

D国1 (一般・留学生)

2024年度 大学院入学試験問題【Ⅱ期】

国際日本学研究科 国際日本学専攻 (博士後期課程)

科目：英語【言語・国際交流研究分野】(辞書使用不可)

[問題番号 D1] 田中 牧郎 教授 研究指導志願者対象

注意) 解答用紙は、指定された用紙を使用しなさい。

明治期の翻訳借用についてまとめた次の英文の要点を述べた上で、この時期の語彙を研究する際に重要だと考える論点をいくつか挙げ、研究の展望を述べなさい。

17.3.2 *Loan translations; Sino-Japanese coinages*

In addition to direct loans, a strategy was adopted of coining SJ words for the new notions, institutions and things to be named, that is, loan translation into (Sino-)Japanese. This coinage often consisted of finding some word, or *kanji* combination, in one of the Chinese Classics, which could be drafted in to write the new word, which was vocalized by using the SJ reading, or alternatively of reviving or adapting SJ words from earlier or specialized usage, but freer coinage from Sino-Japanese was also frequently used.

Some of the new SJ words originate in *kanji* writings intended as a logographic representation of a direct loanword, accompanied by reading glosses in *katakana*, subsequently reinvented as a SJ word. An example which illustrates some of the processes involved is cNJ *shokudō* 食堂 which is now the general word for most types of '(large, public) dining room, dining hall'. In the 1870s English *dining room* was rendered or borrowed as *dainingurūmu*, written as 会食堂 (ダイニングルーム), i.e. logographically in *kanji* with the pronunciation shown in *katakana*. Earlier 食堂 *zikidō* < *zikidaū* (which is *go-on*), was a specialized word for dining rooms in Buddhist temples, but following on from the writing of *dainingurūmu* as shown above, 食堂 was drafted in as a SJ translation equivalent and was, accompanying its new use, given a different pronunciation (reading) using *kan-on* for 食, but keeping *go-on* for 堂 (whose *kan-on* is *tō*). Incidentally, *dainingurūmu* is still occasionally written 食^{ダイニングルーム}堂.

SJ words deliberately coined, revived or adapted in this way during the Meiji period make up the great majority of SJ words in use today – and the overwhelming majority of academic, political and intellectual vocabulary used in Japanese today – and some of these words were later adopted in China and Korea, with Chinese or Sino-Korean vocalization. Many of these new words are attributable to individuals who also otherwise played prominent roles in the process of modernization in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as Nishi Amane, Fukuzawa Yukichi and Inoue Tetsujirō, whose translation of William Fleming's *The vocabulary of philosophy, mental, moral and metaphysical* (1857), *Tetsugaku jii* (哲学字彙, 1881) provides more than 2,500 SJ words relevant to philosophy. Of the many new SJ words coined in this way in the late nineteenth century, a few examples are given in (2):

- (2) *shakai* 社会 'society', *minshu(shugi)* 民主(主義) 'democracy', *jiyū* 自由 'liberty', *shinri(gaku)* 心理(学) 'psyche (psychology)', *tetsugaku* 哲学 'philosophy', *kaisha* 会社 'firm, company', *kaikeigaku* 会計学 'accounting', *rōdō* 労働 'work' (which includes 働 which was made in Japan, see 9.1.5), *yūbin* 郵便 'post', *jidōsha* 自動車 'automobile', *tetsudō* 鉄道 'railway', *denwa* 電話 'telephone', *enzetsu* 演説 'speech', *tōron* 討論 'discussion', *bungaku* 文学 'literature', *shōsetsu* 小説 'novel', *kokka* 国家 'nation', *kokumin* 国民 'people'.

As the short list suggests, new words for abstract concepts and institutions were usually coined in this way, rather than by direct loans. It is highly unlikely that the lexical, terminological modernization of the Meiji period would have been as successful as it was, if it had had to rely on direct loans, rather than

SJ coinages, which are short and in some cases provide educated readers with semantic clues. In addition, SJ coinages have the important function of giving the impression that these words were part of and belonged in an intellectual tradition.

出典：

Frellesvig, Bjarke. 2010. *A History of the Japanese Language* pp.408-410. Cambridge University Press

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国際日本学研究科 国際日本学専攻 (博士後期課程)

科目: 英語【文化・思想研究分野】 (辞書使用不可)

[問題番号 D2] 美濃部 仁 教授 研究指導志願者対象

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次の文章は、コプルストン『哲学史』のフィヒテについての叙述の一部である (Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, Volume 7 Modern Philosophy, Part I Fichte to Hegel*, Image Books Edition, New York 1965, pp. 78-80)。そこでコプルストンが指摘しているフィヒテ哲学の問題点を簡単にまとめた上で、それについて自分の見解を述べなさい。解答は日本語で書くこと。

In the Kantian philosophy it is the human mind which exercises a constitutive activity in giving its *a priori* form to phenomenal reality. True, in this activity the mind acts spontaneously and unconsciously, and it acts as mind as such, as the subject as such, rather than as the mind of Tom or John. But it is none the less the human mind, not the divine mind, which is said to exercise this activity. And if we eliminate the thing-in-itself and hypostatize Kant's transcendental ego as the metaphysical absolute ego, it is quite natural to ask whether the absolute ego posits Nature immediately or through the infra-conscious levels, as it were, of the human being. After all, Fichte's deduction of consciousness not infrequently suggests the second of these alternatives. And if this is what the philosopher really means, he is faced with an obvious difficulty.

Happily, Fichte answers the question in explicit terms. At the beginning of the practical deduction of consciousness he draws attention to an apparent contradiction. On the one hand the ego as intelligence is dependent on the non-ego. On the other hand the ego is said to determine the non-ego and must thus be independent of it. The contradiction is resolved (that is, shown to be only apparent) when we understand that the absolute ego determines immediately the non-ego which enters into representation (*das vorzustellende Nicht-Ich*), whereas it determines the ego as intelligence (the ego as representing, *das vorstellende Ich*) *mediately*, that is, by means of the non-ego. In other words, the absolute ego does not posit the world through the finite ego, but immediately. And the same thing is clearly stated in a passage

of the lectures on *The Facts of Consciousness*, to which allusion has already been made. 'The material world has been deduced earlier on as an absolute limitation of the productive power of imagination. But we have not yet stated clearly and explicitly whether the productive power in this function is the self-manifestation of the one Life as such or whether it is the manifestation of individual life; whether, that is to say, a material world is posited through one self-identical Life or through the individual as such. . . . It is not the individual as such but the one Life which intuits the objects of the material world.'³⁵

The development of this point of view obviously requires that Fichte should move away from his Kantian point of departure, and that the pure ego, a concept arrived at through reflection on human consciousness, should become absolute Being which manifests itself in the world. And this is indeed the path which Fichte takes in the later philosophy, to which the lectures on *The Facts of Consciousness* belong. But, as will be seen later, he never really succeeds in kicking away the ladder by which he has climbed up to metaphysical idealism. And though he clearly thinks of Nature as being posited by the Absolute as a field for moral activity, he maintains to the end that the world exists only in and for consciousness. Apart, therefore, from the explicit denial that material things are posited 'through the individual as such', his position remains ambiguous. For though consciousness is said to be the Absolute's consciousness, the Absolute is also said to be conscious through man, and not in itself considered apart from man.