研究とジェンダー研究をリンクさせることが必要であることを指摘する。つまり、父親の家庭への関与は「覇権的マスキュリニティ」という面に両立するののかという観点から議論されなければならないということである。



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The Decline of the Male Breadwinner? Father's Changing Position in the Family – Expectations, Pretensions and Social Practice

Twenty years ago, British feminist and psychologist Lynne Segal contributed to the emerging field of masculinity studies a book titled “Slow Motion. Changing Masculinities, Changing Men”. Segal (1990: 26) wrote: If we want to know whether masculinity is changing we must look at how men act as fathers. Assigning fatherhood such salient importance, understanding the way men practise fatherhood as a “litmus test” of social change in masculinity – this makes sense when we consider that a keystone of the bourgeois gender order is involved: the figure of the male breadwinner. This figure is a core feature of the social construction of masculinity until now. But it is increasingly devalued in recent discourses on masculinity and fatherhood.

Segal's book was published at a time when a new type of father began to draw attention and caught the interest of the mass media. The “new”, “proactive”, “committed” or “involved” father: these terms have been used to convey a new ideal of fatherhood that has begun to penetrate German state family policy during the last decade. Politicians are about to discover the father. In 2005 the former German family minister Ursula von der Leyen postulated: “This country needs new fathers”.¹⁸ In an interview she confirmed her position: “This society will not be able to go on existing without developing the paternal role”.¹⁹ She went as far as prophesying that men will no longer find a wife if they are not willing to contribute equally to domestic work and childcare. Whether such an intimidating scenario will have the hoped-for effect is to put into question, but, according to a distinction made by Ralph LaRossa (1988), we can observe a changing *culture of fatherhood* and must ask whether the *conduct of fatherhood* is changing in equal measure.

After briefly looking at the social background of the recent changes of father's position in the family (1) I will describe the changing culture of fatherhood in some details (2). Afterwards I will focus on the conduct of fatherhood and on the gap between culture and conduct (3). Then I will ask for the reasons of this gap, looking at obstacles against putting new images of fatherhood into practice, but also at favourable conditions (4). Finally, I will discuss the findings in terms of patterns of constructing masculinity (5).

In western modernity, the figure of the male breadwinner is a cornerstone of masculinity. In the middle of the 20th century, sociologist Talcott Parsons defined the adult male role as anchored in the sphere of occupational work: “in his job and through it by his status-giving and income-earning functions for the family” (Parsons/Bales 1955: 14-15). Traditionally, fatherhood manifests itself not so much by the father's engagement *in* the family, but rather *for* the family. Consequently, there were a lot of discourses what mothering does mean, but the notion of fathering was not well developed. This changed during the last two or three decades. An important background of the changing images of masculinity and fatherhood is a more or less far reaching change of circumstances in men's lives. For a growing number of men the breadwinner figure becomes an unreachable ideal. This is caused by two developments: 1. The increasing labour force participation rate of women and especially of mothers challenges the position of fathers

¹⁸ „heute“, Nov. 18th, 2005 (www.heute.de/ZDFheute/inhalt/22/0,3672,2397814,00.html, <5.10.2007>)

¹⁹ Der Stern 7/2007 (www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/582597.html?nv=cb, <05.03.2007>)

being the sole or at least the main breadwinner. 2. The growing discontinuity and precariousness of employment affects more and more not only the life course of women, but also of men (Lengersdorf/Meuser 2010; Meuser 2007a). For men who are not employed continuously the breadwinner figure becomes an illusion. Regarding these developments, father's position in the family is changing independently of fathers' intention to create a new image of fatherhood. However, the new culture of fatherhood emerged at a time when the institutional pillars of the male breadwinner role began to break off.

Which image of fatherhood is emerging within the new culture of fatherhood? It is a father who is involved into the family. He is engaged within the family, not only for the family: participating in the daily issues of family management, in domestic work and in child care. A definition, given by the psychologist Joseph Pleck in 1987, still sketches the new ideal quite good: The new father is "present at the birth; he is involved with his children as infants, not just when they are older; he participates in the actual day-to-day work of child care, and not just play; he is involved with his daughters as much as his sons." (Pleck 1987: 93)


What this new ideal does concretely mean in terms of duties and participation rates is a subject of quite controversial discourses. A widely consented positive definition of the involved father does not exist. But one thing is clear: what the involved father is not. He is not the traditional male breadwinner. Notwithstanding the vagueness of the new image of the involved father, this image induces a normative pressure on fathers to behave according to the new ideal. This normative pressure is enhanced by new directions in psychological research that stress the father's importance for the child's well being (Meuser 2005). A further source of pressure is a new direction of family politics in many European countries. What is known from Scandinavia since 30 years or more, that not only mothers but also fathers are addressees of family politics, is now more or less adopted even in countries that, according to the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), belong to the cluster of conservative regimes. In Germany for example, a remarkable change into this direction took place under the regime of the former conservative family minister Ursula von der Leyen (2005 to 2009). This indicates that the new image of involved fatherhood begins to dominate the culture of fatherhood.

According to the definition of Pleck, quoted above, involved fatherhood implicates a new role of fathers in family management, fathers who have more duties and more responsibilities than only being the good provider. But, looking at the representation of the new father in the media, we see that the discursive change is less fundamental than might be assumed at first glance. On the one side, popular media discovered the father during the last decade, but on the other side, the primacy of the breadwinner role is not questioned. While men are portrayed as being caught up, too, by the problems of reconciling job and family, they are still shown to be the family provider. Only a small proportion of their time is allotted to the family. Rather than spending lots of time with their kids, they are to make sure that the time spent is "quality time". The recommended quality is marked out by two traits: it is "not focused on the father's everyday care function, but rather on the father acting as a 'playmate', and 'the father's involvement is seen primarily in his relationship with the son'" (Baader 2006: 124). In this, the discourse reproduces a pattern that is typical for the paternal involvement with the family: fathers involve themselves more with their sons than their daughters (Harris/Morgan 1991; Marsiglio 1991). Generally, the "quality time"

concept indicates that the father's greater involvement does not necessarily relieve the mother's burden: "fathers' caring does not necessarily equate with fathers' sharing" (Wall/Arnold 2007: 522).

Media representations are one part of the culture of fatherhood, another part are the men's self-images of being a father. Survey data concerning men's attitudes towards gender issues show, as a general trend, a decreasing orientation at traditional patterns and values. Concerning family issues, the breadwinner role is accentuated only by a minority of men. Instead, the role of the educating and caring father is emphasized. For Germany, a study by Fthenakis and Minsel (2002) reveals that 71 percent of the male respondents see themselves in this role. Only 29 percent opt for the traditional breadwinner role. Nevertheless, seeing himself not primarily as the breadwinner does not mean that gainful employment is becoming unimportant for men. As the following figure shows, taken from a survey of young people from 16 to 29 years: the relevance of gainful employment increased between 1992 and 2003 as well as the relevance of the family (Gille 2009).

Fig. 1: Relevance of employment and of own family and children in West and East Germany 1992 to 2003, men and women, age 16-29 (means)




Both realms are judged as highly important, but job and work are a little bit more important than family and children – for both, men and women. There are some differences between West- and East-German respondents, but I cannot go into detail here. This figure shows that (young) men are only to a small degree less interested in family issues than (young) women.

What are the consequences for today's father's self-images? According to the results of a qualitative study by Michael Matzner (2004) we can distinguish four coexisting types of father's self-images: the traditional breadwinner, the modern breadwinner, the holistic father, and the family-centred father. There are some quantitative and qualitative studies that let us assume that the modern breadwinner is the most common pattern of fatherhood among contemporary German men (Helfferich 2006; Schulz/Blossfeld 2006). Like the traditional father he sees himself as the breadwinner and the mother as responsible for child care, domestic work and family life. But the division of work is not so strictly handled. The modern breadwinner assists his wife in domestic work. His identity is both: job and family centred. His presence within the family is relatively high during pregnancy and after childbirth, but thereafter decreasing. In the relationship with his children he takes the role of the playmate, but sometimes he is also the child's confidant. This


pattern is characterized by some fundamental ambivalence or conflict. The modern breadwinner aims to be both: breadwinner and caring father. This is evidenced by the following data, taken from a German representative study (Zerle/Krog 2009).

Fig. 2: Agreement with father's duties (in %)



Nearly 95 percent of the male respondents say that it is father's business to earn the family income, but also nearly 95 percent say that it is father's duty to have time for the child, and 80 percent to parent the child. The data give also a hint how the conflict will be solved. Less than the half of the respondents are willing to put back job and career in favour of child caring. Today a lot of fathers, especially young fathers, experience this discrepancy of interests, and the pattern of the modern breadwinner is the most common solution. This is evidenced by the following data (OECD 2009).


Fig. 3: Employment patterns among German couple families with children aged 0-14, 2007



to In Germany, the most common pattern is that of one parent working fulltime, one parent working half time, followed by one parent working fulltime. Usually the man is working fulltime. This indicates that in Germany a modified male breadwinner model characterises the majority of families – or, according to Matzner, the “modern breadwinner”.


A related topic is how men's work-life balance is influenced by their marital status. According to the findings of a German study on employment status, men increase the working hours when a child is born (BMFSFJ 2003).

Fig. 4: Employment Status of men aged 15-64, by number of children in the household, 2000




The rate of childless men who work more than 36 hours per week is 56 percent. It is heightened 75 percent when the first child is born and to 82 percent with the second child. We know from different studies that the partnerships of young couples without a child are to a more or less degree de-traditionalized. They are not fully egalitarian, but the men participate in domestic work, at least more than their fathers did when they were young. But with the birth of the first child a process of re-traditionalizing takes place (Fthenakis/Minsel 2002; Oberndorfer/Rost 2004; Schneider/Rost 1998). Domestic work tends to become more and more the wife's concern. As the following figure shows, fathers spend less time to domestic work than childless husbands (Döge 2006).

Fig. 5. Average expenditure of time of men per day (in minutes) (2001/02)



Another point is how father's participation rate changed over time. The Same time budget study compares 1991/1992 to 2001/2002; unfortunately we do not have newer data (Döge 2006).

Fig. 6: Expenditure of time for domestic work and child care – men and women with children under 6



There is no remarkable change of time fathers spend to domestic work: a slight increase of 4 minutes per day (197 to 201 minutes). The time spent to childcare increased from 74 to 83 minutes within ten years. These data correspond with findings concerning men's attitudes to family: that men see themselves as educating and caring fathers. Here, the gap between father's and mother's engagement is less than in the case of domestic work. The figure shows another change that is at least as important as the slight change of fathers' time budget: Although still spending more time to domestic work and child care than fathers, mothers reduced their time more than fathers increased theirs.

These spotlights on the practice of fatherhood show that there is still a huge gap between the culture of fatherhood that focuses on father's involvement in domestic work and child care and the conduct of fatherhood that is still affected by the pattern of the male breadwinner and the traditional division of labour between the sexes. This raises the question why men, on the one side, wish to participate more in family life, but on the other side, realise these wishes only to a low degree. We must ask this question if we assume that these wishes are more than a lip service. Relying on qualitative studies on the practice of involved fatherhood we can identify some structural obstacles.

Involved fatherhood implies a serious challenge to the existing norms concerning men's occupational commitment. It put into question the prevalent expectation that men do not have any duties outside gainful employment. Fathers who allude to their family obligations at the workplace are confronted with astonishment, lack of understanding and rejection among their colleagues and bosses. The bosses interpret the desire to reduce the working hours in favour of family time as a lack of occupational commitment, the colleagues as a sign of a missing solidarity because they fear they would have to do extra work. Further, often the man's masculinity is doubted by the colleagues. Although, according to German legislation, both parents are entitled to take paternal leave there is a widespread expectation in business companies that women will make use of this right, but not men, at least not for a longer time. Following common gender stereotypes, a mother's claim to take parental leave is seen as an expression of her legitimate maternal commitment to the child, whereas a father's claim evokes doubts on his loyalty with the company.

The desire of fathers to participate more in family life is broken by the institutional limits of the labour market. The new culture of fatherhood must be implemented against an existing structure that accepts a changing fatherhood only so far as it does not reduce the father's disposability for the labour market (Born/Krüger 2002; Döge/Behnke 2005; Oberndorfer/Rost 2004).

But not only the structures of the labour market are resistant to the implementation of new patterns of fatherhood. Fathers who want to engage more in family life are often confronted with wives who defend the domestic sphere as their domain. The wives claim to define the standards of domestic work, the father becomes the junior partner of his wife (Jurczyk/Lange 2009). In an own ongoing study a wife expressed this in an interview quite drastically, saying to her husband: "You are more my trainee." (We interviewed both parents together.)²⁰ Everyday family issues still prove to a high degree to be a sphere that is defined by women. This is so to say the heritage of the gender order of occidental modernity: The private sphere of the family is assigned to women, and notwithstanding changing gender relations, the responsibility for this sphere is still accepted by many women. Further, traditional gender stereotypes are still effective. Especially the caring competence of men and fathers is doubted. Neither men nor women consequently quit the belief that the woman is a bit more competent in domestic work and child rearing (Burkart 2007: 88). It seems that so far the new fatherhood is oriented to the way how mothers do family work (Tazi-Preve 2004: 123). Practicing involved fatherhood potentially implies a re-negotiation of established positions and power relations within the family. An early German Study on shared parenthood stated that this family arrangement implies a loss of power of women (Busch/Hess-Diebacker/Stein-Hilbers 1988). The own ongoing study confirms this finding. Most mothers approve more participation of fathers in family work. But conflicts about the way how he does this work are also common (Behnke/Meuser 2010).

Obstacles against implementing involved fatherhood are found in the occupational sphere and in the family itself. But we can also identify some favourable conditions. As some qualitative studies concordantly reveal, involved fatherhood is found among those families where both parents have a similar income or where the mother's wage is higher than the father's. But nota bene, this does not mean that the income situation determines the praxis of fatherhood. A similar income increases the options for choosing among different models of parenthood and fatherhood (Oberndorfer/Rost 2002). But the most important criterion seems to be the men's attitude to occupational career. As several studies including the own one show, involved fathers are not so much interested in making career than their colleagues (Behnke/Meuser 2011; Döge/Behnke 2005; Ehnis 2009; Kassner/Rüling 2005). They see involved fatherhood as a chance to escape the pressure of occupational work. Their biographical blueprints differ more or less from the so called male normal biography. Let me quote a father who, in an interview, expressed this attitude in a typical manner:

"So for me work never has been something somehow where I say 'I like to get ahead or achieve something special or (uhm) to actualize myself somehow'. This was never ever... You see? So even before it wasn't. Originally I worked full time, but I always had jobs which were somehow limited in time or I've had a longer break, you know?"

²⁰ The project "Gains and Losings. Ambivalences of Involved Fatherhood" ("Gewinne und Verluste. Ambivalenzen einer stärkeren Involvierung des Vaters im familialen Binnenraum") started in 2009 at the TU Dortmund University. It is funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).

For this man the job is not connoted with self-fulfillment, not yet and not before he was founding a family. Reducing the working time does not only mean having more time to spend with the family, but also having more spare time for his own needs. Many fathers comprehend involved fatherhood as a new way of self-realisation.

Both, the findings concerning the obstacles against more involvement of fathers into family work and the findings about advantageous conditions, remind us that we cannot talk about father's contribution to family work without talking about occupation and the structures of the labour market. Let me point to another aspect of this connection that is becoming more and more important. The structures of gainful employment are changing dramatically since the end of the last century. One aspect is the flexibilisation of work. The formerly clearly cut boundaries between the workplace and the family are fading away. More and more people do parts of their occupational work at home. This does not only bring working fathers into their homes for a certain time, it forces families to negotiate the boundaries between work issues and family issues at home. A British study by Susan Halford (2006) reveals that men who do part of their occupational work at home changed their fatherhood practices. Being physically near to their children enables them to react more flexible to the children's needs and involves them into the care work throughout the working day. They spent more time with their children than the average father does. The boundaries between work and family become permeable, but they do not vanish. The fathers continue "to mark boundaries between work and home" (Halford 2006: 392). And their wives support them in marking these boundaries. Nevertheless, the time these fathers spend with their children is at least double of the time that British fathers generally spend. This study shows that getting fathers more involved into family work is not only caused by changing attitudes towards fatherhood, but can also be caused by structural changes of the labour market and work conditions, independently of the father's intentions. In understanding changes of family life we must look outside the family and take the workplace into account. Which options fathers and families have depends to a high degree on the imperatives of the labour market. A pressing question is how it is possible to combine paternal engagement within the family with an occupational career. This seems to be nearly impossible under the given conditions of career development in most Western countries.

I come to the conclusion. How is involved fatherhood related to cultural images of masculinity? In the mid-1990s, Dutch sociologist Trudi Knijn (1995: 171) identified a "crisis of fatherhood" on the grounds that the traditional father role has become obsolete. According to this thesis, the father "who represents the external world and elevates himself to head of the family" is gradually disappearing, while the countermodel of an involved fatherhood "still does not yet fit genuine masculinity". While fathers know about the don'ts they are uncertain about the do's that make up an involved father. But, according to Knijn, an uncertain father is "an attack not just on the image of a good parent but also on the image of a man who has everything under his control" (Knijn 1995: 176-177).

