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Contents

Governance of Policy-Making Process under the Second Abe Administration from a Point of Contestability

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze governance of policy-making process under the Second Abe administration which run the Japanese government from December 2012 to September 2020. "Governance" can be defined differently, but it is defined here, as "institutions in which the government decides efficiently, makes consensus and coordinate between stakeholders, and formulate policies based on scientific analysis and evaluations". In particular, we focus on contestability in terms of scientific analysis and evaluations. The analysis has two parts. The first one analyzes actual policy-making processes as a case study for legislation of national security, regulatory reforms, postponement of consumption tax hike, and free child care and education. The second one analyzes how prime minister' office makes decisions and compares policy-processes between traditional Liberal Democratic Party system, the Koizumi Administration and the Second Abe Administration. The policy-making process of the Second Abe Administration is characterized as a hybrid system of the traditional bottom-up model and the top-down model based on prime minister's leadership which manages both the ruling parties and ministries effectively. The decision-making is quicker and more efficient than before, but the Second Abe Administration is inferior to the Koizumi Administration in terms of contestability, thus the policy-making process is undermined significantly.

1. Introduction

Abe administration inaugurated in December 2012 (hereinafter, the Second Abe Administration) had lasted for nearly eight and ended in September 2020. Shinzo Abe replaced Eisaku Sato as the longest-continuously-serving prime minister. In light of the fact that most administrations lasted for only one or two years during the 30 years of Heisei Era (from 1989 to 2019), this remarkable political stability is often referred to as "Abe as a sole winner." One of the factors that made Abe a sole winner is the institutional strengthening of Cabinet functions and prime minister's authority that took place since the 1990s. Specifically, it was facilitated by the electoral reform and the central administrative reform (Takenaka, 2006; Makihara, 2016; Machidori, 2012; etc.).

Under the conventional political system[1] of Japan, the policy-making function was shared by the government and the ruling party (LDP). The latter conducted preliminary review of policies and bills proposed by the former and sometimes acted as a veto player (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993). In addition, the ruling party, bureaucrats, and interest groups worked together for policy-making[2]. This "iron triangle" weakened the authority of the prime minister and the Cabinet[3]. The Second Abe Administration has maintained the conventional decision-

1 It is often called "the 1955 system", where the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] held the majority.

2 Members of parliament belonging to LDP are also called "Zoku-giin", which means legislators with strong ties to special interests, typically doctors, farmers, small and medium enterprises. Shinoda (2020) describes the traditional policy-making process in Japan and its transformaiton.

3 Machidori (2012, p. 6) states, "One of the major characteristics of postwar Japanese politics is that a discrepancy occurred between the constitutional structure that explicitly adopts the parliamentary system of government and the code of conduct for political parties and legislators under the medium-sized constituency system," and "The electoral reform and the central government reform aimed to resolve the discrepancy."

making mechanism, but in a way that it does not interfere with the will or policies of the Prime Minister. It can be said that political leadership that has been sought after is now established, while what the term “political leadership” means needs to be clarified.

Has the institutional strengthening of the prime minister’s authority enhanced performance of the Second Abe Administration? The main role of the government is to make policies, form budgets, implement the policies and budgets, and enhance the welfare of the people. The Second Abe Administration has earned a relatively high reputation in terms of external affairs, such as diplomacy and defense policy. Negative effects, however, have been obvious when it comes to internal affairs, although the yen weakened and the stock price increased at the initial stage[4].

During Koizumi Administration, a variety of discussions on public finance and social security reform among other topics took place at the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy meetings, therefore the transparency of policy-making process increased. In contrast, a large number of councils and committees have been established under the Second Abe Administration without statutory grounds, and the signature economic policy, such as the three arrows, growth strategy, promoting dynamic engagement of all citizens, and work-style reform, has been formulated one after another, with little review of previous policies. An enormous number of reports that have been published give the impression that something has been done, but, in large part, they are of little substance. The most typical example of late is free childcare and education. Although offering free education across the board helps the richer, the policy was adopted under the initiative of the Prime Minister’s advisors, without verification of cost-effectiveness.

It must be said that the policy-making process has substantially deteriorated under the Second Abe Administration, despite the political stability. It is not always best to make policy decisions promptly under the initiative of the Prime Minister or his advisors. Important elements in the policy-making process include consensus-building with interested parties, discussion and analysis from the expert’s point of view, checks from outside the government, clear explanation to citizens and stakeholders, and improvement of transparency. These constitute the governance for making better policies.

This paper analyzes the policy-making process in the Second Abe Administration from the governance perspective. In particular, the paper focuses on the analysis and verification function for increased soundness of policy-making and discussion. The analysis is conducted in two ways. Firstly, characteristics of the process of important policies are analyzed as a case study, covering the national security legislation, regulatory reforms, postponement of consumption tax hike, and free childcare and education. Secondly, the roles and functions of councils and the mechanism of decision-making under the initiative of the Prime Minister’s advisors, which are characteristic to the Second Abe Administration, are analyzed, and the policy-making process is compared with that in traditional LDP administrations and Koizumi Administration.

This paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, previous studies relevant to the governance of policy-making process are reviewed, and the framework for analysis is defined. The process of making specific policies, such as the national security legislation, is analyzed in Chapter 3. In-depth analysis of the mechanism of the decision-making process under the

4 Precisely speaking, measures had been taken to counter excessive yen appreciation since approximately six months before the inauguration of Second Abe Administration. The unprecedented monetary easing started at the beginning of 2013 was introduced merely to support such measures.

initiative of the Prime Minister's advisors is conducted in Chapter 4, through the analysis of the councils and comparison with Koizumi Administration. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the paper.

2. Literature Review and Analysis Framework

(1) Review of Previous Studies

Whether the government is able to make necessary policies and solve various economic and social issues is a matter of governance. In general, the term governance is used in relation to how a country is governed. A leading example is the definition by the World Bank. World Bank (1992, p. 1) defines governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development."

This paper gives attention to what constitutes governance. World Bank (1994, p. vii) states that good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy-making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law. Kooiman and Van Vliet (1993) highlights the role of the central government in governance and points out the importance of coordination (involvement of important stakeholders relevant to the policy), collaboration and steering (effective collaboration among relevant parties to achieve desirable outcome), and integration and regulation (functioning of institutional mechanisms and processes to actually achieve the desirable outcome).

Next, the paper focuses on the policy-making process and its governance. In general, policy is understood as a way to realize a specific purpose or intention. A policy process refers to the process of making and implementing such policies[5] and involves various actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups, and academics. According to Ito et al. (2000, p. 34), political processes consist of negotiations and transactions based on activities by various actors, such as politicians, political parties, bureaucrats, interest groups, and citizens, for the realization of their own interest, among which the process rolled out in relation to making and implementing policy is called the policy process. The behavior of political actors in the policymaking process - as shaped by their roles, incentives, and constraints - will depend, in turn, on the workings of political institutions and on more basic institutional rules that determine the roles of each of the players, as well as the rules of engagement among them (Spiller et al. 2008, p. 13–14).