The identity concept underpinning the model of an involved fatherhood remains vague and, moreover, calls for the male to act in a manner that is almost incompatible with a key feature of generally accepted masculinity. Involved fatherhood, thus, is not just about one of several dimensions of male existence, but it calls for the full readjustment of the male gender identity. The

new understanding of fatherhood needs to be integrated in an identity concept which in most men revolves chiefly around the ideal of hegemonic masculinity. In spite of the ongoing change in gender relations and progressive erosion of male hegemony, no cultural semantics has yet been established that would construct masculinity beyond the model of hegemonic masculinity so as to achieve broad acceptance. In our own ongoing study, we find that even those men who self-confidently practice involved fatherhood relate in a certain way to the pattern of hegemonic masculinity (Behnke/Meuser 2011). Let me end with a quotation from an interview. Here a father who takes parental leave distinguishes himself from those men in his company who would never make a career break, because they want to get ahead:

“So he is an engineer and... so I thought a bit, you know, they are all such clever boys, all of them young and ambitious and determined and getting ahead, but if it comes to this [claiming for parental leave] they cannot go to the boss and say ‘look out mate, I’ll take parental leave for a year’, you know, they can’t make it.”

Presenting himself as a man who has no fear to make his claims and to speak straightforward to his boss and being more courageously than his young colleagues, he proves his masculinity relying on the well established competitive mode of constructing masculinity (Meuser 2007b). In this, he acts according to the pattern of hegemonic masculinity. But he also deviates from this pattern insofar as the field of competition is not occupational career, but claiming the right of taking parental leave. Involved fatherhood seems to be an ambivalent thing. It must be accomplished within a symbolic gender order that still defines masculinity in terms of hegemony. Although the discourse of involved fatherhood stands programmatically in contrast to male hegemony, involved fathers obviously cannot avoid to relate in a certain sense to the pattern of hegemonic masculinity. This might explain why involved fatherhood is often infused with identity conflicts and why for many fathers it remains an episode in life, practiced for a limited time.

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リスクとしての子育て？—仕事と育児をめぐるサラリーマンの葛藤—

Having Children is a Risk? The Salarymen's Dilemma:
Caught between Work and Parenting

多賀 太 Futoshi TAGA

これまで、日本人のライフコースにおいて、結婚して子どもをもうけることは当然のことと見なされてきた。特に、高度成長期から 1990 年頃までの間、中流階層のサラリーマン男性は、概して、将来にわたって安定した収入を期待でき、育児のほとんどを妻に任せることができたため、数人の子どもを設けることにそれほど負担を感じる必要はなかった。しかし、近年の社会変動は、サラリーマンにとって子どもを持つことの意味を変容させた。家族生活の個人化が進行するなかで、結婚して子どもを持つかどうかは個人が選択すべき事柄になってきた。また、男性の雇用状況はより不安定になる一方で、高学歴化や生活水準の上昇にともない、一人の子どもを育てるのに要する費用が上昇してきた。さらに、父親にも育児や家庭教育への参加が求められるようになり、男性も仕事と子育てをめぐる葛藤とは無縁でいられなくなった。これらの点をふまえて、本報告では、サラリーマンへのインタビューによって得られた生活事例をもとに、彼らが、子どもを持つことをいかに意味づけており、仕事と育児をめぐるいかなる葛藤に直面しており、そうした葛藤に対していかに対処しているのかを探究する。要点は、以下の通りである。一方で、仕事や個人の自由な生活をより大事にしたい男性の中には、子どもをもうけることをある種のリスクと見なして回避してきた者が見られる。他方で、子どもをもうけた男性たちの中には、仕事と育児の間の葛藤に悩む者が見られる。そうした葛藤には、仕事のために育児ができない悩みと、育児のために仕事ができない悩みという 2 つのタイプが見られる。こうした父親たちの葛藤感は、仕事時間と育児時間のやりくりだけでなく、仕事観や育児観の変化によっても軽減されている。

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リスクとしての子育て？ —仕事と育児をめぐるサラリーマンの葛藤—

Having children is a risk? Salarymen's dilemma between work and parenting

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I はじめに Introduction

「結婚しても必ずしも子どもをもつ必要はない」という考え方について
Response to "One need not always have children after marriage"

内閣府「男女共同参画に関する世論調査」(2009)
Cabinet Office, "Public Opinion Poll on Gender Equality" (2009)

(旧)厚生省(1999)
Ministry of Health and Welfare (1999)

厚生労働省(2010)
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2010)

I はじめに Introduction

II 研究動向 Research Review

III 調査概要 Survey

IV 事例研究 Case Study

- 育児ができない悩み
Sense of lacking participation in parenting
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Sense of lacking participation in work
- 葛藤克服のプロセス
The process of conquering dilemma
- 子どもを持つことの回避
Avoiding having children

V 結論 Conclusion

II 研究動向 Research Review

量的研究 Quantitative Research

- 父親の育児参加規定要因(松田2002, 末盛2010など)
The cause of fathers' participation in childcare (Matsuda 2002, Suemori 2010 etc.)
- 育児に伴う葛藤感(矢澤他2003, 冬木2003など)
Fathers' sense of conflict caused by their participation in childcare (Yazawa et al. 2003, Fuyuki 2003 etc.)

質的研究 Qualitative Research

- 夫婦間の育児分担(平川2004, 堀2005など)
How to share childcare duties between husbands and wives (Hirakawa 2004, Hori 2005 etc.)
- 育児に積極的な父親(Ishii-Kuntz 2003など)
Fathers who are actively involved in childcare (Ishii-Kuntz 2003 etc.)
- 仕事と育児の多様な調整パターン(船橋2006, 小笠原2009など)
Various pattern of juggling work and childcare (Funabashi 2006, Ogasawara 2009 etc.)
- 葛藤の詳細や子どもをもつことの意味づけへの焦点化は弱い
Less focused on the details of conflict and fathers' apprehension of having children

III 調査の概要 Survey

調査1 Survey 1

多賀太「男性雇用労働者の生活構造の変化と持続に関する研究」平成16～18年度科学研究費補助金(若手研究B)
Futoshi Taga "Research on the change and the continuity of employed male workers' life" supported by KAKENHI (16710186)

調査2 Survey 2

多賀太・村田陽平・佐々木正徳・東野充成「グローバル社会における男性性、変化、葛藤」(シドニー大学 R・Connellとの共同研究(2006-2008年))
Futoshi Taga, Yohei Murata, Masanori Sasaki, Mitsunari Higashino, "Masculinities, Change and Conflict in Global Society" supported by Professor Raewyn Connell, The University of Sydney (2006-2008)

III 調査の概要 Survey

- 半構造化面接 Semi-structured interview
- 機縁法 Snow-ball sampling
- 対象者数 The number of subjects:

		調査1 survey 1	調査2 survey2
男性 men	子どもあり having children	21	6
	子どもなし not having children	9	12
女性 women		3	4
合計 total		33	22

IV 事例研究 Case Study

1. 育児ができない悩み Sense of lacking participation in parenting

事例1) アキオ Case 1: Akio

- 1970年代前半生まれ(面接時30代前半)
Born in the early 1970s (in his early 30s at the time of interview)
- 中央省庁キャリア官僚、関東地方のある管轄事務所の課長職
A "first-track" bureaucrat and a section chief of a local office of a certain ministry office
- 彼の労働時間は、平日朝9時から夜中の1時か2時、週末の仕事も多い
He works from 9 a.m. to 1 or 2 a.m. on weekdays and often works on weekends
- 妻は働きたいが、2人の息子(5歳と4歳)の世話のため家事専業
His wife is eager to work but stay at home to take care of their two little sons
- 子どもの世話ができないことに、不満と妻への申し訳なさを感じる
He feels frustrated and apologetic for not participating childcare enough

2. 仕事ができない悩み

Sense of lacking participation in work

事例2) アツシ Case 2: Atsushi

- ・1960年代後半生まれ(面接時30代後半)
Born in the late 1960s (in his late 30s at the time of interview)
- ・政府系シンクタンク主任研究員
A chief researcher in a governmental affiliated think-tank
- ・妻は国際線の客室乗務員、10歳の娘と2か月の息子
His wife is a cabin attendant for international airline. They have a 10-year-old daughter and a 2-month-old son.
- ・労働時間についてはある程度裁量の余地があるが、残業も多い
He can work at his discretion to some extent, while often work overtime
- ・妻の勤務中は、彼が労働時間を減らしてほとんどの育児を担当してきた
While his wife is out on duty, he has reduced working hours and done almost all the childcare duties.

(アツシ)

独身のときは、時間もお金も自由に使えたり、自分の好きな研究をやって成果を上げていくことを中心に生活を組み立てていましたが、子どもが生まれるとそうはいけなくなりました。業績主義の度合いが高まるほど、家族をもてば、仕事に使えるエネルギーと時間が少なくなり、職業上は不利になります。つい最近までは、仕事に集中できる独身の人を羨ましく思っていました。

When I was single, I lived a life centering on doing research on favorite subjects, but after having a child, I can't do so any more. I used to feel that I sacrificed myself for my family, because devoting time and energy for family life brings disadvantage for my career prospect under the condition of escalating free-competition. Until recently, I had envied single colleagues who can devote time and energy to work as they like.

(Atsushi)

事例3) シュウタロウ Case 3: Shutaro

- ・1960年代後半生まれ(面接時30代後半)
Born in the late 1960s (in his late 30s at the time of interview)
- ・大手家電メーカー生産管理部門の課長級
A section chief in the production control department of a major corporation of consumer-electronics maker
- ・家事専業の妻、11歳、7歳の娘の4人暮らし
Living with a wife who is a homemaker and two daughters who are 11 and 7 years old each
- ・かつて1週間のうち4日出張の勤務シフト。妻の育児を支えるため、昇進に不利な出張のないポストに異動。しばらくの間元気がない期間を過ごす。
He used to go on a business trip 4 days a week. In order to help wife with childcare, he offered to transfer himself to a job which has no business trip as well as would damage his career prospect. Then he spent some dispirited years.

3. 葛藤克服のプロセス

The process of conquering dilemma

事例2) アツシ Case 2: Atsushi

最近では、仕事以外の自分の存在意義を感じさせてくれる家族の存在をありがたく思うようになって、家族生活を犠牲にしてまで仕事で何かをやり遂げようとは思わなくなってきました。今はむしろ、一生仕事にしか自分の存在意義を感じられない人は気の毒だと思うようになりました。長女が生まれてから10年たってようやく2人目の子どもを持つと決心したのも、そうした心境の変化によるものです。

Recently, I came to feel grateful to my family that makes me feel the significance of my existence other than job and don't want to succeed in work at the expense of family life any more. Now I would rather think that the people who can find the significance of one's existence only in job are miserable. The decision to have the second baby 10 years after the first one was born is due to the change of mind like that.

事例3) シュウタロウ Case 3: Shutaro

- ・娘たちがある程度成長して妻に精神的な余裕が出てくると、仕事の負担は大きい昇進に有利な部署に異動
As the wife became mentally more stable, he offered to transfer himself to a busier position which helps to get promotion.
- ・平日は約13時間の勤務
He works about 13 hours a day on weekdays
- ・現在、平日は家事・育児の大部分を妻に任せ、週末には家族と一緒に過ごす
Now he leaves most domestic duties to wife on weekdays, and spend time with family on weekends.
- ・「今はもう家族生活を犠牲にして仕事に没頭しているわけではありませんが、うまく仕事と家庭生活を両立できています」
"Now I don't devote myself to work by the sacrifice of family life any more. I can successfully keep my work and family life in balance."

IV 事例研究 Case Study

4. 子どもを持つことの回避 Avoiding having children

事例4) シゲト Case 4: Shigeto

- ・1960年代後半生まれ(面接時30代後半)
Born in the late 1960s (in his late 30s at the time of interview)
- ・損害保険会社勤務、新築マンション購入直後
Working for a casualty insurance company
Just after buying a new condominium
- ・結婚して10年以上、専業主婦の妻と2人暮らし
Having lived with a wife who is now a homemaker without children for more than a decade

子どもがほしいといえばほしいんだけど、いなくてもいいかな、みたいな感じ。正直悩んでいるところです。この歳になると、自分の考え方や生き方を伝える人がほしいなと思う一方で、今ののんびりした生活も捨てがたい。嫁さんが「別に今いらん」といっているんで、それに半分甘えて、「じゃあいいか」という感じで、子どもをつくっていないというのはありますね。

(シゲト)

It's like, I don't mean that I don't want children, but I needn't. Actually, I'm wondering whether to have or not. At my time of life, I want a person to whom I pass down my way of thinking and life, on the one hand, but I don't want to discard my current relaxed lifestyle, on the other hand. I justify me for not having children partly by utilizing what my wife says, "I don't want children for now," and persuade myself, "Then we needn't."

(Shigeto)

事例5) マナブ Case 5: Manabu

- ・1950年代後半生まれ(面接時50代前半)
Born in the early 1950s (in his early 50s at the time of interview)
- ・大学院修了後、大手エンジニアリング会社入社
Entered a Japanese major engineering company after taking a postgraduate degree
- ・同期社員の間で最速ペースで昇進
Having attained promotion at the fastest pace among the employees who joined the company in the same year
- ・外資系精製技術会社日本法人役員に転職
Changed his career into an officer of a US-affiliated filtration company

私は、意図的に子どもをもたなかったんです。理由は2つ。1つは、自分が、早く、うまく駆け抜ける人生を送りたかったから。もう1つは、子どもがいて本当に問題なく良かったという人は、世の中で2割くらいだろうと思うからです。複数子どもがいたらどちらかはうまくない、頭が悪いだけじゃなくて、家庭で問題を起こしたりもする。だから私は、結婚したときから子どもは持ちたくないと言っていました。家内もそれに賛成してくれました。
(マナブ)

I didn't have children intentionally. There are two reasons. One is that I wanted to get ahead rapidly and successfully in my life. The other is that I think only about twenty percent of parents would be perfectly happy about having children without any problems. If you have children more than one, at least one won't grow well, not only do poorly but also make trouble at home. So, I have declared that I didn't want to have children since I got married and my wife agreed with me.
(Manabu)

V 結論 Conclusion

- 結婚後に子どもを持つことは「当たり前」から「自己選択」へ
Having children after marriage was "natural" before, but has become "optional" now.
- 子育てにともなう負担や失敗は自己責任という風潮
The tendency that not the society but the individual must accept responsibility for the burden, the cost and the failure of childrearing
- 従来からの稼ぎ手役割期待+新たな育児参加期待
Conventional expectation as a breadwinner plus new expectation as a childcarer
- 女性だけでなく男性も仕事と育児の間で葛藤を経験
Men face a dilemma between work and parenting as well as women

男性にとって、子どもを持つことの「リスク負担」としての側面が顕著に
The characteristic of having children as "risk-taking" has become more distinctive

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要旨／Abstracts

Traditionally, in Japanese people's life courses, it has been regarded as natural to get married and to have children. In the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, middle-class "salarymen" generally did not see having children as a burden because they could expect a continually secure income and also entrust the greater part of childcare duties to their wives. However, recent social changes have transformed what it means to have children for men. The individualization of family life styles have turned having children into an option. Not only are employment conditions less stable today, at the same time higher education has become more popular and living standards have risen, so that bringing up a child now simply requires more money. Higher expectations for fathers to participate in parenting force fathers to make a choice between work and parenting. Based on oral life histories, the paper explores how salarymen find meaning in having children, what constitutes the conflict between work and parenting, and how fathers deal with these conflicts in detail. The paper argues that those salarymen who place high priority on work or their personal lives regard having children as a risk and therefore avoid it; whereas salarymen who have children generally face one of the two types of work/parenting problems: (i) a sense of reduced participation in parenting because of work obligations and (ii) a sense of reduced participation in work because of their parenting obligations. Both types are experienced as stress, which – it will be suggested – can be reduced not only by managing the balance between working time and parenting time, but also by changing the understanding of work and parenting.

第 2 日目 2010 年 10 月 23 日(土)

Day 2: Saturday, 23 October 2010

■Session3

住まいとライフコース:住まいから見る新しい生き方

Changing Life Courses and Housing

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戦後日本の親子・親族関係の持続と変化 —全国家族調査(NFRJ-S01)を用いた計量分析による双系化説の検討—

**Continuities and Changes in Parent-Child Relationships and Kinship in Post-war Japan:
Examining Bilateral Hypotheses by Analyzing the National Family Survey (NFRJ-S01)**

施 利平 SHI Liping

本稿の目的は、親子関係の出生コーホート間比較を行うことにより、戦後行われてきた二つの双系化仮説—仮説1「直系家族制の解体により、長男との同居パターンが消失すると同時に、親子間の援助における長男と他の子との差異、息子と娘との差異がなくなる」と仮説2「直系家族制の解体により、同居における長男優先のパターンが消失するとともに、抑制されていた娘や妻方親類との援助がより活発に行われるようになる」—を検証し、戦後の親子・親族関係の基本構造と変化のトレンドを明らかにすることである。「戦後日本の家族の歩み」調査（NFRJ-S01）のデータを用いて分析を行ったところ、夫方同居率の低下がみられるものの、長男同居のパターンの存続とともに、妻方援助の存在と顕在化の傾向があることが確認された。今日においても直系家族制と双系的な親類関係が共存していることは、仮説1の反証であるとともに仮説2の修正を要請するものである。

This study aimed at examining two hypotheses that have predicted the changes in parent-child relationships and kinship in post-war Japan and at clarifying the structure of parent-child relationships and trends of changes by comparing parent-child relationships of different birth cohorts. The hypotheses, both based on the dissolution of the stem family system and the fact that parents therefore have become less likely to live with their first-born son, were: (1) support from parents is equally shared among children, and (2) support between married daughters and their parents has become more active. The data used is NFRJ-S01 (National Family Research of Japan, 2001 Special). The major findings were that: (a) First-born sons tended to live with their parents even though co-residence with the husband's parents has declined, and (b) Existing support from the wife's parents has become more active after the 1950 birth cohort. These results indicate a possibility that the stem family system and kinship (*shinrui*) co-exist even today, offering evidence against Hypothesis 1 and call for a modification of Hypothesis 2.

戦後日本の親子・親族関係の 持続と変化

—全国家族調査(NFRI-S01)を用いた
計量分析による双系化説の検討

施 利平(明治大学)

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2. 使用データ
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4. 議論

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1. 先行研究

- ・戦後日本の社会環境が大きく変化
法制度や産業構造と人口学的要因などの環境変化が大きく変化
↓
家族・親族の構造や機能に大きな影響
1960年代以降に家族制度が直系家族制から夫婦家族制へと転換して、親子・親族関係が大きな変化を遂げた(森岡, [1983]2000: 落合, [1994]2004)。

3

1. 先行研究

- ・しかし、親子・親族関係の変化の方向性は明らかではない。
＝直系家族制下の親子・親族関係がいかなる基本的な構造をもち、また戦後どのような持続と変化をみせているのか
という根本的な問いに対して、いまだに共通した見解が得られていない

4

1. 先行研究

- ・二つの双系化仮説
仮説1: 娘や妻方の親との緊密な交際・援助は直系家族制の解体により出現したもの(森岡, [1983]2000: 1993: 三谷, 1991)。
仮説2: 娘や妻方の親との交際・援助は直系家族制下においても行われていたが、直系家族制の解体や同族結合の弛緩により顕在化した(喜多野, 1951: 光吉, 1966)。
↓↓
直系家族制下で娘や妻方の親との交際・援助が存在していたか否かで見解が分かれており、実証研究による検討を要する。

5

1. 先行研究

- ・仮説の予想と実証研究との齟齬
2つの双系化説はともに直系家族制の解体とその後の親子・親族関係の対称化を予想する。⇔1990年以降の実証研究は、長男との同居(田淵・中里, 2004)、娘や妻方の親との緊密な援助・交際(西岡, 1997: 白波瀬, 2005)という非対称的な親子関係を報告。
↓↓
仮説の妥当性への検討が要請される。

6


2. 使用データ

- ・日本家族社会学会全国家族調査委員会が中心となって組織した「全国調査『戦後日本の家族の歩み』(NFRI-S01)」のデータを利用する。
- ・日本国内に居住する2001年12月末日時点で満32～81歳の女性(1920年1月1日～1969年12月31日出生)を層化二段無作為抽出法により5,000人抽出し、2002年1月～3月に訪問留置法で調査が実施された。回収票数は3,475で、有効回収率は69.5%である(加藤, 2003a)。
- ・本稿の分析サンプルは未婚者を除いた3,351名の既婚者とする。

7

3. 分析結果一


図1: 親との同居率(長子1歳時)



8

3. 分析結果一


図2: 親からの育児援助(長子3歳未満)



9

3. 分析結果


図3: コーホート・兄弟構成ごとの親との同居率(長子1歳時)



10

3. 分析結果


図4: コーホート・兄弟構成ごとの親からの育児援助



11

3. 分析結果

図5: コーホート・兄弟構成ごとの親からの育児援助(別居子に限定)



12

4. 議論

- 親子関係の非対称性
2つの仮説はともに親子関係の対称化(夫方と妻方、長男とその他の子ども)を予想する
↑↑
- 夫方との同居⇔妻方からの育児援助
- 長男夫婦は夫方との同居し、夫方から育児援助を優先的に受ける⇔「夫次三男・妻男兄弟無」夫婦は妻方と同居し、妻方から育児援助を優先的に受ける

13

4. 議論

- 直系家族制の持続を示唆
 - 結婚15年目時点での同居率は年長コーホートと年少コーホートでは同様(加藤2003b: 2006)。
 - (夫方同居率の低下←結婚時同居から途中同居への変化)
 - 一子同居パターンの持続
- 夫方は長男夫婦と同居⇔妻方は「夫次三男・妻男兄弟無」夫婦と同居

14

4. 議論

- 妻方育児援助の存在と顕在化
妻方の援助は年長コーホートでも存在+妻方の援助の増加
↓↓
妻方援助は直系家族制下でも存在→仮説1の「父系から双系への変化」の棄却
直系家族制の崩壊によるものではない

15

4. 議論

- 妻方育児援助の顕在化の理由
きょうだい数の減少→親から一人当たりの子どもへの援助が増加
結婚時同居から途中同居への変化→妻方が育児援助を行いやすくなる

16

4. 議論

- まとめ
- 1) 親子関係の非対称性
- 2) 直系家族制の存続
- 3) 直系家族制と親類関係の共存

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Thanks !

- 謝辞
分析に当たり、東京大学社会科学研究所附属日本社会研究情報センターSSJデータアーカイブにより個票データの提供を受けた。
- 関連文献は以下の論文を参照されたい。
施 利平2008「戦後日本の親子・親族関係の持続と変化ー全国家族調査(NFRJ-S01)を用いた計量分析による双系化説の検討」日本家族社会学会学会誌『家族社会学研究』第20巻第2号p.20-p.33
Shi liping2010"Continuities and Changes in Parent-child Relationships and Kinship in Postwar Japan: Examining Bilateral Hypotheses by Analyzing the National Family Survey (NFRJ-S01)" Tohoku University ISS, University of Tokyo 『GEMC journal』no.2:48-67

18



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若年層の住宅条件とライフコース変化

Young People's Housing Opportunities in the Context of Japan's Homeowner Society

平山 洋介 Yosuke HIRAYAMA

戦後日本社会を特徴づけたのは、その持家社会としての存立である。そこでは、雇用と所得の安定を確保し、結婚して家族をもち、そして住まいの「梯子」を登って住宅所有を達成する、というパターンがライフコースの社会標準であった。しかし、1990年代から、若い世代の住宅の「梯子」はぐらつき、ライフコース・パターンは分岐した。就労の不安定な若者は、親元にとどまる傾向を強めている。親の家を離れた若者にとって、適切な住まいの確保はより困難になった。増大する単身者は、持家市場に入らず、賃貸市場にとどまっている。結婚し、家族を形成した人たちは、住宅所有を達成しようとする。しかし、住宅ローンの返済負担はより重くなり、住宅の資産価値は減少した。家族世帯のグループでは、共働きによって住宅所有を達成するケースが増えている。



この報告は、若年層の住宅条件とライフコースに関して、変化の実態を経験データにもとづいて示し、住宅・社会政策の再編から説明しようとするものである。戦後日本の住宅・社会政策は、「男性稼ぎ主」型の家族による持家取得に援助を集中し、標準パターンのライフコースを保全しようとする点において、保守主義の傾向をもつ。しかし同時に、1990年代半ばに始まった新自由主義の政策転換は、住宅の供給・消費に関する市場経済の領域を拡大した。保守主義と新自由主義の組み合わせは、若い世代の住宅履歴の分岐を促進する要因となった。持家に住む中間層の家族は、保守主義の政策フレームのなかで、依然として有利な位置を占めるのに対し、低所得者、単身者、借家人は、新自由主義の政策再編の影響をより強く受け、市場経済により直接的にさらされている。

平山 洋介

神戸大学大学院人間発達環境学研究科教授。神戸大学博士（学術）。専門は住宅・都市研究。研究テーマは、住宅と家族変化、住宅所有と世代変化、住宅と都市変化。

Yosuke HIRAYAMA is a Professor at the Graduate School of Human Development and Environment, Kobe University. He received a Ph.D. from Kobe University. He specializes in housing and urban studies, and his research interests include housing and family change, home ownership and generational dynamics, and housing and urban transformation.

要旨／Abstracts

The housing system in postwar Japan has consistently driven the growth of the owner-occupied housing sector, where many people have followed a conventional life-course in terms of ascending the housing ladder towards home ownership. Since the 1990s, however, a more insecure economy combined with the reorientation of housing and social policies has led to divergence in young people's housing pathways. There has been a notable increase in young adults who live in their parents' homes for longer periods while young independent households have found it difficult to secure adequate, affordable rental housing. Many households have delayed entering the owner-occupied housing market and increasing numbers of single-person households in particular have tended to remain in the rented housing sector. In addition, homeowners have been confronted with heavier mortgage burdens for houses whose values as assets have become more uncertain. Married women are now progressively entering the labour market to supplement the household economy in enabling home ownership to be accessed. An apparent decline in the cycle where many people have successively followed conventional housing paths has meant new challenges to the traditional organization of the home-ownership-oriented housing system.

My presentation explores young people's shifting housing opportunities in Japan's homeowner society with particular reference to transformations in housing and social policies. The conservative nature of public policy has largely been maintained, advantaging middle-class family households in accessing home ownership. However, in response to economic stagnation and within the context of pervasive neo-liberalism, the government has moved sharply towards accentuating the role of the market in providing housing and mortgages. The rise of neo-liberal policies has become more pronounced while conservative institutions have firmly been ingrained in Japan's postwar society. Conventional middle-class families, who have been protected by conservative policies in moving up the housing ladder, have maintained their relatively advantageous positions in the market economy. Alternatively, neo-liberal policy has especially affected the housing conditions of specific groups who have been beyond the protection of conservative institutions, involving unmarried individuals, low-income households and those in unstable employment. The combination of conservative and neo-liberal approaches in policy practices has thus had strong diverging effects on young people's housing experiences.

Young people's housing opportunities in the context of Japan's homeowner society

Yosuke Hirayama, Kobe University

International Conference on *Life Courses in Flux*
Sponsored by DIJ and Meiji University
22-23 October 2010, Tokyo

1

1. Introduction


- Japan as a home-owning society
- Conventional life-courses
 - Marriage and family formation
 - Stable employment and income
 - Home ownership and asset accumulation
- Generational fractures
- Divergence in young people's housing pathways
 - Increase in parental home dwellers
 - Increase in single renters
 - Delay in accessing home ownership
 - Increase in dual-earner households purchasing a house
- Explanatory factors: micro/macro
- Institutional context

2

2. Young people and the institutional context

- Conservative policy
 - Housing policy
 - Taxation and social security
 - Corporate-based welfare
- Neo-liberal policy
 - Responses to the 'post-bubble' recession
 - Reorientation of housing policy
 - Labour market reorganization
- Combination of conservative and neo-liberal approaches
 - Socio-economic disparities
 - between families and singles,
 - between regular employees and non-regular employees, and
 - between homeowners and renters

3




Changes in the 'social mainstream'

4

3. Decline in affordable housing


- The rented housing sector
- The owner-occupied housing sector

5




Changes in economic situations of renter households

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Changes in economic situations of owner-occupier households

7




Changes in mortgage debts and housing assets of owner-occupier households

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
4. Divergence in housing pathways

- Parental home leavers and parental home dwellers
- Family households and single households
- Single-earner households and dual-earner households


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
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
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
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
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

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15



16



5. Conclusion

- Inter-generational disparities
- Intra-generational disparities
- Decline in the 'social cycle'
- Housing and life-courses

近代家族後のライフコース選択 —住まいによる空間編成／日記による時間編成—

The Life Course Choices after the End of the Modern Family System: The “Construction of Space” by Habitation and the “Construction of Time” from Diaries

西川 祐子 Yuko NISHIKAWA

(以下の PP はパワーポイントのスライドの番号です)

PP 1 「近代家族後のライフコース選択—住まいによる空間編成／
日記による時間編成」



I はじめに—選択の行為主体としての個人の出現

ライフコースの選択は、必ずしも新しいことではないが、選択の行為主体が現在では家族から個人へと変化したことが新しいのである。社会の基礎単位が家族とみなされていた近代には、個人は家族を再生産するべきであるという確固たるモデルコースがあった。あらかじめ用意されたモデルを選択するか、しないかという問題設定には、選択の自由があるとは言えないであろう。近代の終わりがみえてきた現在、家族の中から姿をあらわした個人は、これまでのようにあらかじめ用意されたモデルを選択して一生を終えるのではないだろう。

近代の国民国家は家族を基礎単位とみなし、家族を代表する家長との間で主権の譲渡の契約をかわし、国民統合を行った。その間、家長をのぞく個人は家族の中に埋没していた。近代国民国家と近代家族とは相互に交渉しつつ相互に形を変えるが、その歴史的経緯は世界の国家間システムの中において刻々と変化する各国の位置の変化とも呼応して、一様ではない。これからする報告には、近代家族モデルの変化は、家族の容器として建設されてきた住宅のモデルの変化に呼応し、住まいモデルの選択という個人の主体的な行為を重ねたつもりが、じつは社会変動に忠実に従ってきたのだ、という発見含まれている。

ドイツ・日本文化研究所が2004年に行ったシンポジウム「ジェンダーと国民国家—日本についての歴史的考察」は、グローバルな広がりをもつ近代化のプロセスを、具体的には、日本社会という事例において考察しようとするものであった。2004年シンポジウムには私も参加し、「国家建設としての家庭建設—住宅の戦後史から」と題した報告を行った。今回のシンポジウム「ライフコース選択の臨界点—生き方はどこまで自由に選べるのか」は、近代の行き着くところを確認した後、その先に来るべき社会を、個人が選択するライフコースをとおして考察しようとするものだ、と私は理解している。

PP2 そこで私の今回の報告は、II「住まい空間と日常生活の変化」において前回と同様に、マトリックス図をもちいて日本型近代家族モデルとその容器である住まいモデルの変遷が、個人の容器であるワンルームマンションのワンルームの部屋にいたる経過をたどる。IIIにおいては今回新しく、近代において、一方に主婦が執筆する家庭日記と家計簿、他方に個人のとくに内面の日記が発明されたことを指摘する。マトリックス図「住まい空間と日記の変遷—日記帳日記からブログまで」を用いて日記の執筆者、日記帳の形態、文具、そして日記の内容が変化してゆく経過をたどる。IV

「近代家族後のライフコース選択—ネットワークとコミュニティ」では、近代家族モデルと住まいモデルの変遷の最後の到着点である「ワンルーム」に居住する個人の立ち位置から、近未来を考える。

II 住まい空間と日常生活の変遷

PP4 日本型近代家族とその容器については、新聞雑誌が宣伝するモデルが先行する傾向があり、モデルが人々の生活を大きく変えた。手書きの絵は、わたしがそれぞれ①「いろいろばたのある家」、②「茶の間のある家」、③「リビングのある家」そして④「ワンルーム」と名づけた空間モデルの中における食事時の団欒風景を描いている。

PP5 これを整理すると、＜家族の容器としての住まい＞の3モデルとその内容である家族の類型は図のようである。

①囲炉裏端のある家（「家」家族の容器）

②茶の間のある家（「家庭」家族の容器 その1）

③リビングのある家（「家庭」家族の容器 その2）

「家（いえ）」家族は、明治民法に記されているように第6親等までの親族をふくむ「家（いえ）」の成員と、ときには同じ屋根の下で働く家事使用人や家業に従事する従業員を含む。

「茶の間のある家」に住む「家庭」家族その1は、「家」家族の次男、三男が都市へ出て形成する夫婦とその子どもたちから形成される。新しいタイプの核家族をひきいる新型課長は、しかし戸籍上は独立しておらず、夫の兄または父が経営する「家」家族に所属していることが多い。

「リビングのある家」に住む「家庭」家族その2は、第二次世界大戦後の改正民法が規定し、20世紀後半に支配的であった夫婦とその子どもたちから成る小家族である。成員構成は「家庭」家族2と同様であるが、戸籍上も独立した家族を形成している。「家庭」家族その2の容器である「リビングのある家」では子どもたちが住まいの中に個室を確保し、家族内で個人化が進行するところが「茶の間のある家」モデルの場合とは異なる。なお家族の容器としての住まいが個室化へいたる住まい建設のキーワードは、住まいを「閉じる」、「区切る」であり、壁がしだいに強化された。

そして最後の＜個人の容器としての住まい＞モデルがワンルームマンションの④ワンルームである。独立度の高い部屋であるワンルームまでたどり着いた後、現代の建築家は逆に「ひらく」と「つなぐ」というキーワードに留意しながら新たな住宅デザインに苦心している。このことについては後に述べる。

しかし住まいモデル①から④への変遷はけっして1線進化型に進行してきたのではない。現実の街には、PP6の絵が示すように4つの住まいモデルが雑然と混在している。そこで住まいモデルの変遷を静態ではなく動態で把握する変遷図を考えると、図はPP7のようにやや複雑な二重構造をとることになる。

旧二重構造である「いろいろ端のある家」／「茶の間のある家」の二重構造は、1925年前後に成立した。右側の「茶の間のある家」は20世紀前半においてはほとんどが都市に借家として建設された。好景気の時期には都市に人口が集中して借家の建設が増加するが、不況、災害、戦争が到来すると「家庭」家族は借家である「茶の間のある家」は放棄して故郷の「いろいろ端のある家」に避難し、旧家長の庇護の下に入るのであった。したがって二重構造の「いろいろ端のあり家」と「茶の間のある家」の間には、お金の仕送り、米など物のやりとり、さらには人の交流が絶えずあり、家計上は1つの世帯（ハウスホールド）を形成していた。