World Bank (2010) states that the policy process is "an institutional construct involving formal decision-making organizations and procedures (cabinet, budget, etc.), a formal division of labor (e.g. politicians lead in identifying policies, civil servants in implementing them), and a set of institutions that help determine the behavior of actors in the process" (p. 9) and that good policies are those that are (i) consensus-built among key stakeholders, (ii) economically sound, (iii) implementable politically, (iv) implementable technically, (v) technically responsive, (vi) sustainable, and (vii) stable. The study by the World Bank also analyzed best practices of policy-making in OECD countries and listed the following common elements: (i) political authority and technical expertise at the center of government (including the function of a strong technical

5 In the 1950s, Lasswell formularized the model that analyzes the process by classifying it into stages (Lasswell, 1956).

secretariat), (ii) an organizational system that coordinates policy-making, (iii) senior public servants who provide expert policy advice and coordinate between policy-making and implementation, (iv) strong policy-making and implementation capacity of the line ministries, (v) strong capacity of the legislature, and (vi) active alternative channels of policy advice exist.

Recent years have seen the development of core executive theory, which considers the policy coordination process in the central government as relationships between actors, such as the prime minister, the Cabinet, ministers, and bureaucrats, and exchanges of resources between actors (Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995; Ito, 2006). In addition, such policy-making and coordination processes are closely related to the political system of the country. Jahn (2012) indicates that government decision-making structures are determined by four factors: (i) executive concentration (prime minister's expertise, prime minister's function as gatekeeper, prime minister's involvement, ministerial compliance, prime minister's monitoring of ministers, and coherent communication), (ii) government's strategic planning capacity (strategic planning, scientific advice, and preparation), (iii) legislative influence (obtain documents, summoning ministers, and summoning experts), and (iv) consensus building with extra-parliamentary actors (mobilizing public support, association competence, and association relevance).

In recent years, openness and transparency have been highlighted with regard to the policy-making process. OECD's recent agenda has been "open and inclusive policy making" (OECD, 2011), and trust in government is considered important for that purpose. OECD (2013, p. 3) highlights the following key areas for action as a base to increase trust in government:

(i) Building the evidence base;
(ii) Strengthening capacity for strategic foresight, helping to manage complex challenges in a context of uncertainty and risk;
(iii) Open government — inclusive and responsive policy making; and
(iv) Strengthening integrity and ensuring fairness in policy making.

Transparency is relevant to openness. While transparency in general means the level of openness and availability of information, a more stringent definition is necessary in the context of policy process. Stoeckel and Fisher (2008, p. 12) states that for policy transparency emphasizes "the role of good public governance that leads to policy improvements and better outcomes for society." Specifically, they argue that (i) independent and contestable review, (ii) systematic review in all areas over time, (iii) findings a formal input into government decision-making, and (iv) economywide cost benefit analysis.

Attempts to measure governance of a country include the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI), as well as the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) for developed countries. The SGI aims to support OECD and EU governments' capacity to act with the long term in mind, thereby achieving more sustainable policy outcomes (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017, p. 5) and consist of the Policy Performance Index, the Democracy Index, and the Governance Index. The Governance Index looks at "a government's capacity to deliver sound policies as well as the participatory and oversight competencies if social actors (p. 14)."

The Governance Index covers not only the ability of governments to offer sustainable policies but also the participation of non-governmental actors and organizations and the ability of monitoring. Specifically, the index measures the following two factors:

(i) Executive capacity: strategic capacity, interministerial coordination, evidence-based instruments, societal consultation, policy communication, effective implementation, adaptability, organizational reform capacity; and
(ii) Executive accountability: citizens' participatory competence, legislative actors' resources, media, parties and interest associations.

(2) Analysis Framework

Previous studies on the governance of policy process were reviewed above. This paper gives attention not to the quality of policies but to the characteristics of and requirements for the policy-making process that yields better outcome. Based on previous studies, the important elements of such a process are as follows:

(i) Efficient decision-making, leadership and coordination, cooperation and consensus-building, analysis based on expertise, evaluation based on evidence, transparency and fair procedure, and smooth implementation within the government; and
(ii) Diverse advice, monitoring and checks by the legislature, and citizen participation and openness outside the government.

With this as a guide, this paper defines governance of policy-making process as the manner in which efficient decision-making, consensus-building and coordination of actors, and scientific analysis and evaluation are systematically exercised.

In economics, efficiency means a state without redundancies, normally called "pareto-optimality". In general, it means that something is not redundant, is prompt, or is highly efficient. Here, the term is defined as a state where decisions are made not only quickly but after following certain procedures in the parliamentary system of government and promptly considering a range of options. For efficient decision-making, the role of the center of executive branch, with the prime minister at the core, is important.

Coordination generally means aligning different opinions, excesses, and deficiencies with the orderly or normal state. In the field of politics and public administration, it refers, for example, "a cooperative effort that enables the different parts of a complex body, such as the central government, to work together effectively", or "the instruments and mechanisms used by political and administrative actors to enact and carry out coherent and jointly approved government policies" (Persson, 2016, p. 636). Here, consensus-building and coordination are defined as attempts to align different opinions to build a consistent consensus on an issue or a countermeasure. Specifically, coordination within the government and with the ruling party, as well as consultation with opposition parties, is important.

In analysis and verification, the importance of contestability is underlined. Contestability in economics means that new entry to a market has been made easier in terms of regulation, making the market more competitive. When it comes to policy process, World Bank (2010, p. 9) states, "A competition among ideas occurs when alternative sources of policy advice and ideas, whether inside or outside the government, have gained, or can gain, the ear of the government in the policy process." This suggests the importance of competition among policies and ideas in the policy process. Here, contestability is defined as a state where competition occurs based on scientific analysis and verification, evaluation of current systems and proposals, and consideration of options that take place within (between ministries; between core ministries, such as the Cabinet Office, and other ministries; deliberative councils; etc.) and outside (universities, think tanks, media, etc.) the government, concerning policies. Specific approaches include advice and recommendation from experts (deliberative councils, research institutes within the government, public comments, etc.), as well as verification and analysis by independent organizations (Board of Audit, independent fiscal institutions[6], independent regulators[7], etc.).

Governance refers to a state where the three factors described above are in place. In other words, it means that the government has such a policy capacity. In this paper, the Second Abe Administration is analyzed from the governance perspective.

3. Transformation of the Policy-Making Process

In Chapter 3, the policy-making process in the Second Abe Administration is analyzed, mainly with regard to internal affairs. It can be said that the Second Abe Administration makes policies literally under political leadership. What political leadership means can be different in different contexts. For example, it may mean the initiative of the prime minister, the Cabinet, or politicians. Precisely speaking, political leadership in Abe Administration means the initiative of the Prime Minister's office and advisors. Prime Minister himself does not take the strong initiative as Junichiro Koizumi did, and policies are made under the initiative of the advisor team, including the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, Special Advisors and Executive Secretaries[8].

The basic characteristics of the process is that major policies in which the Prime Minister and his advisors are interested are decided in a top-down manner as they control the ruling party (LDP) and the bureaucracy, while other policies are decided based on a bottom-up manner involving preliminary review of bills by the Policy Research Council and other forms of collaboration between the bureaucracy and the ruling party, which has been common in traditional LDP governments.

In addition, various advisory councils and committees chaired by the Prime Minister, most of which have no statutory grounds, have been established to drive forward policies and reforms in a range of fields, such as the growth strategy. Phrases that attract people's attention, such as "the three arrows", "promoting dynamic engagement of all citizens", and "100-year life", are used, and details are discussed at relevant councils. The main purpose of the discussions, however, is to showcase the initiative of the Prime Minister and the government's ability to take action.

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6 For example, OECD (2015, p. 4) defines such institutions as "publicly funded, independent bodies with a mandate to provide non-partisan oversight and analysis of, and in some cases advice on, fiscal policy and performance."

7 For example, OECD (2017, p. 22), explains the drivers of independence are budget independence, conditions for dismissal of the head of the regulatory agency, appointment of members/head of the regulatory agency by parliament or the legislature, accountability and reporting to executive, legislature, or representatives from regulatory industry, power to set tariffs or price-setting, and power to review or approve contract terms between regulated entities or market actors.

8 When it comes to diplomacy, Prime Minister Abe frequently travels abroad and has been trying to build a close relationship with leaders of other countries. Prime Minister himself is playing a leading role in this respect.

Although many reports have been published, they are of little substance[9].

As a comprehensive analysis of the Second Abe Administration's diverse internal policies is impossible here, the policy-making processes of some policies representative of the administration are analyzed as case studies. An important point in discussing policy-making process is that policies considered or implemented by the government are "chosen."

Speaking of "major policies in which the Prime Minister and his advisors are interested," it is important to pay attention to the type of the policies. It is difficult to drive forward reforms that change the status quo or the introduction of new policies because they often face opposition. Some may compromise in the course of reform, while others exercise leadership with a strong political will and proceed with the reform. Needless to say, it is easier to drive forward policies with little opposition. The policy-making process of Abe Administration is characterized by clear choice of policies. The policy processes of (1) the national security legislation and (2) regulatory reforms concerning the establishment of a new veterinary school are analyzed below. The former represents a policy legislated under leadership despite strong opposition and difficulty in building consensus, and the latter represents a policy over which leadership was not exercised, despite the difficulty of the issue. In addition, the policy processes of (3) the two postponements of consumption tax hike and (4) free childcare and education are also analyzed as cases where decisions on politically important policies were made under leadership, without sufficient discussion[10].

(1) National Security Legislation

The national security legislation consists of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security and the International Peace Support Act1[11]. Past governments had interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution as permitting Japan to exercise the right of individual self-defense to the minimum extent necessary but not permitting to exercise the right of collective self-defense. The Second Abe Administration changed the interpretation of Article 9 by a Cabinet decision and enacted laws that set forth conditions for exercising the right of collective self-defense.

Shortly after the inauguration of the Second Abe Administration, the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, which is established by a prime minister's decision was reconvened in February 2013[12], and discussions by experts took place at the meetings.

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9 This issue is analyzed again in Chapter 4 through comparison with conventional governments.

10 Other important policy issues for the Second Abe Administration include labor market reform, including easing of dismissal labor regulations, and amendment of the Immigration Control Act to accept more foreign workers, but it is unlikely that fundamental reforms took place under strong leadership.

11 The former is the Act Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Act and Other Existing Acts for Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community (Act No. 76 of September 30, 2015), and the latter is the Act Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security (Act No. 77 of September 30, 2015). The former consists of the amendment of 10 Acts, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, and the latter is a new Act.

12 The Advisory Panel was first established in May 2007 under the First Abe Administration. As Prime Minister Abe resigned partway through the Advisory Panel's deliberation process, the discussion did not make much progress back then.

As the Cabinet Legislation Bureau has been responsible for the government's interpretation of the Constitution, decision by the Bureau will be necessary to change the interpretation. Traditionally, an official from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs/Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, or Ministry of International Trade and Industry/Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry served as the Commissioner of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Overturning the tradition, the Second Abe Administration appointed Ichiro Komatsu, Ambassador to France as the Commissioner in August 2013, although he had no experience in the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Komatsu considers it acceptable to exercise the right to collective self-defense and has served as Director-General of the International Legal Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those who voiced strong opposition to such a move included Masahiro Sakata, a former Commissioner of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau[13].

In May 2014, the aforementioned Advisory Panel published a report. Prime Minister Abe received the report and stated that Japan is permitted to exercise the right of collective self-defense under limited circumstances, when the situation may have a grave impact on the security of the country. On July 1, the National Security Council and the Cabinet made a decision to change the interpretation of the Constitution, entitled "Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People."

Despite the Cabinet decision, it was not until May 2015, approximately one year after the decision, that relevant bills were submitted to the Diet. The bills were deliberated at special committees of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. On September 16, the LDP, Komeito, Assembly to Energize Japan, Party for Future Generations, and New Renaissance Party concluded an agreement on national security legislation, and the bills passed the House of Councillors plenary sitting three days later to be enacted[14].

The first point to note in analyzing the policy-making process of the national security legislation is that it faced a lot of opposition. For example, former Commissioners of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau repeatedly expressed their opposition, constitutional scholars pointed out the unconstitutionality of exercising the right of collective self-defense[15], and a constitutional challenge to the national security legislation[16] took place. Opinion polls also showed deep-seated opposition[17].

Second, the coalition partner Komeito was less willing to push forward the national security legislation[18]. It is said that talks between the LDP and Komeito took place before the

13 He states that under Article 9 of the Constitution, exercising the right of collective self-defense is permitted "under no circumstances whatsoever" (The Asahi Shimbun, August 9, 2013).

14 The laws took effect in April 2016.

15 Such scholars include Setsu Kobayashi and Yasuo Hasebe. In a survey on the national security legislation conducted by The Asahi Shimbun targeting 209 constitutional scholars, 104 of 122 respondents said the legislation was unconstitutional, 15 said the legislation may be unconstitutional, and 2 said it was not unconstitutional (The Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 2015).

16 In October 2015, a man in Ehime Prefecture filed a constitutional challenge, saying that the national security legislation violates Article 9 of the Constitution. Both Tokyo District Court and Tokyo High Court, however, dismissed the claim.

17 For example, 27% supported the national security legislation that passed the Diet, 50% were against the legislation, and 23% were unsure or did not answer in a survey conducted by TV Asahi (September 2015).

18 Komeito was originally against exercising the right of collective self-defense and attached importance to maintaining the conventional interpretation of the Constitution. It took some time until the date of submission of the Advisory Panel's report was fixed because Komeito made a counterargument that the

Cabinet decision to change the interpretation of the Constitution, as well as before the submission of the bills to the Diet, and that the drafts were revised in response to the objection from the Komeito, which substantially limited the circumstances where exercising the right of collective self-defense is permitted. Shimizu (2018) depicts how the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat, led by the Prime Minister, fixed the general framework of the interpretation of the Constitution, Masahiko Komura and Kazuo Kitagawa were at the center of talks between the LDP and Komeito, and Yusuke Yokobatake (Commissioner of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau), Nobukatsu Kanehara (Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary), and Nobushige Takamizawa (also Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary) coordinated the talks.