新二重構造である「リビングのある家」／「ワンルーム」の成立は1975年前後である。ここでも左側の「リビングのある家」は持ち家、右側の「ワンルーム」は賃貸住宅という違いがある。地

理上は距離があるこの2つの住まいモデルの間において、旧二重構造の場合と同様にお金と物と人の循環があり、家計上の世帯は完全には分離されてはいない。しかし時とともに住まいモデル二重構造の重心が右へ移されてゆく傾向がある。

PP9「住まい空間と日常生活の変遷」は4つの住まいモデルの中で展開される生活の変遷をさらに項目別に辿ってマトリックスにしたものがある。各項目の具体的変化が著しい。このマトリックスの背景には、むろん労働のあり方や衣食住に影響する産業構造の大きな変化が横たわっている。

住まい空間と日常生活の変遷

	変化項目 住宅モデル	家族モデル	住まい空間の 管轄主体	就寝形態	食事と 団らんの形	調理場所	排泄場所	沐浴空間	光熱と水
	1925年頃	「家」 家族	旧家長	組み合わせ多様な共同就寝	いり端に膳を並べる序列席	お勝手と土間	汲み取り式かわや 屋内・屋外	屋外設置	まき 井戸水 あんどん
1975年頃	「茶の間の ある家」	「家庭」 家族 その1	新家長	夫婦と子ども達の共同就寝	ちゃぶ台を囲む円卓式	台所	汲み取り式便所 屋内	銭湯ないし 屋内風呂	水道・電気ないし 炭火・ガス
	「リビングの ある家」	「家庭」 家族 その2	主婦	夫婦／子ども達別就寝、子どもの性別別就寝	テーブルを囲みテレビに視線集中	キッチン	水洗式トイレ	屋内バスルーム	水道・電気・ガス
	「ワンルーム」	個人	個人	単独就寝	小テーブル 個室ないしはパーティー式	ミニキッチン	水洗式トイレ	屋内バス・トイレ	水道・電気・ガス

家族モデルの項の変化にともない住まい空間を管轄する主体も変化するのだが、「茶の間のある家」から「リビングのある家」へ移る頃に、住まい空間の管轄は住まいの所有者である夫の手から妻の手へと移行することが注目に値するであろう。専業主婦の誕生であり、家計の管理責任が妻へと移行することにもなる。食事と団欒の風景の変化は、PP4の絵に描いたとおりである。屋外にあった調理場所、排泄場所、沐浴空間が時代を下ると共に住まいの内部に移動することが注目に値するであろう。生活が家族の空間の中で完結する傾向が強まるのである。このことを可能とするのは、光熱、水の豊かな供給である。その結果として、エネルギー使用量の激増があるであろう。

PP9 III 住まい空間と日記の変遷一日記帳日記からブログまで

PP10は出版社博文館が大正13年(1924年)用博文館日記帳のために同社の雑誌に出した広告の頁である。広告は日記帳の種類が多いことを誇っている。日記帳の出版界は、博文館だけでなく多くの出版社が参入する大きな市場であって、女性用雑誌がしばしば新年号の付録とした家庭日記付家計簿も加えると各社100万を越える巨大な発行部数を競いあった。

PP11からPP18までは、その後も顧客層を細分化してターゲットを決めて売り出した多種多様な日記の紹介である。さらにPP19では、多様な日記を整理し、日記の変遷をPP9の住まい空間の変遷図にあわせて作成した。先には日本型近代家族の変遷にふれて、「いり端のある家」／「茶の間のある家」の組み合わせである旧2重構造が成立する1925年から「リビングのある家」／「ワンルーム」の組み合わせである新2重構造が成立する1975年までのほぼ半世紀間が日本社会において一夫一婦継続婚と「家庭」家族の規範がころうじて成立していた時期であると述べた。

PP 9「住まいと日常生活の変遷図」と PP 1 9「住まいと日記の変遷」図を並べて見ると、1 9 2 5 年から 1 9 7 5 年の「家庭」家族の時期はまた、日記帳日記の時代であることが判明する。

住まい空間と日記の変遷

	変化 項目	日記帳 モデル	日記の 執筆者	日記執筆 の場所	日記帳の 形態と 文具	読者の 有無
	住宅 モデル					
1925 年頃	いろいろ端の ある家	家日記	旧家長	旧家長は書 院または家 長の座で	和紙の和綴じ 帳面に筆と墨 で	家族ないし 子孫が読者 の原則
1975 年頃	茶の間の ある家	家庭(主婦) 日記と家計 簿／個人の (内面)日記	家庭日記は 主婦 個人日記は 新家長	主婦は茶の 間で 新家長は書 斎で	洋紙に印刷 製本の日記 帳にペン	家庭日記と家 計簿の読者は 家族／個人日 記は無読者
	リビングの ある家	家庭(主婦) 日記と家計 簿／個人の (内面)日記	家庭日記と 家計簿は主 夫／夫は手 帳	主婦はリビ ングで 夫は個人机 で	洋紙に印刷 製本の日記 帳にペン	家庭日記と家 計簿の読者は 家族／個人日 記は無読者
	ワンルーム	ブログ日記 内面日記	個人	個室で	パソコン	ブログは不 特定多数読 者、SNSは グループ

さて、「いろいろ端のある家」で「家」家族をひきいる旧型家長が執筆する「家」日記が執筆される場所を想像するために、PP 2 0「いろいろ端のある家」のイメージと PP 2 1「囲炉裏端のある家」の平面図を見ていただきたい。住まい空間のすべてが家長の管轄範囲であるから家長は自分がえらぶ場所で、和紙に和綴じの帳面に筆と墨で毎日の日記を書く。この日記は家長のひきいる家族だけでなく子孫が保管して読むことが期待されている。

つづいて「茶の間のある家」のイメージ PP 2 2「と平面図 PP 2 3を見る。「茶の間のある家」は畳を敷く和風建築であるが、書斎つきの応接間だけは洋室である。この住まい空間では、夫と妻のつける日記の種類が違うことが注目に値するであろう。家族の日記を家庭日記つき家計簿に記入するのは妻の役割となり、妻は茶の間のちゃぶ台の上で日記をつける。夫は書斎の自分の机で個人の日記をつけ、それを鍵のかかる引き出しに仕舞う。個人の日記は人に見せない、他人の個人日記は読んではいけないという規範がようやく成立したのであった。

PP 2 4「リビングのある家」の PP 2 5間取りは現代の都市に普及しており、都心の集合住宅の場合も、郊外の戸建住宅の場合も、nLDK 設計である。nは個室ないしは寝室の数であるが、nは家族数マイナス1であると言われる。夫婦の寝室は1つだからである。この住まい空間では専業主婦はリビングのテーブルの上で家庭日記付家計簿をつける。しかし夫が個人日記をつける空間を確保することはむずかしい。夫の日記帳はしばしば予定を記す手帳で代用されてゆくであろう。

PP 2 6は、ワンルームマンション第1号として東京都内に1 9 7 6年に建設されたマンションの「ワンルーム」平面図である。ここでもう一度 PP 2 7として「住まい空間と日常生活の変遷」マトリックスと PP 2 8「住まい空間と日記の変遷」マトリックスをお見せするので、両図の「ワンルーム」の行に再度、注目していただきたい。ワンルームは単一空間であり単身者が入居する原則である。この空間にはキッチン、トイレつきバスルームがあって衣食住のための装置すべてが完備されている。しかし、ワンルームの住民にインタビューを試みると、ワンルームでは既製の食べ物を持ち寄る形で小規模ホームパーティがしばしば行われ、ワンルームの住民は自宅における社交を重視している。これは、「茶の間のある家」では応接間で来客をくいとめ、「リビングのある家」では社交そのものを制限する傾向があるのとくらべ、予期せぬ展開である。

日記については、マトリックス「住まい空間と日記の変遷」を見ればわかるように、「ワンルーム」の住人は紙媒体の日記帳ではなく電子媒体のウェブ日記を採用することが多いのであるが、ここから個人の日記が一気にウェブ上に全公開あるいは SNS のようにグループ内公開へ向かう特徴が見られる。近代家族モデルの変遷を追うと 1 つの空間に共に生活する家族の数がしだいに減少することに気づくのであるが、最後に「ワンルーム」に単身入居する瞬間から何かが大きく変化する。

ここからが、この報告の最後の章にあたる IV 近代家族後のライフコース選択：ネットワークとコミュニティである。

PP 2 9 IV 近代家族後のライフコース選択：ネットワークとコミュニティ

PP 3 0 で建築家上田篤が 1 9 7 3 年に製作した「住宅双六」を紹介する。時は高度経済成長まっさかりであり、政府は持ち家政策を打ち出していた。そのため住宅金融公庫に大きな予算をつけて、住宅建設のためにローンを組むことを奨励、土地の価値は暴騰し、建築ラッシュが起こっていた。「住宅双六」は若者が成長し、就職、結婚をして家庭家族を形成した後もしだいに大きな住宅に住み替えて行く様を、サイコロを振っては先へ進む双六のゲームにたとえた図である。発表当時、ライフコースについて語る際にたいへんよく引用された図である。双六の「上り」を PP 3 1 の図では緑色に彩色した。図の中心に置かれた「上り」は、郊外に建てる庭付き一戸建て住宅である。モデル的なライフコースの終着点が郊外に建てる庭付き一戸建て住宅であることに世論は一致していたかのようであった。

PP 3 1 は、同じ建築家上田篤が 2 0 0 7 年に発表した「新住宅双六」である。1 9 7 3 年当時にはなかったワンルームがライフコースの中で子ども部屋の次に入居すべき空間となって出現している。3 4 年後に製作された「新住宅双六」は、「旧住宅双六」では右端に置かれていた「ふり出し」が中心に置かれた。なぜなら「新住宅双六」では、「旧住宅双六」では 1 つであった「上り」が 6 つに増えているからである。PP 3 1 で示すように、郊外の庭付一戸建て住宅もマスの 1 つであるが、これが終着点ではない。現実においても郊外の戸建住宅は高度経済成長の後、大型スーパーの撤退、路線バスの廃止、次世代の住宅継承の無いこと、などが重なって空き屋と独居世帯が増加している。郊外の一戸建て住宅で人生を終えることはなかなか難しくなっている。そこで新住宅双六において郊外戸建住宅の次に用意された「上り」は、老人介護ホーム、親子マンション、農家町家回帰、外国定住、都心超高層マンション、自宅で生涯現役の 6 種である。

しかし、ライフコースという問題から見れば「上り」の数が増えたことがライフコースの選択が増えたことになるだろうか。そしてよく見れば、「新住宅双六」で新しいのは、長寿社会になる一方で、老後に子どもたちの家族の中に吸収される可能性が減っている状況にあって高齢者の処置をどうするかを選択肢が 6 つ挙げられているだけである。途中の家族形成時期についての変化はほとんど無い。基本的には家族の再生産があって家族の時代がつづく前提ではないか。

PP 3 2 で三度目にマトリックス「住まいと日常生活の変遷」を見ながら、現在では「ワンルーム」の次に、家族と家族の容器の再生産以外の選択が模索されていることを考えざるを得ない。家族の再生産は、右肩上がりの経済成長、家族扶養賃金制度、家族の内外での性別役割分担を前提にしていたのであり、その前提のほとんど全てが今日においては崩壊ないしは変化を強いられている。

むしろ先にふれた「ワンルーム」における社交の復活ないしは復活願望、ブログによる遠距離交際あるいはネットワーク形成のなかに、新たな傾向を見るべきであろう。家族の時代には家族内で生活のすべてが完結する前提であったから、家族を形成しなかった人間の孤独感は強く、同じく家族の最後の生き残りである孤老の孤立は救いがたく深刻である。家族の再生産という呪縛から抜け出す世代が今、取り組んでいるのは、個人となって独立した者同士が血縁と婚姻には限らない関係

をむすぶための仕掛けではないか。

現在とくにニュータウンや大型集合住宅の再開発に携わる建築家たちは、住民とともに私領域と公領域のあいだに、たとえ私領域の空間を少しずつ供出してでも作らなければならない共領域をどのようにデザインするか、に努力をかたむけている。かつて集合住宅やニュータウンが建設されたときには、全く相談をうけることなく、用意されたいくつかの選択肢からの選択が許されるだけであった住民が、再開発のときにはエンドユーザー、あるいは当事者としてしばしば計画に参加するという新しい状況もまた生まれている。住民たちはコミュニティ空間の創造に参加するだけでなく、インターネット他の手段で遠距離に住む知人たちと複数のネットワークを形成して生きている。そして共領域の創出には身内とはかぎらない他者たちとたえず交渉をつづけることが必要なことを学びつつある。いまだ未完成ではあるが、これを図に表現したのが PP 3 3 である。

最後に、「ライフコース」の「コース」という言葉には落とし穴があることを指摘しておきたい。「コース」という言葉には、競馬のトラックである *race course* のように、あらかじめ定められた、という含意がある。いくら数が多く、また自主的、主体的な選択であっても、選択肢からの選択は、選択の枠をきめる者にたいする従属に他ならない。ほんとうの選択とは日々、他者と交渉しつつ自分と他者たちのために新しい選択肢を創造することではないだろうか。

要旨／Abstracts

Around 1975, Japan saw the emergence of two new types of housing: (i) the LDK housing type (i.e., living rooms, dining room, and kitchen) for standard families, and (ii) single-room apartments (called “mansions” in Japanese) mainly for young family members who live away from home for the purposes of studies or work, but who continue to receive financial support from their family. Being thus based on a one-household income only, this phenomenon can be called the double-structured “home with living room”/“one-room studio apartment” model. And whereas it was once the norm that these young people would later move into an LDK type of house, nowadays they tend to stay in these mansions, thus leaving the older family members living alone in the houses originally meant to accommodate the entire family. At the same architects have started to redevelop the so-called “new towns” (i.e., dormitory towns) and large multiple dwellings by creating more common spaces as a countermeasure to the social isolation that people living alone tend to experience.

Diary writing has seen similar and related changes. Whereas housewives living in LDK housing types used to keep household accounts and family diaries, whilst their working husbands tended to write their personal feelings in their schedules or notebooks, there has been a new trend since 2001, mainly among people living in studio apartments who use blogs as a form of diary-writing. In general, the writing of household accounts and diaries is on the decline. On the other hand, the use of blogs and social networking services (SNS) is increasing; today, “writing diaries” has become more a means of associating with others and creating networks than recording one’s feelings or family life. Perhaps the freedom of being able to choose one’s life course lies in the ability of vulnerable individuals to maintain their own space whilst creating common spaces that exist between the private and public, where one can connect to others.