Third, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau played a role under the instructions from the Cabinet in the Cabinet decision on the change of interpretation and Diet deliberation of the bills, although former Commissioners of the Bureau expressed opposition to the change of interpretation of the Constitution[19]. The national security legislation constitutes a delicate system that can be compared to glasswork, in terms of interpretation and implementation. Legislation needs to be well thought out, even if the Prime Minister gives instructions.

On the whole, the national security legislation had a negative impact on election results. It can be said that the legislation was made possible through the will of Prime Minister Abe, his advisors who uphold the will, and key people in the ruling parties.

While the exercising of leadership can be recognized as an accomplishment, the policy-making process is problematic. Firstly, those who object to exercising the right of collective self-defense had been eliminated from the Advisory Panel members from the outset. For example, no one even raised a question against an extreme remark in the third meeting (October 16, 2013), which argued that permitting to exercise the right of collective self-defense is not even an issue of constitutional interpretation but merely an issue of policy[20]. Prime Minister Abe often spoke at the Advisory Panel meetings as well. For instance, he stated in the aforementioned third meeting, “Discussions on the reconstruction of the legal basis for security ultimately contribute to the protection of our people and survival of our country, as well as to the realization of underlying peace and stability of the international community.” This is a statement that expresses his ideas, and whether it is a fact is unclear. The minutes suggest that discussions by the Advisory Panel had a forgone conclusion.

(2) Regulatory Reforms Concerning the Establishment of a New Veterinary School

Regulatory reform is a pillar of Abenomics. The Council for Regulatory Reform was established based on a cabinet order in January 2013, shortly after the inauguration of the Second Abe Administration, to serve as an advisory body to the Prime Minister for comprehensively

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right of individual self-defense is sufficient in addressing the situation (The Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2014).

19 Makihara (2017, p. 265) states, “The entire process from the Cabinet decision to the preparation of the bills was led by Yusuke Yokobatake, the Deputy Commissioner. Yokobatake was originally not approbatory of the change of interpretation of the Constitution. He, however, heard the intention of the Prime Minister’s advisors through Commissioner Komatsu and, in the process of internal discussion, worked out a way to limit the scope in writing even if he had to permit the change of interpretation.”

20 Summary of minutes of the third meeting of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security. Who made the remark is not indicated.

researching and deliberating regulatory reforms. The first report by the Council, "A Breakthrough for Economic Revitalization," published in June 2013 states, "Regulatory reforms are essential in removing impediments to the revitalization of Japan's economy and realizing economic growth driven by private-sector demand. It is one of the top priorities of the government (p. 1)." The report includes policies for regulatory reform in the fields of energy and environment, childcare, health and medical, employment, and business creation.

In relation to regulatory reforms, Abe Administration also introduced the national strategic special zone system. The zones, based on the National Strategic Special Zones Act (2013), were established in addition to the existing special zones, such as the Comprehensive Special Zones, to drive forward regulatory reforms under the leadership of the Prime Minister. The Council on National Strategic Special Zones was established based on the said Act, which consists of the Prime Minister (chair), relevant ministers, including the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and experts from the private sector.

Regulatory reforms by the Second Abe Administration achieved a certain degree of success in some areas, including the reform of agricultural cooperatives, private companies' investment in agricultural production corporations, and private lodging. Meanwhile, reforms of so-called bedrock regulations, such as regulations in the fields of healthcare and welfare, employment, and communications and broadcasting, have not made much progress. While promoting regulatory reforms, the government introduced tougher regulations in many areas, such as the sale of alcoholic beverages at a discount price, new entry to the taxi industry, and establishment of universities in urban areas.

Diet discussions became complicated over whether Prime Minister Abe himself gave instructions so that Kake Educational Institution, the chairman of which is a friend of his, is selected for the establishment of a new veterinary school utilizing the national strategic special zone system. This, however, is not the essential point. The decision-making process of regulatory reforms is analyzed here, with a focus on the establishment of a new veterinary school. What made the matter complicated is the fact that the issue of the selection process and that of the regulation on the establishment of veterinary schools intersect there.

This paper first analyzes the selection process. Establishment of a new veterinary school was discussed based on the proposal, "Future Course of Action for the National Strategic Special Zones," prepared by members from the private sector for the Council on National Strategic Special Zones meeting held on September 9, 2016. In response to the proposal, two hearings took place. The first was a hearing with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, conducted by the National Strategic Special Zones Working Group on September 16, 2016. There, Director in charge from the MEXT explained the four conditions for the establishment of a new veterinary school and stated, "This is probably a matter that cannot be settled solely by our ministry," and the discussion did not go any deeper[21]. The second was a hearing with Kyoto Sangyo University by the National Strategic Special Zones Working Group on October 17, 2016. Kyoto Sangyo University explained there that they have given a reason for the establishment of a new veterinary school to MEXT but have been rejected. Tatsuo Hatta, the chair, responded, "Thank

21 Summary of minutes of the hearing with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, conducted by the National Strategic Special Zones Working Group.

you for a most compelling explanation.[22]" In addition, establishment of a new veterinary school in Imabari was proposed in the first meeting of the Imabari Subcommittee of the Regional Council on National Strategic Special Zones, held on September 21, 2016[23].

Next, it was decided in the Council meeting on November 9 that relevant laws should be amended to "enable the establishment of a new veterinary school, provided that there are no existing universities or other institutions for veterinary training in the wider area.[24]" No further discussion took place at the Council or other meetings, and the application was open from January 4, 2017. Establishment by Kake Educational Institution (to start accepting students in April 2018) was decided in the Council meeting on January 20[25].

The issue here is the decision-making process through which the government gave its approval to Kake Educational Institution for the establishment. During the two months, conditions that are in effect advantageous to Kake Educational Institution had been set under the initiative of the Cabinet Office, such as the school shall open in April 2018 and only one new school shall be approved. Meanwhile, Kozo Yamamoto, Minister of State for Regional Revitalization in charge of special zones, stated, "I took the initiative and made every decision," and when asked about the reference materials used for comparison, he said, "There are no minutes.[26]" Kihei Maekawa, former Administrative Vice Minister of the Education Ministry, commented on this matter at the joint meeting of the House of Representative's Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Committee and Cabinet Committee held on July 10, 2017, where he stated, "These conditions were added one after another, and in the end, only Kake Educational Institution in Imabari was left to qualify." Deliberation and discussion should have taken place to choose between Kake Educational Institution and Kyoto Sangyo University on a level playing field. It must be said that the discussion process was of low transparency.

Next, this paper will summarize regulations concerning the establishment of a new veterinary school. Establishment of a new veterinary school is regulated not by law but by a public notice by MEXT, "Criteria for Approval of the Establishment of Universities, Graduate Schools, Junior Colleges, and High Schools." One of the requirements for an application for establishment of a new university, etc. to be considered is that it is not intended to establish a medical school, a dental school, a veterinary school, or a mariner training school. That is to say, such applications are not subject to consideration in the first place and are not given any chance at all. Furthermore, this has been true for the past half a century. Although this public notice imposes restrictions on private entities, it has no statutory grounds and is a typical example of discretionary administration by a government office.

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22 Summary of minutes of the hearing with Kyoto Sangyo University, conducted by the National Strategic Special Zones Working Group.

23 Establishment of a New Veterinary School" (September 21, 2016, Moriyuki Kato, Special Advisor to Imabari Chamber of Commerce and Industry).

24 Additional Regulatory Reforms in the National Strategic Special Zones (draft)" (November 9, 2016, Reiko Akiike and other experts from the private sector).

25 Authorization for Special Zone Plans (January 20, 2017, Kozo Yamamoto, Minister of State for Regional Revitalization)" sets forth, "(3) Exception to the approval criteria for the establishment of a new veterinary school: Kake Educational Institution will, after obtaining approval to establish a veterinary school, establish in Imabari a new veterinary school to meet emerging needs, such as conducting cutting-edge science research and taking measures against infectious diseases in the region. [Open in April 2018]"

26 The Asahi Shimbun (July 25, 2017).

Prime Minister Abe originally said that he would be the drill to destroy the so-called bedrock regulations[27]. If he is serious, he should drill into the aforementioned public notice. Prime Minister Abe stated in a lecture delivered on June 24, 2017, "We will approve the establishment of two or three, or even more new veterinary schools, regardless of area (*The Asahi Shimbun,* June 27)," but it has not happened. At the House of Councillors Budget Committee meeting held on May 9, he explained that, in response to the request from veterinarians, it was decided to establish only one new veterinary school. This indicates that consideration was given to vested interests. As regulatory reform is a battle against vested interests who are often and supporters in an election, the Second Abe Administration has been reluctant as well, in light of elections.

(3) Two Postponements of Consumption Tax Hike

The first postponement of consumption tax hike (from 8% to 10%) was announced by Prime Minister Abe at a press conference on November 18, 2014. In response to the fact that the preliminary GDP for July–September 2014 (seasonally adjusted), announced on the previous day, was down 0.4% from the previous quarter and down 1.6% on an annualized basis, he stated, "I asked for opinions of over 40 experts on whether or not to proceed with the tax hike. (snip) All things considered, I have come to the conclusion that consumption tax hike to 10% should be postponed for 18 months, instead of making it happen in October next year as legally prescribed, to overcome deflation, let the economy grow, and ensure the success of Abenomics (*The Nikkei,* November 19, 2014)." He said that he would dissolve the House of Representatives on November 21 to seek public confidence in the decision. In addition, he stated, "I will never give up fiscal consolidation. (snip) I assure that the tax hike will not be postponed again. It will definitely happen in April 2017, regardless of the state of economy (ibid)."

The issue is not the appropriateness of the postponement of tax hike but how such an important decision was made. It was reported that most executives of the ruling parties called for a consumption tax hike as planned. "In addition to Sadakazu Tanigaki, the Secretary-General, and Komeito leader Natsuo Yamaguchi, Toshihiro Nikai, the Chairperson of General Council, calls for the tax hike, and they are gradually creating an 'encircling net (*The Nikkei,* October 8, 2014).'" LDP's Research Commission on the Tax System, which had been leading tax reforms, never discussed postponement of the tax hike, either[28]. In addition, the government held five meetings with experts (over the period from November 4 to 18) to examine pros and cons of the tax hike. *The Nikkei* reports that of 45 experts who attended the meetings, "67%, or 30 of them, called for a tax hike as legally prescribed, and 12 called for a postponement or cancellation of the tax hike. Three did not make their positions clear (*The Nikkei,* November 18, 2014)." Although the government itself created opportunities to ask for experts' opinions, their views were not

27 Speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting on October 7, 2013.

28 The power of LDP's Research Commission on the Tax System, in which even the prime minister or Minister of Finance found it difficult to intervene, had already been weakened in the fiscal 2014 tax reform, and the leadership of the Prime Minister's advisors had been established. Specifically, abolition of special corporate tax for reconstruction a year ahead of schedule and reduction of the effective corporate tax rate were decided without consultation with the Ministry of Finance or LDP's Research Commission on the Tax System, and Prime Minister Abe mentioned those tax reforms, along with consumption tax hike, in a press conference on October 1, 2013 (The Nikkei, October 2, 2013).

reflected in the decision.

While it is unclear, against such a backdrop, exactly when Prime Minister Abe decided to postpone the consumption tax hike, Ministry of Finance, which is in charge of tax systems, were left out of discussion. A series of international conferences took place in November, and budgeting would go into the new year if the House of Representatives were dissolved at the end of the year. "Ministry of Finance never thought Abe would potentially dissolve the House of Representatives and call for a snap election on the pretext of seeking confidence in the postponement of the tax hike (Shimizu, 2018, p. 359)." Prime Minister Abe did not have the Executive Secretary from Ministry of Finance accompany with him to the visit to Asia and Australia. On November 17, he "consulted with Taro Aso, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, in the government plane on his way back from Australia and expressed the intention to postpone the consumption tax hike for 18 months and dissolve the House of Representatives at an early stage (*The Nikkei,* November 18, 2014)."

The second postponement was announced in relation to the G7 Ise-Shima Summit that took place at the end of May 2016. On May 27, Prime Minister Abe announced at the press conference after the closure of the G7 Ise-Shima Summit that he would consider postponing the tax hike. At another press conference on June 1, he stated, "Consumption tax hike that may hurt domestic demand should be postponed. The global economy is faced with major risk (*The Nikkei,* June 2, 2016)."

The ruling parties and the Ministry of Finance were again left out of discussion, and the Prime Minister's advisors set the stage for the postponement. It started from Prime Minister's presentation to G7 leaders on the first day of the Summit (May 26), explaining based on a reference material that the global economy is as fragile as it had been before the 2008 financial crisis. Economic slowdown of emerging economies at the time was compared to the 2008 financial crisis in the reference material, which "served as a supporting material for advocating postponement of the tax hike due to external factors and was prepared under the initiative of Takaya Imai, Executive Secretary to the Prime Minister (political appointment), from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Ikuro Sugawara, Vice-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (the 'METI line') (*The Mainichi,* June 1, 2016)." The reference was handed out, out of the blue, at a study meeting of relevant ministries held at the Prime Minister's Office on May 24, two days before the first day of the Summit. "It was 'a great surprise (a senior ministry off icial)' for the Ministry of Finance, who had been calling for a tax hike as planned. Taro Aso, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, was shown the document by a senior official who ran into the Minister's office on the second floor of the Ministry building, and groaned 'Why are they talking about the situation before the financial crisis? This handout is annoying (ibid).'" Furthermore, it was reported that G7 leaders were puzzled at the explanation suggesting impending crisis, made by Prime Minister Abe based on the reference material, and that UK Prime Minister Cameron "expressed an objection by saying, 'I doubt that the situation is so serious as a crisis (ibid).'"

Prime Minister Abe had stated in Diet meetings and on other occasions that consumption tax hike would happen as planned unless there was an incident equivalent to the Great East Japan Earthquake or the 2008 financial crisis. It was reported that the postponement was "first brought up among close aides to the Prime Minister in early spring (snip) Kazuho Tanaka, Vice-Minister of Finance who served as Executive Secretary to the Prime Minister during the First Abe Administration, said to those around him, 'I trust Prime Minister Abe (*The Nikkei,* June 4, 2016).'"