近代家族後のライフコース選択

—住まいによる空間編成／日記による時間編成

西川祐子報告

2010年10月23日午後の部

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- I はじめに: 選択の行為主体としての個人の出現
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- IV 近代家族後のライフコース選択: ネットワークとコミュニティ

2

I はじめに
—選択の行為主体としての個人—

- ライフコースの選択は、必ずしも新しいことではないが、選択の行為主体が現在では家族から個人へと変化したことが新しい。
- 社会の基礎単位が家族とみなされていた近代には、個人は家族を再生産するべきであるという確固たるモデルがあった。あらかじめ用意されたモデルを選択するか、しないかという問題設定には、選択の自由があるとは言えないであろう。
- 近代家族後の個人は、これまでのようにあらかじめ用意されたモデルを選択して一生を終えるのではない。

3

II 住まい空間と日常生活の変遷



4

家族の容器としての住まいモデルから
ワンルームへ

<家族の容器としての住まい>

- ① 囲炉裏端のある家 (「家」家族の容器)
- ② 茶の間のある家 (「家庭」家族の容器 その1)
- ③ リビングのある家 (「家庭」家族の容器 その2)

個室化へのキーワード=閉じる、区切る

<個人の容器としての住まい>

- ④ ワンルーム (個人の容器、居場所)

部屋と部屋のつながり方のキーワード=ひらく、つなぐ

5

しかし、街の風景は一線進化型ではない。4モデルの混在。



6

静態モデルから動態モデルへ
—繰り返す二重構造による微調整旧二重構造
「いろり端のある家」
(「家」家族の容器)「茶の間のある家」
(「家庭」家族の容器 その1)新二重構造
「リビングのある家」
(「家庭」家族の容器 その2)「ワンルーム」
(個人の容器、居場所)

※左が持ち家、右が借家(賃貸物件)の傾向

※時とともに二重構造の重心は左から右へ移る傾向

7

住まい空間と日常生活の変遷

変遷項目 住宅モデル	家族モデル	住まい空間の管轄主体	就寝形態	食事と団らんの形	調理場所	排泄場所	沐浴空間	光熱と水
1925年頃	いろり端のある家	「家」家族	旧家長	組み合わせ多様な共同就寝	いろり端に睡を並べる序列席	お勝手と土間	汲み取り式かわや屋外・屋内	まき井戸水あんどん
	茶の間のある家	「家庭」家族 その1	新家長	夫婦と子ども達の共同就寝	ちゃぶ台を囲む円卓式	台所	汲み取り式便所 屋内	銭湯ないし屋内風呂
1975年頃	リビングのある家	「家庭」家族 その2	主婦	夫婦/子ども達別就寝、子どもの性別別就寝	テーブルを囲みテレビに視線集中	キッチン	水洗式トイレ	屋内バスルーム
	ワンルーム	個人	個人	単独就寝	小テーブル 簡易ないしはバーチャイ式	ミニキッチン	水洗式トイレ	屋内バス・トイレ


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Ⅲ 住まい空間と日記の変遷 —日記帳日記からブログ日記まで—

9




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
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13



14



15



16



17



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住まい空間と日記の変遷

	変化 項目 住宅 モデル	日記帳 モデル	日記の 執筆者	日記執筆 の場所	日記帳の 形態と 文具	読者の 有無
1925 年頃	いろいろ端 のある家	家日記	旧家長	旧家長は書 院または家 長の座で	和紙の和綴じ 帳面に筆と墨で	家族ないし 子孫が読者の 原則
1975 年頃	茶の間の ある家	家庭(主婦) 日記と家計 簿／個人の (内面)日記	家庭日記は 主婦 個人日記は 新家長	主婦は茶の 間で 新家長は書 斎で	洋紙に印刷 製本の日記 帳にペン	家庭日記と家 計簿の読者は 家族／個人日 記は無読者
	リビングの ある家	家庭(主婦) 日記と家計 簿／個人の (内面)日記	家庭日記と 家計簿は主 夫／夫は手 帳	主婦はリビ ングで 夫は個人机 で	洋紙に印刷 製本の日記 帳にペン	家庭日記と家 計簿の読者は 家族／個人日 記は無読者
	ワンルーム	ブログ日記 内面日記	個人	個室で	パソコン	ブログは不 特定多数読 者、SNSは グループ

囲炉裏端のある家



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住まい空間と日常生活の変遷

変遷項目 住宅モデル	家族 モデル	住 まい 空間	就 寝 形態	食 事と 団らん の形	調 理 場所	排 泄 場所	沐 浴 空間	光 熱と 水
1925 年頃	「家」 家族 その1	「家」 家族 その1	就寝、子ども の性別 就寝	レベに視 線集中	「家」 家族 その1	「家」 家族 その1	「家」 家族 その1	「家」 家族 その1
1975 年頃	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2	就寝、子ども の性別 就寝	レベに視 線集中	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2
	個人	個人	単独就 寝	小テー ブル 個室な いしは パーティ ー式	ミニキ ッチン	水洗式 トイレ	屋内バ ス・トイ レ	水道・電 気・ガス

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住まい空間と日常生活の変遷

変遷項目 住宅モデル	家族 モデル	住 まい 空間 の管轄 主体	就 寝 形態	食 事と 団らん の形	調 理 場所	排 泄 場所	沐 浴 空間	光 熱と 水
1925 年頃	「家」 家族	旧家長	就寝、子ども の性別 就寝	レベに視 線集中	「家」 家族	「家」 家族	「家」 家族	「家」 家族
1975 年頃	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2	就寝、子ども の性別 就寝	レベに視 線集中	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2	「家庭」 家族 その2
	個人	個人	単独就 寝	小テー ブル 個室な いしは パーティ ー式	ミニキ ッチン	水洗式 トイレ	屋内バ ス・トイ レ	水道・電 気・ガス

23



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
住まい空間と日常生活の変遷								
変遷項目 住宅モデル	家族モデル	住まい空間の管轄主体	就寝形態	食事と団らんの形	調理場所	排泄場所	沐浴空間	光熱と水
1925年頃	「家」家族 いろいろ端のある家	旧家長	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室
1975年頃	「家庭」家族 茶の間の家 リビングのある家	家族その1 家族その2	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室
	ワンルーム	個人	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室


住まい空間と日常生活の変遷								
変遷項目 住宅モデル	家族モデル	住まい空間の管轄主体	就寝形態	食事と団らんの形	調理場所	排泄場所	沐浴空間	光熱と水
1925年頃	「家」家族 いろいろ端のある家	旧家長	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室
1975年頃	「家庭」家族 茶の間の家 リビングのある家	家族その1 家族その2	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室
	ワンルーム	個人	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室

住まい空間と日常生活の変遷								
変遷項目 住宅モデル	家族モデル	住まい空間の管轄主体	就寝形態	食事と団らんの形	調理場所	排泄場所	沐浴空間	光熱と水
1925年頃	「家」家族 いろいろ端のある家	旧家長	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室
1975年頃	「家庭」家族 茶の間の家 リビングのある家	家族その1 家族その2	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室
	ワンルーム	個人	和室	居間・食事室・台所	和室	洋室	洋室	洋室

住まい空間と日記の変遷					
変遷項目 住宅モデル	日記帳モデル	日記の執筆場所	日記帳の形態と文具	読者の有無	読者の有無
1925年頃	「家」家族 いろいろ端のある家	旧家長	和室	家族日記と家計簿の読者は家族／個人日記は無読者	家族日記と家計簿の読者は家族／個人日記は無読者
1975年頃	「家庭」家族 茶の間の家 リビングのある家	家族その1 家族その2	和室	家族日記と家計簿の読者は家族／個人日記は無読者	家族日記と家計簿の読者は家族／個人日記は無読者
	ワンルーム	個人	和室	家族日記と家計簿の読者は家族／個人日記は無読者	家族日記と家計簿の読者は家族／個人日記は無読者

IV 近代家族後のライフコース選択： ネットワークとコミュニティ






住まい空間と日常生活の変遷									
	変化項目	家族	住まい空間の管轄主体	就寝形態	食事と団らんの形	調理場所	排泄場所	沐浴空間	光熱と水
	住宅モデル	モデル	主体						
1925年頃	いろいろ端のある家	「家」家族	旧家長	組み合わせ多様な共同就寝	いろいろに睡を並べる列席	お勝手と土間	汲み取り式かわや屋外	屋外設置	まき井戸水あんどん
	茶の間のある家	「家庭」家族その1	新家長	夫婦と子ども達の共同就寝	ちゃぶ台を囲む円卓式	台所	汲み取り式便所 屋内	銭湯ないし屋内風呂	水道・電気ないし炭火・ガス
1975年頃	リビングのある家	「家庭」家族その2		夫婦／子ども連帯別就寝、子どもの性別別就寝	テーブルを囲みテレビに視線集中	キッチン	水洗式トイレ	屋内バスルーム	水道・電気・ガス
	ワンルーム	個人	個人	単独就寝	小テーブル 食卓ないしはパーティー式	ミニキッチン	水洗式トイレ	屋内バス・トイレ	水道・電気・ガス

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IV 近代家族後のライフコース選択： ネットワークとコミュニティ



おわりにーライフコースの落とし穴

- 「コース」という言葉には、競馬のトラックである race course のように、あらかじめ定められた、という含意がある。いくら数が多く、また自主的、主体的な選択であっても、選択肢からの選択は、選択の枠をきめる者にたいする従属に他ならない。ほんとうの選択とは日々、他者と交渉しつつ自分と他者たちのために新しい選択肢を創造することではないだろうか。

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西川 祐子

女性史・ジェンダー研究者。京都大学修士。パリ大学博士号（フランス語、フランス文学）。研究テーマは、近代における空間と時間。

Yuko NISHIKAWA is an independent scholar in women's history and gender study. She received a Master's degree in literature from Kyoto University and a Ph.D. in French literature from the Université de Paris. Her research interests are space and time of the modern ages.

ドイツにおける女性用住居コミュニティとライフコースとの関連性

Women's Housing Communities in Germany and their Relevance for Life Courses

ルート・ベッカー Ruth BECKER

ドイツでは女性用住宅コミュニティに関する断続的ではあるが、長い伝統が存在しており、それは中世のものから新旧の女性運動の文脈の中で現れた住居プロジェクトまで続いている。そして近年には再び、顕著な数で新しいプロジェクトが現れてきている。本報告では、中世のベギン修道会のコミュニティ、および戦前の女性運動の住居プロジェクトに見られた動機と概念について触れつつ、主として過去三十年間に展開された住居プロジェクトを中心に考察を進める。女性のために住居コミュニティを形成する動機とは何であろうか。女性は人生のどの段階でこのようなプロジェクトに関心を持つのか。この特定の住居形態はそこの女性住民にとって何を意味し、いかなる経験をもたらすのだろうか。なぜ今日の住居コミュニティは高齢女性によって占められているのか、またなぜこれらの女性が（男女）「混合」型の協同組合の中で最も重要なグループを構成しているのだろうか。本報告では 80 の住居プロジェクトを考察することで、これらの問題に答えてみたい。またこうしたプロジェクトの創始者と参加者へのインタビュー、および筆者の参与観察を通じて得られたデータをもとに分析を行う。プロジェクトごとにあらゆる歴史的、社会的差異は見られるが、女性のための住居コミュニティは社会の未解決の問題に対する答えを提示していると主張できよう。それは、中世においては女性の独立した生活への選択肢の欠如への救済であったが、今日では異性パートナーとの不安定な関係、シングル・マザーの厳しい生活環境、高齢者女性の新しい生き方の探求、そして自らが同性愛者であることを「表明 (coming out)」した女性への救済となっている。

ルート・ベッカー

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Ruth BECKER is a Professor at the Dortmund University of Technology, where she also received her Dr. rer. pol.. She was the head of the coordination office of the Women's Research Network of Northrhine-Westfalia from 1998 to 2009. She is currently an editor of the journal, *Gender. Zeitschrift für Geschlecht, Kultur, Gesellschaft* (Journal for Gender, Culture, Society). She specializes in gender studies, housing and urban planning. Her research interests are analyses of the processes of gendering spatial structures, the development of forms of life, ideas of housing and social spaces and of the social, economic and spatial aspects of housing provision, as well as concepts of feminist urban planning and feminist concepts of housing.

Relevance of Housing Communities of Women for the life course in Germany

In the last 30 years a significant number of housing communities have been created in Germany - by women, for women. Both the motivation and the aims of the women living in these communities is the focus of my presentation which is based on analyses of over 80 projects (Becker 2009) and also on my own personal experience.



The motivation of the women involved in these projects can only be fully understood by first looking at the housing situation women are confronted with. My thesis is that housing is one of the most important aspects of gender relations. The housing situations of individuals are strongly influenced by the gender regime of a society. Gender hierarchy, different gender roles, rights and options lead to specific dominant housing concepts. The indicators of gender hierarchy regarding housing, for example, are:

- Whether women are allowed to decide where and with whom they live
- Whether women have the means to decide where and with whom they want to live
- Whether women are discriminated against if they decide to create an alternative housing concept
- Whether women are in danger of experiencing violence in their homes
- Whether women have more duties in housework than male cohabitants
- Whether women can participate equally in decisions about designing and using space
- Whether the interests of women in the home are respected by cohabitants

Women's alternative housing concepts can be seen as a response to the still widespread existing aspects of gender hierarchy in housing (Becker 2010).

Housing communities for women in European history – the Beguines

The first concept for women housing independently in Europe are the Beguinages, a housing estate for a community of women. The Beguinages were founded by women in the 12th century, called Beguines, as an alternative for women who would or could not live as married wives. At this time a large number of men left Europe to take part in the crusades. Therefore women outnumbered men and a lot of unmarried women had no alternative except to join a religious order.

In this situation the Beguinages offered women the possibility to live in a community outside marriage and without the constraints of enclosure in a religious order. Unlike nuns, Beguines could keep their property and also could later on leave the Convent of the Beguines. It was possible to stay only for a time in the Beguinage whereas the decision to marry or to become a nun had lifelong consequences (Opitz 1993).

Additionally Beguines' Convents had some democratic aspects. Unlike monasteries each "Beguines' convent" developed its own rules and principles. However there were some shared aspects such as religious activities and economic independence. The convents were often built near hospitals as the Beguines were often engaged in nursing. Some also worked in handicrafts. They were economically independent through their work which was very unusual for women at

this time. The Beguine convents grew rapidly, some had more than a thousand inhabitants and in the 12th and 13th century they had political influence although sometimes they were persecuted by the Catholic Church (Wehrli-Johns/Opitz 1998). Some Beguinages (housing estates – for example in Amsterdam) still exist, but are not longer inhabited by beguines.

Housing Communities developed by the First Women's Movement in Germany

The second, alternative historical concept of housing for women which I want to present is the housing activities of the feminist movement at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Women engaged in the feminist movement e.g. in Germany developed concepts in order to meet the housing problems of a growing number of single women. It was very difficult, especially for educated women who worked as teachers or in semi-professional occupations, to find adequate living space. Their income was too low to rent a flat and the living pattern of single males – sub-tenancy – was largely impossible for women, as most landlords prohibited tenants from subletting a room to a single woman. At the same time, women living alone were in danger of being seen as a prostitute. Consequently, single women mostly lived in the household of a male relative in a subordinated position.

In answer to these problems, the feminist movement developed residential homes for single women. Some were primarily for women still working whilst others offered housing for female pensioners. Some homes were exclusively for women of a specific profession, like teachers. Mostly the women had a flat with a small kitchen, although a lot of these homes offered the women housekeeping service including meals. The idea behind this concept was that women with a profession or an occupation should have the same rights as men, who also do not do housework after having worked outside the home. In most of the residences inhabitants had strong social attachments. Some of the homes had a special room for gatherings and social events. The center of these activities was in Berlin (Terlinden/ von Oertzen 2006).

In conclusion we can say that the motives for the activities of the women's movement at the end of the 19th century were comparable to those of the Beguinages. In both cases the motive was the lack of independent housing possibilities for women outside marriage. And in both these cases the housing concepts offered women a possibility to live in a community without subordination to a male head of the household. The difference to the convents of the Beguines was that the inhabitants did not work together but had their occupations outside.

The rising number of women-headed households and the consequences of living alone

After the Second World War the nuclear family with a male head of the household definitely became the standardized housing norm in Germany. There were, in fact, a lot of single women and widows with children, but single mothers and their children were rather seen as an "incomplete family". This term shows very clearly the subordinated position of single mothers in the society of this time. Housing policies concentrated on nuclear families, therefore single women did not have a chance to get a flat of their own. Again politically active women tried to solve this problem by building houses for women with an occupation, but because of lack of money only a few projects came to fruition in the 1960's.

With the development of the second feminist movement in the 1970's the behavior and the possibilities of women changed. A lot of women no longer accepted their subordinated position. More and more women got a professional training and thereafter got a better job. Moreover

married women continued to work outside their home even when they had children. Additionally young women also had a period of post-adolescence and left the household of the parents to live alone or as an unmarried couple with a partner. On average, for some years now, it is the young women rather than young men who leave the parental home a little bit earlier. Elderly and older women prefer to maintain their household after the children have left and the husband has died instead of moving into the household of one of their children, as many widows did in the past.

In consequence, nowadays the nuclear family is no longer the dominant form of households. More than one third of all households are one person-households; in big cities the proportion is even more than 50 percent. The majority of one-person-households are households of women (mostly because women live longer). Only 22 percent of all households are traditional nuclear families, i.e. married parents with children, but one out of five children live only with one parent, mostly the mother. The increasing number of single mothers is a result of the increasing number of divorces, the majority of which are initiated by women (Becker 2003).

In most sociological articles these developments are interpreted as a result of "individualization", characteristic of "post-modern societies". But this interpretation does not consider the social change in gender relations. In a feminist view the new living arrangements are seen mostly as a response of women to hierarchal gender relations – which they no longer accept.

Evidence is given for example by Martina Löw, who interviewed women living alone in Germany between the ages of 24 and 45 (Löw 1994). Löw came to the conclusion that the increasing number of women living alone is an individual answer to unsolved societal problems. The women interviewed pointed out that they do not reject heterosexual relationships in principal, but prefer to live alone because only this allows them to realize their concepts of living. Because, even if the partners agree on an equal gender relationship – it couldn't be realized in every-day life because of the still existing gender hierarchy in society.

A rising number of female headed households are not only a phenomenon in western societies. On the contrary: Woman-headed households are very common in southern Africa (with a share of 42%), and the Caribbean (with 36%) and a little less in the "developed world" (with 27% to 31%), whereas they are very rare in Southern and in Western Asia (9% and 10% respectively), Northern Africa (12%) and Oceania (15%). These data show clearly that the prevalence of woman-headed households is not (only) related to economic "development", as the highest and the lowest percentages can be found in so called developing countries. There must, therefore, be other factors influencing the prevalence of female headed households (Becker 2003).

The sociologist Silvia Chant, analyzing woman-headed households in three different countries (from different world regions), found three main factors for the prevalence of woman-headed households:

The first factor is, "that women have the means of surviving economically without male partners and/or can support children partly or wholly through their earnings". The second factor is "that women are able to some degree or in some way to cope with the social pressures to which they are frequently subjected for not residing with spouses". The third factor is "that the financial and/or psychological gains of living with men do not outweigh those attached to living alone, with other women, and/or with their children" (Chant 1997, p.257).

It seems that, worldwide, living alone, and/or with their children or with other women is becoming attractive for more and more women. The United Nations as early as 1995 came to the conclusion that one third of all households worldwide were woman-headed households.