Prime Minister Abe told Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Aso about the postponement of tax hike on the night of May 28, the day after the closure of the Summit. Aso said, "Consumption tax hike should take place as planned," and "It is natural to dissolve the House of Representatives (if the tax hike is to be postponed). You did the last time the tax hike was postponed in 2014. It doesn't make sense if you don't (*The Nikkei,* June 2, 2016)." LDP Secretary-General Sadakazu Tanigaki, who was also present, called for a snap election upon postponement as well. It was decided, however, to postpone the tax hike without dissolving the House of Representatives.

While an economic situation equivalent to the 2008 financial crisis was cited by Prime Minister Abe as the reason for the postponement of consumption tax hike, economic statistics did not indicate such a grave situation. The preliminary GDP for January–March 2016 increased by 1.7% on an annualized basis. The Monthly Economic Report published on June 17 stated that the Japanese economy was on a moderate recovery, instead of indicating any situation equivalent to the 2008 financial crisis. Simply postponing the tax hike would be inconsistent with the statement, made at the time of the first postponement, that it will not be postponed again. It can be said that the Prime Minister made an excuse for further postponement by bringing up the risk of crisis in the Summit meeting and winning an endorsement.

Major issues concerning the two postponements of consumption tax hike are summarized below. Even if it is the Prime Minister that makes the final decision for the postponement, not consulting in advance with the Minister of Finance, who is in charge of tax systems, is problematic as a decision-making process of the government. As a matter of fact, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy should be convened to discuss whether the tax hike should be postponed, considering that the issue of consumption tax constitutes an important element of economic and fiscal policies. If it is to be postponed, necessary measures, including how to fund social security costs, should be considered as well.

In the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy meeting (November 18, 2014) held immediately before the decision on the first postponement, it was explained that opinions for the tax hike, as well as for the postponement, were expressed at the Meetings to Examine Future Trends in Economic and Fiscal Policy (five meetings during the period from November 4 to 18) and that the largest factor contributed to the negative growth rate of preliminary GDP for July–September announced on November 17 was inventory adjustment[29]. In addition, Sadayuki Sakakibara, Director and Chairman of the Board, Toray Industries, Inc., stated, "All in all, our view is that the actual state of economy is not as bad as the reported minus 1.6%." Prime Minister Abe, however, announced the postponement in the press conference held after this meeting, although he had not mentioned the postponement in the meeting at all.

When it comes to the second postponement, Prime Minister Abe and Mamoru Maekawa, Director General of the Cabinet Office, stated respectively in the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy meeting (May 18, 2016) held immediately before the decision, "Preliminary GDP for January–March was announced today. We have seen a positive growth rate for the first time in two quarters, as well as a positive growth rate for the fiscal year, and we cannot afford to go back to deflation," and "While the fundamentals of Japan's economy have been largely favorable, there has been increasing uncertainty over the future of global economy since the beginning of the

29 Minutes of the 19th meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy in 2014.

year," which were the only remarks concerning the issue[30]. The government's Monthly Economic Report (from January 2018 onward) merely stated, "The Japanese economy is on a moderate recovery," and "There are downside risks to the Japanese economy (snip) amid the weakness of overseas economies."

In the subsequent joint meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy and the Industrial Competitiveness Council (June 2, 2016), Prime Minister Abe said, "World leaders at the G7 Ise-Shima Summit and I shared the sentiment that the economies of emerging countries and developing countries are slowing and the global economy is faced with major risk." Such issues were never discussed in the preceding five meetings of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy in April and May.

(4) Free Childcare and Education

The move toward free childcare and education started when Prime Minister Abe, during an interview with *The Yomiuri Shimbun* in May 2017, indicated his intention to set free education, including early childhood education and childcare, as a priority in constitutional amendment[31]. Specifically, Prime Minister Abe said, "I welcome positive proposals from (free education advocate) Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party)," and "Higher education should be truly open to all citizens as well to let children pursue their dreams (*The Yomiuri Shimbun,* May 3, 2017)."

In response to the Prime Minister's remarks, Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2017 (Cabinet decision made on June 9, 2017), which describes basic economic and fiscal policies of the government, stated, "In order to improve access to education, the financial resources for preschool education will be secured, moving in stages towards making it free. At the same time, from the standpoint of providing sure support for progression to higher education, the measures needed to alleviate the financial burden, such as the smooth and steady implementation of the newly introduced student grant system and the system of student loans repayable in line with income, interest-free student loans, and the reduction or waiving of tuition fees, will be taken forward. At the same time, the financial resources to do so will be secured."

As the next move, "Human Resources Development Revolution" was set as the government's agenda after the Cabinet reshuffle on August 3. For concrete discussion, the Council for Designing 100-Year Life Society was established, and the first meeting was held on September 11. Topics that were to be discussed with regard to education included securing education opportunities open to all, alleviating financial burden, free education, recurrent education, and reform of higher education to work on such issues.

Although free childcare and education was to be discussed by the Council, the substance was decided under the initiative of the Prime Minister's advisors before the discussion. This is because it was necessary for the LDP and Komeito's campaign pledge for the 48th House of

30 Summary of the minutes of the ninth meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy in 2016.

31 The idea of free education itself is found in the eighth proposal "Investment in and Financial Resources for Education to Make Japan an Education-Oriented Country" submitted in July 2015 by the Council for the Implementation of Education Rebuilding established under the Second Abe Administration (based on a Cabinet decision made in January 2013). The proposal states, "It is necessary to prioritize phased introduction of free early childhood education and improvement of its quality, as well as alleviation of the burden of higher education costs, as they contribute to overcoming declining birthrate and breaking the chain of poverty across generations." According to a handout for the Council meeting, free university education will cost approximately 3.1 trillion yen.

Representatives election in October 2017. To secure financial resources for free education, the LDP and Komeito's pledge included raising the consumption tax rate to 10% in October 2019 and allocating two trillion yen for free education and relevant policies from the increased government revenue.

On December 8, the New Economic Policy Package was decided by the Cabinet to give a concrete form to the campaign pledge. Free childcare and early childhood education, as well as free higher education mainly for students from households with exemptions from municipal residence tax, were incorporated in the Package in relation to childcare and early childhood education. A total of two trillion yen was to be spent, in conjunction with the consumption tax hike. Based on the Package, the Council for Designing 100-Year Life Society published its interim report on December 19[32]. The Cabinet Office and the MEXT then discussed the details to materialize the policy.

The first problem about the policy-making process concerning free education is that little analysis was carried out to identify the issues current education and childcare are faced with and to calculate cost-effectiveness of the policy in resolving such issues. For children from low-income households, childcare is already free or available at a low cost[33]. Offering free early childhood education across the board makes it free for high-income households as well[34]. According to a survey by Kyodo News, approximately 40% of the 100 kindergartens surveyed said that they will raise their fees for fiscal 2019 in expectation of the realization of free early childhood education and childcare (*The Mainichi,* October 30, 2018). While free higher education is initially for students from low-income households only, expanding the scope entails a number of problems. As children from high-income households are more likely to go on to a university, public funding to higher education is regressive[35].

In the meetings of the Council for Designing 100-Year Life Society, which was responsible for the discussion on free education, most members merely brought up the importance of education in general[36]. Those from educational institutions, including universities, call for free education from the supplier's perspective because they could attract more students by alleviating financial burden. In sum, the purpose of the Council was to bring up the importance of education, and little discussion took place on data-based analysis of the current situation, financial

32 The final report "Basic Plan for Human Resources Development Revolution" was published in June 2018.

33 For example, certified nurseries in Chiyoda Ward are free for households on social welfare or with exemptions from the Ward's residence tax (effective from April 2015 onward). The fees are set in accordance with household income. Households with annual income up to approximately 3.3 million yen pay 5,600 yen every month for 3-year-olds, and those with annual income of approximately 11.3 million yen or more (the highest income category) pay 57,000 yen. In addition, Chiyoda Ward offers subsidies to encourage kindergarten enrollment, as well as subsidies to parents whose children go to private kindergartens.

34 Akabayashi (2017) points out that as 95% of Japan's 4- and 5-year-olds attend early childhood education institutions, spending taxpayers' money on across-the-board free education to shoulder the parents' financial burden does not directly increase the total amount of society's investment in education, and that middle- and high-income households may spend the money saved on extracurricular lessons, which widens the gap with low-income households in terms of education spending.

35 Discussion needs to take into account external effects of education (e.g. higher education level leads to fewer crimes and less dependence on welfare).

36 For example, Naoto Ohmi, Executive Deputy President of Japanese Trade Union Confederation stated, "The whole society needs to support children's learning so that their economic background does not lead to opportunity gap in education (minutes of the second meeting of the Council for Designing 100-Year Life Society, held on October 27, 2017)."

resources, cost-effectiveness, or priorities[37]. The Council did not discuss how the two trillion yen, allocated for childcare and early childhood education from the increased government revenue after the consumption tax hike, should be spent, either. Members of the Council included those from universities but not any single expert of higher education or early childhood education.

Second, free childcare and education was a predetermined conclusion under the initiative of the Prime Minister's advisors. Consequently, discussion on the details was put off, which caused confusion. An example is the lunch fee issue for nurseries and kindergartens. While parents currently pay the actual cost of lunch at kindergartens, lunch fees are, in principle, included in the fees for nurseries (and low-income households are subject to reduction or exemption). Across-the-board free education means free lunch at nurseries, and the issue is what to do with the lunch fee for kindergartens. It is necessary to discuss whether the lunch fee for kindergartens that charge high tuition should be free as well, considering that the financial resources are limited. When it comes to higher education, guaranteeing the quality of education is an important issue as nearly a half of private universities have fewer students than the capacity. In this respect, the government sets such requirements as arrangement of courses by teachers who have practical work experiences, appointment of outside board members, and strict academic record management, for accepting students supported by free education measures. Meanwhile, Waseda University President Kaoru Kamata strongly criticized the government at the experts' meeting for discussing free higher education (Expert Meeting on Measures to Alleviate Financial Burden for Higher Education), saying, "The criteria for the quality of education do not make sense at all, and screening of universities by the government based on such criteria is unacceptable (*The Nikkei,* January 31, 2018)."

Third, hardly any discussion took place within the LDP. For example, Gaku Hashimoto, Director, Health, Labour and Welfare Division, stated, "I, as Director of Health, Labour and Welfare Division, expressed an objection to spending the revenue from consumption tax on education, but it was included the campaign pledge as if it were obvious (*The Nikkei,* November 9, 2017)." Another pointed out a flaw in the procedure, saying, "When did the LDP discuss realizing free education for 3- to 5-year-olds by fiscal 2020? (ibid)" In addition, the LDP was against free education in the first place. When they were the opposition, they regarded the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)'s child allowance, toll-free expressways, free high school education, and individual household income support as pork-barrel policies and criticized that the costs will eventually have to be covered by the future generation, Japan will suffer financial collapse if no measures are taken, and the DPJ does not take responsibility for the future. The LDP also pointed out that free high school tuition regardless of income is excessively egalitarian and uniformist. In response, the Second Abe Administration imposed income caps from April 2014 on recipients of free high school education introduced by the DPJ.

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37 Susumu Takahashi, Chairperson of the Japan Research Institute, stated, "I ask for the improvement of education quality from the EBPM perspective and with an eye on overall human resources development," and Kazumi Miyajima, Nippon TV News Commentator, stated, "In fact, while young parents appreciate free education, they are concerned that making childcare totally free for high-income families as well may result in middle- and high-income families spending more on extracurricular lessons, which in reality widens the gap. I therefore ask for a system that first helps children who are in a more difficult situation (the fourth meeting, held on December 19, 2017)." Such views, however, were not reflected in the policy.

4. Three Models of Policy-Making Process under LDP Administrations

One of the characteristics of the policy-making process under the Second Abe Administration is that signature policies of the government appear one after another, including the three arrows, the new three arrows, growth strategy, regional revitalization, society in which all citizens are dynamically engaged, work-style reform, and designing 100-year life society[38].

A variety of councils and committees have been established as entities to discuss these signature policies. A leading example is the Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization and its Industrial Competitiveness Council (reorganized into Council on Investments for the Future in 2016). The former was established by a Cabinet decision in December 2012, is chaired by the prime minister, and consists of all cabinet ministers. The latter was established in January 2013 by a decision of the Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization, is chaired by the prime minister, and consists of relevant cabinet ministers, including Minister in charge Economic Revitalization, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and experts from the private sector. Secretariats that support the work of those councils have been established in Cabinet Secretariat, and staff have been seconded from government ministries.

Such councils are not at all new. A recent example is the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, on which policy-making of Koizumi Administration was based. The difference, however, is that while the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy was established by law, the Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization and the Industrial Competitiveness Council have no statutory grounds. The number of such councils quadrupled under the Second Abe Administration (see **Table 1**). Many of them are established not by law but by a Cabinet decision or a Prime Minister's decision. For this reason, the number of Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office staff surged under the Second Abe Administration, which has been pointed out as

Table 1 Transition of the Number of Councils

Form of establishment	Established before Abe Administration and still in existence	Established under Abe Administration (FY2012–2018)	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Law	21	12	0	6	3	1	2	0	0
Cabinet decision	5	16	5	2	3	1	3	1	1
Oral approval of the Cabinet	4	6	1	1	1	1	2	0	0
Approval of the Prime Minister	2	24	3	4	1	5	6	5	0
Approval of the Chief Cabinet Secretary	1	6	2	1	1	1	0	0	1
Approval of relevant ministers, etc.	1	37	3	10	6	4	9	4	1
Total	34	101	14	24	15	13	22	10	3

Source: Created by the author based on the website of Prime Minister's Official Residence.

38 Such policy ideas are brought up by staff of Prime Minister's Official Residence, Cabinet Secretariat, and Cabinet Office who used to work for or have been seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Tanaka, 2019).

"bloated."[39] In addition, those councils have other organizations under them, and the number of councils further increases if such organizations are included (see **Table 2**).

Conventionally, government ministries have a number of deliberative or advisory councils. Councils established under Abe administration are, however, different from them. Mainly the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary take the initiative in the establishment and administration of the councils, which are mechanisms for driving top-down, political leadership (Nonaka and Aoki, 2016, p. 10). The right of proposing basic principles and policies granted to the prime minister by the central government reform can be considered as a backdrop of such developments.