The disadvantages of living alone

Although living alone seems to be becoming more attractive for women it also has some disadvantages:

Besides the basic need of a shelter, housing has at least two other important functions: On the one hand housing is a place of privacy, of self fulfilment, of free behaviour, it is a sphere where one can do what she/he wants, a space outside public control. Living alone can support this function of housing perfectly. On the other hand housing is a place of personal relationships and social interaction. Also these social interactions are very important for personal development and living alone is not the best way to fulfil this need of housing. The problem is the potential conflict between these two aspects of housing because often cohabitants may have different ideas of all relevant aspects of living together and therefore it is not possible, at least for some inhabitants, to realize their need for both self fulfilment and social interaction.

In most societies the standardized concepts are based on difference and hierarchy. The cohabitants have different rights and different duties, depending on age, economic position, and first of all on gender. Therefore in a patriarchal society it can be better for women to live without men although this may comprise aspects of isolation. The danger of isolation is especially relevant for older women/men who do not leave the home often.

Housing Community Projects of the Second Women's Movement in Germany

Housing communities for women are a concept to solve the conflict between the two function of housing – privacy and social interaction – in a new way. They want to offer women a living space, where both – privacy and social interaction – are possible without hierarchical structures.

The self-concept of the new beguines, who refer to the tradition of the medieval beguines, expresses the principle ideas of the housing communities for women very well:

“We, beguines of today, are based on the political equality of women, on the absence of violence, and on the community of women. We refer to the competence and spirituality of women. We support one another and campaign for innovative economic structures and a sustainable coexistence with nature”(Dachverband der Beginen, website, Translation R.B.)).

Mutual support and mutual respect especially, equality of women and lack of violence are very typical aims which can be found in almost all types of housing communities for women. The principle idea is that in communities for women it is easier to develop non-hierarchical living arrangements and interactions due to the fact that there is no gender hierarchy.

Besides these common aims community housing of women has developed different concepts depending on the women involved.

Projects of young feminists in the 1980's

In Germany the first housing communities for women were developed in the 1980's mostly by young women, active in the second feminist movement. Their aims were not only to create living space for women but also to create a women-only public sphere for the women in the neighborhood. Therefore these housing communities often integrated a public space like a café or a center for women or at least they opened their common room (which normally is only open for

the inhabitants) from time to time to the (female) neighborhood. The women in these housing communities were mostly politically active and wanted to create alternative concepts of working outside the rules of capitalism and patriarchy. As most of the inhabitants were young when these first communities were created, working together was more relevant than mutual support. A lot of the women in this type of housing are lesbians who preferred living in a community instead of living alone or with a female partner. Some of these first community housing projects still exist with the same principles although there are also new members. As communal housing ownership is central for some of the politically oriented housing communities for women, some of the communities founded co-operative societies which are only open to women. Often these co-operatives are supported by feminists who are not inhabitants of the housing project who see a women's co-operative as a response to the gender gap in income and property. Most of these supporters are female professionals of middle age with a higher income.

Projects of Women “after the family phase”

In the more recently founded projects we have a slight change of actors and of aims. Although there may still be some young women involved (mostly, but not exclusively lesbians) the most active group are middle-aged women and especially women in their fifties or sixties. Many of them have adult children and are widows or divorced. Therefore they have experienced traditional family life, but this phase has ended for them and they look for an alternative form of housing, offering an individual, self determined life combined with the option of social interaction. Today's activists were often active in the second feminist movement of Germany in the 1970's and 1980's. Independent of the kind of life they had had in their active time, becoming older they want to have an alternative housing situation. A typical example of these projects is the “Beginenhof Berlin”, a house with 53 flats built in 2007. They describe their ideas as follows:

“Our vision is a house in which a community arises, built on voluntariness and awareness. A vital and familiar neighborhood in which women of each age ... can live in solidarity – of course in autonomy and with the option to retreat. ...Various stimulations, common activities, mutual support and appreciation improve our lust for life and quality of life. In difficult situations support can be provided by many. The social net in the community offers a protective background even if professional help will be necessary” (Beginenwerk e.V., website, Translation R.B.).

Although the project is open for women of every age, the dominant group are women already retired. They think about the questions of “how can I have a good life after my family-oriented phase of life” and “what is going to happen when I am no longer able to take care of myself”. They hope to extend the phase of life with high quality with the alternative housing form. They believe in the possibility to develop a non-hierarchal communication and interaction in a community of women.

Project for older women

Different from this is a third group of community housing project. The women-only structure of the inhabitants was (at the beginning) not an aim of the project. Some communities of older women were open for all older persons in general. But finally they became a women's project because no men were interested or men interested had different ideas of living in a project. The very fact that older women are more interest in community housing projects than men results from

two aspects of gender differences.

Firstly, there are fewer older men than women who are widowed or divorced. This derives from the fact that women mostly marry a man who is some years older and that women on average live longer than men: Married women face a widowhood of approximately ten years. Additionally, fewer divorced women than men tend to marry again.

Secondly, men – especially older men – more often have traditional ideas of a gender based division of work. Often female inhabitants in the housing communities said that men who asked for participation were not accepted in the community as they expected to find a situation like in a traditional partnership, where women do all the housework. But this concept does not fit to the idea of mutual support and a self-determined life.

The hope not to have to go into a traditional old peoples' home is a very strong motive for joining a housing project for women. Traditional “old peoples' homes” are disliked by a growing number because these homes have the reputation that the inhabitants are supported but at the same time lose their autonomy. On the other side, living with a daughter or a daughter-in-law is no longer an accepted alternative – although the majority of old people who need care live in the household of a daughter or a daughter-in-law. However, the increased number of women with an occupation make the family-care-system for elderly people more complicated. A lot of senior women do not expect to be cared for by their daughters (or sons) in case of sickness or need for care. One of the projects for elderly women therefore created the slogan: “Not alone and not in a old peoples' home” As elderly people are in danger of a sudden serious illness, some communities of elderly women have developed a system of mutual attentiveness to avoid what not seldom happens to those living alone: They suffer a collapse and can neither help themselves nor call somebody for help. Therefore in some communities a system of “daily visits” exists.

Projects for single mothers

There is a further group of women living in community housing projects for women. Mostly they are in a minority, but there are also some projects especially for them: Single mothers with dependent children. Single mothers are in a difficult life situation: the responsibility for children is a severe obstacle to getting an adequate job. Additionally a lot of fathers do not pay for their children. Therefore single mothers, in Germany, are the group with the highest risk of poverty. A lot of single mothers report discrimination and isolation. Community housing projects for single mothers try to establish a system of mutual support, for example, in child care in order to give the mothers more time for individual interests. Obviously these projects are a needed answer to the lack of adequate support for single mothers in German society. There is still a lack of sufficient child care institutions and of social housing for single mothers and their children, as housing policy has long concentrated on the needs of so called “complete families”.

In conclusion we can say that community housing projects for women are an answer to the lack of social change in politics as well as in personal relations towards a non-hierarchal non-discriminating gender relation. The women involved in the communities developed an answer to this lack of social change – and initiated by this a fundamental social change, a new housing concept which replaces the family with a chosen (elective) affinity to persons who all accept the idea of mutual respect.

However, a housing community for women cannot solve all problems which can arise in social interaction. The experience of more than 30 years has shown that hierarchal structures can appear

even in housing communities for women. Some women leave the community because their expectations have not been fulfilled. Mostly they feel that they have not gotten the kind of attention and support they wanted – or because of differences in ideas of behavior. The majority of the inhabitants seem to be content with the housing situation – at least in the long term. The initiator of a project for 10 single mothers, created 20 years ago, told me: Our children are all out of the house but we, the mothers want to stay and to continue our life together. We are now changing our community to a community for older women.

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居住履歴に見る高齢者の共生型・参加型住宅の選択

Older Residents in Communal Forms of Living: What Do their Biographies Reveal about their Housing Decisions?

マーレン・ゴツィック Maren GODZIK

近年日本において、共生型・参加型住宅が高齢者に受け入れられつつある。共生型・参加型住宅には通常、生活設備が整った小規模住戸と、その住人全員が利用できるキッチンやダイニングルームなどの広いコモン・スペースが備わっている。住人はそれぞれ独立して生活を送ることができる一方、共同生活者や住宅運営に携わる非営利組織によるサポートも受けることができる。共生型・参加型住宅の数はまだ少ないが、過去数十年間に起こっている家族・世帯構成、そして介護環境の変化に対する解決策として大きな注目を集めている。この変化は少子化、それに伴う家族の小規模化、高齢者人口の増加などの人口動態によって引き起こされたものであるが、こういった理由とは別に、もう一つの原因は社会変容、つまり生活環境及び生活様式の変化、それに伴う個人の経験、意識の変化であると思われる。本報告では2009年と2010年に共生型・参加型住宅共同体型住宅に住む高齢者に行ったインタビュー調査に基づき、いかに個々人の生活、特に彼らの居住履歴とその生活環境が、老後、共生型・参加型住宅を選択することに影響したのかを考察する。



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Older residents in communal forms of living: What do their biographies reveal about their housing decisions?

1. Introduction

I do not want to become like my mother(-in-law), I thought. I do not want to live with my children [...]. (Mrs. Sanō., 66, widowed, who experienced 30 years of care for her mother-in-law)

Within the system of the modern family that had developed after World War II, elderly people had been living with one of their children in three-generational households.²¹ Today, the ideal that elderly people live with their children still persists and in fact 45 per cent of the population aged 65 and older live with their children in one household (Naikakufu 2008). The rising numbers of elderly-only households (including couple households) in the last few decades, therefore, has been perceived as a serious problem in Japan, which is often discussed as a sign of dissolving families, hinting at the still powerful norm of multi-generational living arrangements.

Mrs. Sano of the above example, who had cared her mother-in-law living in the same household for most of the time, was fulfilling quite a traditional daughter-in-law role. After thirty years of care, a period of time, in which as she mentions, she did not even have enough time for her own children, her mother-in-law eventually passed away. By that time Mrs. Sano was 55 years old and widowed. The next ten years she spent her life as she said “like a threadless kite” travelling and pursuing her hobbies. A minor injury reminded her of the fact that she probably would not be able to lead an independent life forever. With her profound aversion to moving in with her children, because she could not imagine to be a burden to them as her mother-in-law had been to her, and apparently not being troubled by thoughts concerning the family altar or keeping the family’s house in the family, she started thinking about and actively looking for a new place to live. She was able to sell her house and moved into a communal form of housing, where she has been living with nine other elderly women and where I had the chance to interview her.

Although the extent to which Mrs Sano took over the role of the traditional daughter-in-law may have been extreme, her life course is not an exception for her cohort – she had married a colleague at the age of 23, quit her job to be a housewife, had two children and as the wife of an oldest son she cared for her mother in law. Her decision for a communal form of living, however, is far from being usual.

1.1 Older residents of communal forms of housing

Although communal forms of housing have attained broad media coverage, they are still an exceptional way of living in Japan, even more so than in most Western countries, including Germany. People who choose a communal house, therefore, presumably have made experiences during their lives that have influenced to their decisions to live in an environment deviating from the norms. As a subject of research residents of this kind of housing can be defined as extreme

²¹ Although young couples often live by themselves after marriage for a number of years, in later years the households is often shared with the parents, which resulted in a large share of tree-generation households (cf. Ochiai 2004: vi–vii).

cases, which, according to Flyvbjerg (2006) and others, “reveal more information because they activate ... more basic mechanisms in the situation studied”. Consequently it may be possible to regard the residents and their housing biographies as pioneering in a social environment that is changing in general.

This paper presents results of the interviews I conducted in 2009 and 2010 with older residents living in communal forms of housing with the aim of shedding some light on why older people choose a communal house and how their decisions reflect their individual lives and their housing biographies – and – more generally – how their life courses are different to earlier generations’ older people.

I begin this paper by giving a description of some of the main characteristics of communal housing in Japan that are open to elderly people. I will go on with introducing my approach and my sample and then presenting some quotes from interviews, which, indeed, do suggest that today’s older people have experienced different housing and living arrangements than older generations and have experienced the phase of old age of their parents’ generation in a different way from their parents had. Moreover, they often have means at their disposal that allow them to negotiate their housing choice, as I will show in the discussion part of this presentation, before giving a concluding remark.

2. Communal housing for elderly people

Communal housing is not unique to Japan and communal forms of living for people not related by family ties have existed in various forms throughout the history in many cultures. In *modern* societies they have been organized for – roughly speaking – two reasons (Vestbro 2008): the rationalization of life and the criticism of conventional families/households.²² Despite similarities, having emerged in a different social and historical context, communal houses *today* pursue different goals, which are less ideological, more practical solutions to today’s life constraints (Vestbro 2008: 8). But they can certainly be decoded as a criticism of conventional ways of living as not being appropriate for today’s demands.

Communal housing in today’s Japan can be divided into age homogeneous and multi-generational types. Communal houses for older people (*group living*, グループリビング) try to create a form of living enabling older people to lead an independent life – independent from institutions such as old people’s homes and independent from their families – but they also provide an environment allowing the elderly to grow old in familiar and secure surroundings with support provided if necessary.

Multigenerational communal houses (collective housing, コレクティブハウジング) aim at offering an alternative to closed nuclear family housing. They form a community of neighbours within the anonymity of an urban environment. They are not specially prepared to adjust to the needs of frail people, but aim at forming a sense of togetherness that may help older and younger people if they require support.

²² In Japan, the Dōjunkai apartment houses of the 1920s and 1930s of which some were built with dining rooms and other common facilities followed these principles.

Most communal houses are organized with the support of non-profit organizations, some by individuals. As for the architectural structure, both kinds of houses usually have fully equipped but small size apartments allowing residents to lead an independent and self-determined life and large common space such as kitchens and dining rooms which can be used by all residents.

3. Approach: Elderly people and their housing biographies

According to life-course research, experiences of life differ in accordance with one's age cohort, the historical background and the social surroundings of a given time and place. Given that the ideas and preferences about how to live are presumably shaped by the living and housing situations during the life courses choices of housing at an advanced stage of life can be related to these earlier experiences (Narten 1991; Holland 2001).²³ The range of choice, however, is restricted by one's financial means and one's needs, in the case of elderly people often health related requirements (or the fear of not being able to live without support), which makes it necessary to negotiate between these factors. Housing biographies are inseparable intertwined with other realms of life such as family and work. Consequently, it is necessary to analyse the broader circumstances of lives. As an approach, therefore, I chose in-depth interviews conducted with older people living in communal forms of housing focussing on their individual housing histories.

4. Sample and biographies of residents

The houses where I conducted the interviews were located in and around Tokyo and in two middle sized cities in other prefectures, mostly in residential neighbourhoods. My interview partners were aged between 57 and 89. Of the 25 interviewees 21 were women reflecting not only the fact that elderly women form the majority of elderly people in general but also that the vast majority of the residents of communal houses I visited were women. Their familial backgrounds can be summarized as follows: The majority came from a more or less economically stable background and had been living in detached houses as children in middle sized cities. Women (and men) born before the 1950s had much less access to education than today. My interviewees had a higher education than the average of their cohort. Most had graduated from high school (or the pre-war equivalent), a few had a degree from a teachers training college. Most of the interviewees had been married and had children; at the time of the interviews more than half of them were widowed. During their lives, however, divorce and remarriage was more frequent than I had expected from quantitative cohort data. Most of my interviewees were in relatively good health at the time of the interviews.

5. Moving into a collective house

Concerning their decisions to move into a communal house, critical life events such as the loss of the spouse and a feeling of insecurity due to declining health or the fear of declining health as in the case of Mrs. Sano and at the same time, not wanting to be a burden to their children, played an

²³ Over the course of their lives, older people inevitably had experienced a number of different housing situations. Even if the physical structure of the house remains the same in – the rare – cases of a person that had not moved all his/her life, not only does the neighbourhood usually change over the years, but the life within the house changes considerably: Household members newly emerge and other vanish; the role within the household changes; rooms are used differently; and attitudes towards the living environment changes.

important role (cf. Wu 2004; Nakano 2005). Two further examples are to illustrate further reasons for their choice:

Mrs. Uehara had been living together with her husband, children and her mother in her parents' house where she had cared for her mother for decades. When she was 75 years old she decided that she preferred not to continue to live according to conventions. Instead she moved into a communal house for the elderly (*group living*).

We had this two-family house. But I thought, I couldn't let my son take care of me for the rest of my life. [...] The life of young people is different, even if it's your son or daughter [...]. I also wanted some older companions.

[...] My son approved of my decision [laughs]. And now he and my daughter-in-law are really grateful. It seems that you get along better if you don't live under the same roof. (Mrs U., 79, widowed)

Mrs. Isobe, 64, widowed, who was one of the few who did not have any children, but who had been involved in care tasks over a longer period of time, defined quite clearly what it meant to her to live in a communal house in contrast to a life with close family members:

My sister said 'move in'. But I didn't like the idea. [...] She said 'we are sisters, and even if we don't get along well, we are still sisters. That's different from living with people you don't know. Isn't it good to live together as sisters?' [...] But I was scolded by her almost every day - for not hanging up the washing in the correct way and such things.

But then I met [the people of the collective housing project]. [...] they have a sense of distance. One can become close friends, I think. These are all people that have the right attitude of non-intrusion. That's why one can become friends.

6. Discussion and conclusion

Summarised the interviewees provided me with the following information about changing life courses and the housing choices of older people:

There were only very few among my interviewees whose biographies deviated largely from their cohort's. Their adult lives roughly coincide with the emergence of the modern Japanese family system as it developed in the decades following World War II due to socio-economic developments, urbanization and migration to metropolitan areas from rural regions and which created life models resulting in standard biographies. My interviewees mostly stuck to these biographies in the first half of their lives: In their younger and middle aged lives they experienced nuclear families with emotionally close ties with their two or three children contrasting with to their childhood experiences of a larger, less clear-cut household, where hierarchical relationships tended to be stronger.²⁴

For elderly people during this time, that is the parent generation of my interviewees, a standard

²⁴ For the shift to more intimate relationships within the family, see Fujisaki 1998, Ochiai 2004, Matsuoka 2008 and Ueno 2009.

way of life began to emerge, too. The improvement of the living conditions and medical developments led to longer life spans, but often resulted in increased long-term care requirements. The demographic situation and social norms favoured a life within the family with daughters-in-law being responsible for care tasks, backed up by a welfare policy framework promoting familial responsibilities and not providing any alternatives: Old people's homes were perceived as the last resort for those who could not rely on family members (cf. Ochiai 2004; Long 2008). Most of my interviewees had been responsible for the care of relatives (parents, parents-in-laws and husbands) over a long period of time and which often meant that they shared one household for some time at least.

My interviewees expected that they would require care for a longer period of time *themselves* at some point in the future, but they did not want to burden their children with this task and be dependent on them. Compared to earlier generations they are relatively affluent and healthy. The pension system as well as the public long-term care insurance provide means for them, their parental generation could not rely on. Moreover, Japan's demographic change, the rapid ageing of society, has generated an awareness among a broad segment of society that works in favour of the development and acceptance of new lifestyles and new forms of living arrangements of older people.

Although the residents of communal houses have family members living nearby who partly even offered to share their houses with their parent, my interviewees deviated from the older generations' living arrangements. In many cases the move into a communal house was due to the emotional bonds between family members and not to a "dissolution of the family", thus reflecting a transformation of the family's role. Most residents were able to maintain a good relationship with their children *because* they lived in different households. Exceptions of course do exist. For some "friends" or "companions" were seen as similarly important as their family.

My interviewees took a proactive stance by making the choice for a communal house. In their views the communal houses offer them like-minded co-residents and an environment in that they feel more independent and self-determined compared to living with their families. Their pioneering step concerning their housing decision²⁵ contributes to the formation of a new self-perception of older people.

With regard to a larger segment of Japan's older people, there are certainly many constraints concerning communal houses for older people. Presumably for the larger part objections to it derive from what people think is "appropriate" or "normal". On the other hand, in the process of the ageing of Japan's society, manifold solutions of housing are desirable, as needs and preferences are diversifying.

In 1994 Ochiai Emiko came to the conclusion that

²⁵ Although being less expensive than many commercial forms of residential facilities for the elderly, the monthly rent is only affordable for those women who were employed continuously, if one takes the national pension of a single woman as basis of comparison (as some of the houses do). In fact, many the interviewees have to rely on assets e.g. from selling a house, or, even more common, from financial support from their children – making them dependent on their family again. Communal housing lacks official support that enables more people with less favourable financial means to choose this housing form.

...the transition to the individual as the basic unit of society does not necessarily mean that more people will live alone. Since stable personal relationships often provide deep emotional experiences, there is every reason to think that people who are economically and practically quite capable of living on their own will nevertheless choose to live together. But the resulting “families” will differ from those of a society where the family is automatically assumed to be the basic unit, because the individuals concerned will have formed them voluntarily (Ochiai 1996: 181).

Ochiai Emiko probably had younger women and men in mind, but it seems to me that her reasoning can also be applied to older people.

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現代日本における生きがいとライフコース

*Ikigai and the Lifecourse in Japan Today*ゴードン・マシューズ **Gordon MATHEWS**

本報告では今日の日本のライフコースに見られる「生きがい」、すなわち、人生を価値のあるものとするものの意味の変化について検討する。戦後の日本では、生きがいは「仕事」と「家庭」がその典型と考えられてきたが、この二つが深刻なまでに揺らいでいる。極めて少数派であるが、独身で、将来の展望のある職に就かない「パラサイトシングル」、「フリーター」と呼ばれる二十代、三十代の成人は、彼らの両親が持っていた大人は何のために生きるべきかという意味を放棄、ないし放棄せざるを得なくなっており、このことは社会の再生産において重大な帰結をもたらしている。戦後の



ベビーブーム世代である彼らの両親はというと、ボランティア活動に従事したり、定年後の楽しみに没頭する者もいるが、全盛期には社会的役割に徹し、今では戻るべき自分自身というものを持たない、ただ待つだけの者もいる。日本経済の衰退は社会的正統性の低下を映し出されている。これは「役割や集団への帰属」から「自己実現のために自分の道を追求すること」へと移る、生きがいのあり方の長期的な文化的変動に関係している。この後者の形成については過去数十年の間に文化的には強調されているが、制度的、社会的には今日の殆どの日本人にとって問題の多いもので、この差が日本の現在の不安感を生み出すこととなっている。要するに、個人がどのように生きるべきかについての文化的願望と社会の現実との差が広がりつつあるため、生きがいは日本においてライフコースを通じて問題の多きものとなっている。

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***Ikigai* and the Lifedourse in Japan Today**

Ikigai is a Japanese term whose primary meaning is “that which makes life worth living.” The most common *ikigai* in Japan have been family and work, with personal dreams and religious belief also held, according to opinion polls as well as my own research (Mathews 1996); but the meaning of these *ikigai* has been disputed in many popular books in recent decades. Are individual dreams the ideal of what one should live for, as some Japanese popular writers have maintained, or are dreams the stuff of childish selfishness, that one should discard in an adulthood spent in living for others, as other writers have maintained? In Japan in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, while the cultural ideal of *ikigai* expressed by a number of popular writers was that of living out one’s personal dreams, the social reality readily embraced by most Japanese was that of living out standard social norms, of women living for their families and men living for their work in order to support their families. This was the standard *ikigai* during those years.

In today’s Japan, however, these standard *ikigai* have been shaken, at both ends of the adult lifecourse. For young adults in their twenties and thirties, a significant minority—*parasaito shinguru* and *furiitaa*, those who remain single and those who do not have career-track jobs—have abandoned or been forced to abandon their parents’ senses of what an adult should live for, with significant consequences for Japan’s social reproduction. These young people may never hold their parents’ *ikigai* of work or family, whether because they choose not to or because the opportunities for such *ikigai* never realistically arise. As for older adults, the parents’ generation of these young people, making up the Japanese baby boom generation now retiring, some turn to volunteering, while others actively engage in personal retirement pursuits; but many more only wait, having surrendered themselves to social roles during their prime years, and now finding themselves with no selves left to which to return.

This problem of what to live for seems to continue up to the very elderly, and even to death and beyond, as we will see. By analyzing *ikigai* particularly in terms of those at the entrance and exit ramps of the Japanese institutionalized adult lifecourse, we can understand the difficulties of finding *ikigai* in Japan today. In this paper, based on a range of recent interviews I have conducted with young people and their elders (sometimes follow-up interviews from my *ikigai* research of twenty years ago), and also on my own recent readings of Japanese books on *ikigai* published over the past decade, I first discuss the different formulations of *ikigai* and how they have shifted in recent years. I then explore *ikigai* over the Japanese lifecourse, and consider what this indicates about Japan as a society.

Changing Conceptions of *Ikigai*

The term *ikigai* has a complicated etymological history, as discussed by Wada (2001: 28-32). The term was used as early as the *Taiheiki*, referring to the fulfillment of socially recognized values and roles. By the late 19th century, however, the term had effectively died out in Japanese usage, and vanished from dictionaries for several decades; it was revived by writers such as Natsume Soseki, seeking to describe a new sense, brought about by modernism, of fulfilling one’s own individual purpose in life. Thus *ikigai* historically shifted in its meaning, from signifying one’s commitment to group and role up to the late 19th century to signifying the pursuit of self in the opening decades of the 20th century.

Over the past half-century, both these concepts of *ikigai* have had their adherents. Some writers have advocated *ikigai* as “commitment to group and role,” using the term *ittaikan* [~ “sense

of oneness with"] (for example, Niwano 1969); others have advocated *ikigai* as "self-realization" [*jiko jitsugen*] (for example, Kamiya 1980 and especially Kobayashi 1989). *Ikigai* as "commitment to group" connotes that one's dominant loyalty should be to the social group and role to which one belongs: one should play one's role to the hilt, as, for example, worker or mother, devoting oneself wholly to one's company or family because this role was the essence of one's being. *Ikigai* as "self-realization" connotes that one's dominant orientation should be towards the growth of the self. One might still be devoted to company or to family, but for different reasons—one may feel that devoting oneself to one's company or family might provide maximum fulfillment for oneself as a human being. In outward appearance, these might appear similar, but in underlying orientation they are distinct: for example, should one devote oneself to one's children because this is what one should do as a mother, or because this is the deepest self-fulfillment that one can attain? If the former is the answer, then one will be committed to one's children by definition. If the latter is the answer, then one may, for example, feel justified in leaving one's children if they don't provide self-fulfillment (even if social pressure may prevent one from acting on this feeling).

Based on an analysis of Japanese books and articles (1996: 12-26), I explored in my earlier book how these two concepts of *ikigai* were in contestation in the early 1990s, with "self-realization" somewhat more advocated as to how one should live. I initially found this remarkable, given the fact that Japanese institutions tended to leave so little room for the pursuit of "self-realization," emphasizing so strongly the individual's immersion in role and group. I then realized that it was because many Japanese could not find "self-realization" in their institutionalized lives that they sought it instead in their *ikigai* dreams of individual fulfillment. I argued in my 1996 book that self-realization was winning out over commitment to group as a dominant conception of *ikigai* in Japan, but that what this actually meant was unclear—was self-realization really becoming a dominant mode of life in Japan, or was it merely a cultural dream, overshadowed by the dominant institutionally-enforced reality of commitment to group? The latter was closer to reality, I conjectured.

Today, *ikigai* as self-realization continues to be a dominant Japanese cultural conception, judging from the many books in bookstores extolling living for oneself. Books extolling living for one's company can hardly be found. However, Japanese institutions governing the situation of work and family continue to be extremely powerful, making living for oneself rather than for one's work or family particularly difficult. And yet two groups are in a sense forced to live for themselves: the young, who have not yet entered the realm of work and family, and may never do so as did their parents, and the elderly, who have in a sense been expelled from the realm of work and family, and now may feel little choice but to somehow fend for themselves. Let us consider each of these groups in turn.

Ikigai and the Young

Over the past several years I have spent much time reading the various books written in Japan on *ikigai* over the past decade. This *ikigai* literature is focused to a very large extent on the aging and the elderly, with almost no discussion of the young. Indeed, there is only one book on *ikigai* I know of that discusses the *ikigai* difficulties of young adults today (Moritomi 2004: 48-56): arguing, quite rightly, that the objective conditions of Japanese employment make it very difficult for young men and women to find *ikigai* in their companies, as did many of their fathers. But this is apparently a lone voice. There is an *ikigai* crisis taking place in Japan today among the young, with a significant minority of young men and women refusing or unable to follow in the footsteps

of their fathers and mothers in living for company or for family. However, the *ikigai* literature barely notices this.

Partly this is a matter of terminology: simply, *ikigai* has become thought of as a term applying more to old people, those, by implication, who no longer have a social role to play and thus must be taken care of. There is also the matter of who writes books: a number of the books on *ikigai* are written by elderly people themselves, saying, in so many words, “here’s how I found my *ikigai*, and here’s what you should do to find yours.” I have not found any remotely comparable outpouring among the young.²⁶ There are, of course, many perceptive books and chapters on the situation of young people in Japan today (on *parasaito shinguru*, see Yamada 1999; on *furiitaa*, see Genda 2001, 2005; and *Furiitaa kenkyūkai* 2001; on generational shifts in Japan, see Kotani 1998, 2004), but it is surprising how few of these books actually deal with the subjectivities of young people—we rarely hear young people’s own words about what they are doing in their lives. Young people should become workers and mothers, it is assumed, and this is why so many popular books on *furiitaa* and *parasaito shinguru* take on such a critical tone, and also why *ikigai* is ignored: young people shouldn’t be asking too many questions about *ikigai* but should be following the paths of their elders, it is assumed. Of course many of these young people would indeed do this if they could—but societal conditions have changed, making these paths unpalatable if not impossible for a significant minority of Japanese young people today.

These young adults—the part-time workers and singletons who do not follow the institutionalized paths of their elders, and remain apart from the standard adult *ikigai* of work and family, often living for their dreams instead—may indeed be unwittingly serving to destroy the Japanese society built by their parents and grandparents. There have been many earlier wayward younger generations in Japan, not least the rebelling youth of the 1960s that make up the *dankai no sedai* generation that is retiring at present—but today’s young people are different due to the societal world that they face. Earlier generations of rebellious Japanese could generally return to the institutional worlds of the parents, but many of today’s young Japanese, forsaking regular employment or marriage and family, may never live lives like their parents: they may never enter “the adult Japanese social order.” It is unclear how many younger Japanese fit these categories, since statistics and definitions vary widely; but it seems clear that a very significant minority—perhaps as many as 30 or even 40 percent—of Japanese aged 20-40 are not entering the “adult Japanese social order” in the way that their parents did, and may never enter the “adult Japanese social order.”²⁷

The institutional embrace of the “adult Japanese social order” as it existed in the 1960s through the 1980s, and to a lesser extent today as well, was based on rigid principles, particularly that men are to sacrifice self to company, and women to family; only through such sacrifice can they live worthy lives as full-fledged adults, it was assumed. Generations of young people during those years resisted this adult social order, but eventually most felt they had to enter it, since, in an era of high economic growth, that social order worked effectively, and was accepted as legitimate. Today’s young people have considerably more ability to resist that social order, for it has lost much credibility, both because of Japan’s lackluster economy over the past twenty years, and because of Japan’s many scandals and social problems during this era. (Consider, for example,

²⁶ I have not, however, thoroughly researched Japanese young people’s blogs.

²⁷ Those who seek career-track work may find themselves forever barred from that path after age thirty, given age restrictions still in place in much Japanese employment—although the situation is incrementally changing (see Mathews 2004: 121-122).

the image of the *sararii* twenty years ago, when he was generally an admired figure, as compared to today, when he is more often a subject of mockery.) This is almost never a matter of conscious rebellion. It is simply a matter of young people making personal and private choices.

There are several interpretations of these young people. One interpretation is that they are spoiled; they no longer have the will to make their way into adult society; they lack the strength to sacrifice themselves to become adults: they lack, in terms of the earlier values we have looked at, a sufficient sense of “commitment to group,” being mired in their own selfishness. Another interpretation is that society itself is to blame: many of these young people, when they look at their parents’ lives, feel that adult society is not worth entering: many in their parents’ generation have sacrificed their individual lives’ dreams for the sake of the social roles they must occupy, a sacrifice that these young people are not prepared to make. It is also true that Japanese society no longer provides the kinds of work situations their fathers enjoyed, making both work and family as *ikigai* considerably more problematic for aspiring young people than they were in past postwar eras (Genda 2001, 2005). Whichever of these interpretations is most valid, it seems clear that the ideology that held strong in the years 1960-1990 has largely eroded. The young people who are not entering the “adult Japanese social order” are both the result of this erosion and the creators of further erosion. They probably have little inkling as to the larger, societal meaning of their behavior, and are thinking in terms of their own individual lives; but the net effect of their behavior, multiplied by the millions, is to erode and perhaps destroy the “adult Japanese social order.”

This erosion is a matter of social behavior, but also of cultural values. “The adult Japanese social order,” based on a common, gender-specific injunction to sacrifice self to group, has today to some extent been giving way to relativism: the idea that one can live as one individually chooses. I have done interviewing of Japanese young people in recent years about “the generation gap,” and this acceptance of relativism among many of the young, unlike many of their elders, is one of my most striking findings. Elders might say, as did this executive: “Young people don’t understand how to deal with people in the world, how to speak to coworkers, especially seniors (*jōge kankei*); they have no common sense.” Younger people might say, as did this university student: “Do I dislike people who devote their lives to their company? Well, I’d never want to live that way, but it’s their life. They should be free to live as they want, just as I should be free to live as I want.” The former voice is that of a collective common value of Japaneseness; the latter voice is that of relativism, accepting no such common Japaneseness—accepting the fundamental principle that one’s *ikigai* is strictly one’s own, to dream and shape as one sees fit. This relativism represents a new embrace of cultural individualism by a significant minority of young Japanese. Unlike the individualism that their elders of the *dankai no sedai* generation are being encouraged to embrace by some writers, this individualism may have remarkable social consequences—such as the potential dismemberment of the social order that the *dankai no sedai* helped build. The *ikigai* literature ignores this, as we have seen—but this, I think, is the major *ikigai* crisis of Japanese society today. Because a large minority of Japanese young people cannot or will not follow the paths of their parents, Japan is going through a lifecourse transformation.

Ikigai and the Old

One of the biggest changes I have found in the recent Japanese literature on *ikigai* has been this: whereas twenty years ago, the books dealing with *ikigai* that I came across generally discussed

sarariiman and *sengyō shufu*, company workers and wives/mothers in their prime of life, today the focus is much more on those who are retiring or retired. This is because of the retirement of the *dankai no sedai*, the postwar baby-boom generation in Japan born between 1947 and 1949; in a larger sense this is due to Japan's rapidly aging population, with well over 20 percent of the population now over the age of 65. Twenty years ago the section of Japanese bookstores in which books on *ikigai* were most readily found was "psychology"; today, this section of Japanese bookstores is "social welfare" [*shakai fukushi*]: care for those who need help in society, and particularly the elderly. If one googles *ikigai* in Japanese, one finds countless webpages of *ikigai* centers providing activities for the elderly.

Most members of the postwar baby-boom generation probably feel too young to attend *ikigai* centers; they are middle-aged, or members of "the young old" rather than "the old old" (Pipher 1999). This is the generation that was tinged with the Japanese counterculture of the 1960s, and that (for at least a few of its members) stormed the ramparts of their universities in student protest; but this is also the generation that, in its male incarnation, became *kigyō senshi*, the corporate warriors spearheading Japanese economic advances in the 1970s and 1980s. It is members of this generation that are now being asked to live for themselves and find their own purpose in life once they retire, but this may be difficult after decades of having more or less left behind one's individual self to fulfill a social role. One salaryman friend in his fifties complained bitterly to me that when he attended a long-delayed reunion of his university friends a few years ago, friends with whom he had once protested against all that was wrong with Japan, they exchanged business cards: they had lost their own identities and become corporate cogs, he indicated. But soon they, and he himself, will be cast aside by their corporations, to be on their own: what, then, will they do with themselves? Will they still have selves left to which to return?

For the *sengyō shufu*—"professional housewives"—of this generation, the transition beyond role may be less abrupt, but still jarring. A woman of this generation I first interviewed in 1990 was two decades later adrift: her children have grown up and are doing well, and she has a reasonably good relation with her husband. But nonetheless, she says, "life isn't interesting anymore"—she feels she has nothing to do. Once one's role as corporate employee or as wife and mother is attenuated, who, then, are you? Given the immense importance of social roles in defining identities in Japan, this is a very real question, more than in most other societies. But the problem of rolelessness seems more apparent among the men I interviewed than among the women: some are able to flourish in their new-found time, but others sleep and mope. One authority writes that men of this generation may become alcoholic in their retirement: they may have no friends or activities, but only drink and watch TV (Takenaka 2000: 44, 47). Another authority remarks how these newly-retired men "have wholly devoted themselves to work, and now they have no idea what to do with their lives....This is especially true for salarymen during the high growth era, for whom work was their *ikigai*—losing their purpose in life, they may quickly grow old" (Kanemaru 1999: 10).

There are, in the recent popular literature on *ikigai*, two different responses to this new situation of rolelessness, corresponding to the *ikigai* conceptions of "self realization" and "commitment to group." One argument is that "after age fifty, you've arrived at a time when you can honestly live for yourself....You can stop worrying about what other people think" (Shimizu 2005: 59, 60). An opposing argument is that *ikigai* is not simply self-fulfillment but rather "something that you do for others": "Old people too can feel that they have *ikigai* by playing a proper role as a member of society," even if it is no more than watching over children playing in the park (Saitō 2004: 90-91). Among the people of this

age group I have interviewed, a few are indeed pursuing their own individual paths, traveling to far-off locales or playing musical instruments or even becoming Buddhist monks. But many more seem to have abandoned any such dreams: the hope of finding oneself yearningly set forth by many of my informants in their forties in 1989-90 seems to have been largely laid aside in the intervening years. A few have become active in volunteer activities of sorts, and have made this the center of their lives. Others, whether by choice or by economic necessity, have continued to work. Many others, however, seem to be living their lives around their television. Life seems difficult for many of these former salarymen and mothers of the *dankai no sedai* generation, in that they are now losing or have lost their social roles, roles that for decades have more or less defined their existences as Japanese and as human beings. What, then, shall they do now? While there are the *ikigai* centers discussed earlier, as well as opportunities for volunteering and, for some, employment, finally only they themselves can find themselves. In a sense we can say that, having been excluded from “the adult Japanese social order” and left to fend for themselves, they now have no choice but to find themselves.

Ikigai and Death

The *dankai no sedai* is still relatively young, in its early sixties; thus, how this generation ages remains to be seen. My sense is that many will age in a more divergent and perhaps more vibrant way than their elders of the *Shōwa hitoketa* generation, those born between 1925 and 1934, or those born during the war. It is elders of the latter two groups who today are clients of the *ikigai* centers, and for whom the relation between *ikigai* and old age/death is particularly poignant.

There is a clear tension apparent in the *ikigai* literature as to what *ikigai* in old age should be. Should *ikigai* consist of one's own personal discovery and cultivation of the meaning of one's life as one ages and approaches death, or is it instead something that society should provide for those individuals who have lived beyond their societal usefulness, as a means, essentially, of “killing time”? Kamiya Mieko, the most widely cited authority on *ikigai* over the past thirty years, maintains that in facing one's death, one may have the capacity to truly find one's *ikigai*, a pursuit that has perhaps been obscured by the social values one must adhere to earlier in life: “When one is confronted with death...one can no longer be attached to social status, money, and glory...and one may to a surprising extent purely experience the happiness of being alive” (1980: 158). The *ikigai* centers mentioned above, on the other hand, essentially provide a way of keeping old people engaged and occupied: their implication is that because as one grows older, one loses one's social roles and one's *ikigai*, one must be provided by society with a new *ikigai*.

One way to read this apparent contradiction is to see Kamiya's self-realization as an ideal that only a few people can actually attain in their lives; for the rest, there are the *ikigai* centers (and of course a given individual could conceivably engage in both). A number of recent books speak, as does Kamiya, about the possibility of attaining wisdom as one approaches death. One writer states, “As you get closer to death and confront death, you can question yourself as to what your *ikigai* really has been...” (Asahi 2006: 84); another writer argues, quoting Heidegger, that “death is the final chance you have to show that you really have lived....Death is the last chance you have for self-realization” (Hinohara 2003: 201, 221). On the other hand, it seems, again, that few can actually do this. A book on the psychology of the elderly reports that old people's *ikigai* is a response to loss: many old people unconsciously compensate for the loss of work, vigor, and loved ones by maintaining a range of *ikigai*: hobbies, travel, being with family, and so on (Inoue 2005: 66-67). However, the book also reveals that the dominant activity of old people is watching television (2005: 64-65). “People used to live to be fifty, and now they live to be eighty; but there

is no evidence that there is any gain in wisdom from these extra years of life,” one recent book asserts (Ueda 2005: 112-113). But can old people fairly be asked to attain wisdom? If a society is based on commitment to group and role as the fount of personal meaning, as remains largely the case within Japanese institutions if not necessarily in Japanese cultural life as a whole, then it is unreasonable to ask those in old age, who may no longer have clear roles to play, to find their own personal meanings of life.

There is another, still deeper problem with the injunction to live for oneself in one's old age—what good is self-realization, or wisdom, if you only die after attaining such a state? As Baumeister has written in the American context, “It is supremely disturbing to think that the value of your life will not outlast your life. The modern emphasis on self as a value base condemns people to precisely that fate” (1991: 279). This applies to Japan as well: why bother to pursue self-realization if the end result of that pursuit is merely death, with no meaning beyond? In terms of death, self-realization is problematic, as commitment to group and role may not be, since the group continues to exist although the self dies. If, for example, one's *ikigai* has been one's children, then even though one dies, one's children and grandchildren and all their descendants continue, and thus one's *ikigai* continues indefinitely into the future. Ancestor worship, for all its male bias, institutionally solidifies this orientation: one worships one's ancestors while one is alive, and then after one dies, oneself is worshipped. One's company may also play this role: one retires, but the organization to which one has given one's adult life continues into the future. Self-realization, on the other hand, may not have such power; self-realization, almost by definition, is based solely on the self, which dies.

A number of recent books have discussed the relation of *ikigai* to the possibility of life after death. Again, we find two very different conceptualizations of what life after death means—corresponding, again, to “self-realization” and “belonging to that which is larger than self.” The most popular book written on *ikigai* over the past two decades has been Iida Fumihiko's 1996 tract *Ikigai no sōzō*, [The creation of *ikigai*], which has sold some 400,000 copies. This book, relying heavily on the work of maverick Western scholars claiming to prove the truth of reincarnation, defines *ikigai* as “the will to create a life of higher value” (2006: 482, 483); *ikigai* unfolds lifetime after lifetime following the idea that each of us grows from incarnation to incarnation, and chooses our future lives and their misfortunes in order to grow more fully. Death is thus not real, according to Iida, but is merely a stage of growth, which is our human purpose—growth into wisdom, and into self-realization. The ultimate universal purpose of this growth is never made clear; simply, we pass through life after life, death after death to reach ultimate self-realization, whatever that may mean.

Another recent book offers a contrasting picture. Asahi Toshihiko's *Anata wa waratte daiōjō dekimasuka?* [‘Can you die laughing?’] has had only a tiny fraction of the readers of Iida's book, but offers a different, more complex vision of *ikigai* and of death. *Ikigai*, to Asahi, means to live fully, with a sense of one's life's goal (2006: 59), but few ever can: “If you could truly imagine yourself dying right now, and being revived tomorrow with the chance to relive your life, you might finally know what your *ikigai* really is” (2006: 85). But this is not, ultimately, an *ikigai* based on self-realization, for the self too is but an illusion. Asahi discusses Buddha's four noble truths (2006: 61-62)—all life is suffering, and the way out of this suffering is to desire nothing, and, ultimately to transcend self, to, indeed, accept the self's liberation/extinction—and offers his Buddhist view of death: our bodies, our lives are no more than vehicles, through which we seek to discover our real selves (2006: 132-133)—which are finally our non-selves. We are only borrowing our lives, or lives after lives after lives, before finally permanently returning to *dai shizen* (see Morotomi 2004: 256), that vast entity to which we ultimately

belong. This is the end of individuality: to ultimately discover oneself, and find that it is nothing.

We thus see that the tension between living for oneself or for social groups extends from young adults, to the newly retired, to the very elderly and even the dead.

This represents a fundamental tension in the Japanese social order. If self-realization is the ultimate meaning of life, then Japanese institutions such as company and family, in their all-encompassing demands on the individual, should be fought: in their demands they hinder the pursuit of self-realization, which is, after all, the purpose of life. On the other hand, if belonging is the ultimate meaning of life, then the embrace of Japanese institutions such as work and family is natural, since society replaces nature as the entity to which we immediately belong while we live; “self-realization” is an illusion, since there is ultimately no self to be realized, but only one’s belonging to a larger whole. Japanese society—like other societies in the developed world today, although with very different emphases—seems unclear as to which of these paths may be best to follow.

Conclusion

We can envision the *ikigai* conflict between self and group within different generations as the entrance and exit ramps on a highway. We see at the entrance ramp into Japanese adult institutions a significant minority of young adults who cannot or will not enter the prime-of-life roles and commitments of their parents’ generations. We see on the exit ramp from Japanese adult institutions those retirees who gave themselves to group and role in the prime of life, and now must reinvent themselves more or less apart from that group and role, whether as linked to a new role, or in spurning all roles in pursuit of self. We see at the farthest reaches of that exit ramp—those exiting not just Japanese institutions but life itself—signs of the same conflict that has bedeviled their juniors: should one live for others, or for oneself? This is a universal conflict, apparent in every society, but one that has particular resonance in Japan, a society institutionally and socially structured to living for one’s group, but culturally emphasizing living for oneself.

We thus see at both ends of the adult institutional order the creation of individuality—the forced creation of individuality for those on the exit ramp who have lost their institutionalized roles and identities, and the more or less chosen creation of individuality for those on the entrance ramp,²⁸ who will not or cannot enter the institutionalized roles that continue to define mainstream adulthood in Japan today. To some extent, the institutionalization of roles in the prime of life is universal. Adult institutions—those that support work and family—in all societies require a degree of sacrifice of self for role. Societies everywhere have a stake in encouraging stability in work and family, and do so with arrays of incentives, penalties, and exhortations. However, in many societies, there is a substantial degree of flexibility as to how one enters and exits these adult institutions: one may begin a new career at multiple times in one’s life; one may shed one’s family and begin anew, albeit not without paying a price. Japan has not had this flexibility. As must always be said, there is variation in Japan—certainly there are not a few Japanese in the prime of life who have managed to maintain strong senses of their own individuality despite their immersion into the roles of worker and mother. It is also the case that the structuring of the adult social order is gradually loosening, by fits and starts. Nonetheless, the power of this structure to suppress the individual self remains largely intact.

Four decades ago, Takie Lebra wrote that “the individual Japanese is not a self-sufficient autonomous whole, but a fraction constituting a part of the whole” (1976: 105); this remains largely

²⁸ It’s not clear what percentage of today’s young do not take regular employment because they cannot, and what percentage choose not to take such employment; these categories are blurred (Mathews 2004: 128).

true within the roles required by the adult Japanese social order. However, as this paper has shown, Japanese outside this order, whether hesitating at its entrance or pushed out the door at its exit, may choose or are forced to be no longer fractions. This is a key reason why the *ikigai* arguments between living for self and living for group are so prominent in Japanese cultural discourses today.

I have only begun to demonstrate it in this brief paper, but this insufficiency of *ikigai* finally results from the fact that the Japanese adult social order is not attractive enough to envelop Japanese young adults, and does not last long enough to embrace the Japanese elderly. This is linked to an ongoing long-term cultural shift in the formulation of *ikigai*, from “belonging to one’s role and group” to “pursuing one’s individual path to fulfillment,” coupled with an ongoing loss of legitimacy of the Japanese social order in its failure to cure Japan’s economic doldrums. Whether a society based on the pursuit of individual happiness will ultimately be a happier society than a society based on commitment to group and role is a vast question, one that transcends this paper. But *ikigai* today is problematic because of the ongoing gap between cultural dreams and societal realities as to how a person should live. This, I argue, remains the fundamental dilemma defining the Japanese lifecourse today.

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ⁱ For an outline of the historical development of the genre and its most important characteristics, please refer to Alisa Freedman's paper.

ⁱⁱ See National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR) 2010: *Jinkō tōkei shiryōshū 2010 – sei, nenrei (5 sai kaikyū), haigū kankei betsu wariāi : 1920-2005nen*. Available at <http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/Popular/Popular2010.asp?chap=0> (accessed 5 August 2010).

ⁱⁱⁱ During most of the post-war period, only 1-2% of all children were born by unwed mothers; see National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR) 2010: *Jinkō tōkei shiryōshū 2010 – chakushutsu denai ko no shusseisū oyobi wariāi: 1925-2008 nen*. Available at <http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/Popular/Popular2010.asp?chap=0> (accessed 5 August 2010).

In 2005, the total fertility rate (TFR) fell to a then all-time low of 1.26. Although it recovered slightly since then, it remains far below the replacement level of 2.08 (1.32 in 2006, 1.34 in 2007, and 1.37 in 2008). See Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), *Heisei 20-nen jinkō dōtai tōkei geppō*. Available at <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/geppo/nengai08/index.html>.

It has been observed that adding to the decreasing number of marriages, after around 1990, fewer births among married couples also became a significant factor contributing to the falling birth rate. See Iwasawa Miho 2002: 'Kinnen no kikan TFR hendō ni okeru kekkon kōdō oyobi fūfu no shusseisū kōdō no henka no kiyo ni tsuite'. In: *Jinkō mondai kenkyū*, 58:3 (2002): 15–44.

^{iv} For example *Around 40: Chūmon no ooi onna tachi* ("Around 40: Demanding Women", TBS 2008), *Yotsu no uso* ("Four Lies", TV Asahi 2008), *Konkatsu rikatsu* ("Seeking Marriage, Seeking Divorce", NHK 2009), and *Konkatsu!* ("Spouse Hunting!", Fuji TV 2009).

^v Much of my argument on *Around 40* is taken from a longer paper by Alisa Freedman and myself which is currently under review.

^{vi} See for example Atō Makoto 1997: 'Nihon no chōshōshika genshō to kachikan hendō kasettsu'. In: *Jinkō mondai kenkyū*, 53:1 (1997): 3–20.

^{vii} See <http://singojiyu.co.jp/>.

^{viii} This is underscored by his disliking of fried cutlets (*tonkatsu*), a specialty of the restaurant his father owns. *Tonkatsu* thus not only rhymes with *konkatsu* but also serves to mark Kuniyuki, who only eats the cabbage served with the cutlets, as "herbivore". On the other hand, his younger brother Kuniyasu enjoys *tonkatsu* and hamburgers, and also in a metaphorical sense he is a "carnivore" (*nikushoku danshi*) who proposes to his older girlfriend.

^{ix} The drama aired in a special time slot known as Fuji TV's "*gekku*" or "*getsuku*" (Monday 9 pm) reserved for *dorama* that are expected to be especially popular. Famous *gekku dorama* include "Tokyo Love Story" (1991) whose final episode had a viewing rate of 32.3% and *Hitotsu yane no shita* ("Under One Roof", 1993; average viewing rate 28.2%, highest rating 37.8%). While *Konkatsu!* had the then lowest viewing rate of all Fuji TV *gekku dorama*, the actual viewing rate was most likely higher as *Konkatsu!* was reported to have a very high recording rate. Surveys do not usually account for people who watch programs online or record them.