Those councils publish a number of reports every year. By July 2018, 341 reports related to policy were published. Many exceed 100 pages. The most important, related to growth strategy, is Japan Revitalization Strategy (the first strategy was decided by the Cabinet in June 2013, and revisions were made to the strategy every year). It consists of 98 pages of main text, 15 pages of roadmap, and 49 pages of short- to mid-term progress schedule and includes a lot of plans but little analysis of the current situation or problems.

Based on the characteristics described above, how is policy-making in the Second Abe Administration different from that in past LDP administrations (classified here into administrations under the traditional 1955 system and Koizumi Administration)? **Table 3** answers this question by classifying the process into three stages (agenda-setting, policy-making and discussion, and coordination and decision-making) and analyzing the roles of politicians, bureaucrats, and deliberative councils, etc.

Table 2 Councils by Topic

Topic of the council	Established before Abe Administration		Established under Abe Administration	
	Council	Organization under the council	Council	Organization under the council
Economic policy	4	0	8	0
Regulations/Industrial development/Market	6	13	15	70
Finance/Tax system	1	0	2	0
Public administration	1	0	13	8
Social security/Labor market	5	0	12	14
Education/Culture	1	0	8	15
Regional development	4	1	9	22
National security/Diplomacy	3	1	19	6
Law/Order	9	1	15	9
Total	34	16	101	144

Source: Created by the author based on the website of Prime Minister's Official Residence.

39 The government itself pointed out in "Review of Work of Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office," a January 2015 Cabinet decision document, that Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office handle a wide variety of topics as important policy issues require cross-ministerial response, and that they have been unable to fully serve the intended purpose, such as addressing policy issues promptly or leading important policy-making. In addition, the National Government Organization Act and other relevant Acts were amended in response to the Cabinet decision.

Table 3 Comparison between the Three Models of Policy Process in LDP Administrations

Stage	Actor	Ruling party/ Bureaucrat model (The 1955 system)	Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy model (Koizumi Administration)	Prime Minister's advisors' initiative model (Second Abe Administration)
Agenda-setting	Politicians (Prime minister/ Ministers/Ruling party)	△Request from politicians of the ruling party to line ministries	◎Prime Minister brings up issues at the Council (Amendment of the Cabinet Act made clear the prime minister's right to make proposals at Cabinet meetings)	◎Prime Minister brings up issues at press conferences, etc.
	Bureaucrats from line ministries	◎Bring up the necessity of amending the system	○Request to the Council	×Directions from the Prime Minister's advisors
	Deliberative councils, etc.	△Request to line ministries and the ruling party (Often on behalf of the ministries)	◎The Council summarizes issues with the support of the secretariat	△Although a number of councils without statutory grounds have been established, agenda is set in advance
Policy-making/Discussion	Politicians (Prime minister/ Ministers/Ruling party)	○Discussion as policy divisions of the ruling party	○Discussion as policy divisions of the ruling party	○Discussion as policy divisions of the ruling party
	Bureaucrats from line ministries	◎Present drafts prepared by line ministries to deliberative councils, and work on bills and other details	◎Work on bills and other details	◎Work on bills and other details
	Deliberative councils, etc.	○Discussion based on the drafts prepared by line ministries (who provide data and information) ○Insufficient independent analysis and discussion	◎The Council discusses basic directions (transparency increases but not necessarily independent) ○Deliberative councils at line ministries make discussions at the same time	△The Council is not regarded as important ◎Discussion at councils under the initiative of the Prime Minister's advisors (basic directions are predetermined)
Coordination/Decision-making	Politicians (Prime minister/ Ministers/Ruling party)	◎Preliminary review by policy divisions of the ruling party (which has the right to veto)	◎Prime Minister makes the decision in the end ○Preliminary review by policy divisions of the ruling party (effectiveness of the right to veto diminishes)	◎Important matters are decided by the Prime Minister's advisors, and instructions are given to the ruling party and line ministries for coordination ○Other matters are subject to preliminary review by policy divisions of the ruling party
	Bureaucrats from line ministries	◎Make necessary arrangements within the government and with the ruling party, relevant industries, etc., and exert other forms of influence	○Make necessary arrangements within the government and with the ruling party, relevant industries, etc., and exert other forms of influence	△Influence of bureaucrats from line ministries on important policies diminishes
	Deliberative councils, etc.	×No role after submitting reports	△Follow-up by the Council	×Approval at councils as a mere formality

Source: Created by the author based on the analysis in the main text.
Note: The symbols represent how strong the involvement is (◎ is the strongest, × is the weakest and △ is the medium).

To summarize the obvious difference between the Second Abe Administration and Koizumi Administration, the former, first of all, discusses policies at council meetings apparently as a mere formality because the conclusion has been predetermined. Under the Koizumi

Administration, heated discussions on such topics as privatization of postal services and road related public corporations took place between ministers in charge (in opposition to the privatization) and members from the private sector at the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy meetings, and the Prime Minister often gave directions in the end (Ota, 2006, p. 9). In contrast, discussions at council meetings are close to a mere formality under the Second Abe Administration because the conclusion has been set by the Prime Minister's advisors in a top-down manner. A typical example is the process of discussing free education. There have hardly been scenes where Abe makes a decision after serious and heated discussions (Shimizu, 2018, p. 357). Second, the influence of ministers and bureaucrats from line ministries and Diet members in the policy division of the ruling party diminished. A leading example of the former is Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, who made their power felt under the Koizumi Administration and DPJ administrations. A leading example of the latter is the fact that Prime Minister Abe, in personnel changes of the party, dismissed Takeshi Noda, Chairperson of the Research Commission on the Tax System, who had been in opposition to the introduction of reduced consumption tax rate strongly pushed forward by Komeito (October 2015), and appointed Yoichi Miyazawa, former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, as Noda's successor.

Finally, the governance of policy-making process in the Second Abe Administration is summarized below. Firstly, efficiency improved compared with conventional LDP administrations because coordination of matters in which the Prime Minister and his advisors are interested can take place within the government and the ruling party under the initiative of the Prime Minister's advisors. Secondly, there are two sides when it comes to consensus-building. Decisions on consumption tax hike and free education were made without much discussion within the government and the ruling party and consensus-building. Meanwhile, a certain consensus was built, with an eye on elections, on regulatory reforms, revision of medical fees and other issues, and issues and policies in which the coalition partner Komeito is interested. Thirdly, analysis and verification (contestability) has been significantly neglected compared with the 1955 system and Koizumi administration. In particular, weakness in analysis based on expertise and evidence, as well as in monitoring and checks by the legislature, is evident. While a number of councils have been established, the meetings are not for discussion of details but for confirmation of the basic framework that has been decided by the Prime Minister's advisors or by Cabinet Secretariat or Cabinet Office in accordance with the intention of those advisors.

5. Conclusion

This paper summarized relevant previous studies and first analyzed the process where important policies, such as the national security legislation, regulatory reforms, postponement of consumption tax hike, and free education, were made under the Second Abe Administration. In addition, the paper analyzed the roles and functions of a variety of councils and major characteristic of the Second Abe Administration and the decision-making mechanism under the initiative of the Prime Minister's advisors, and compared the Administration with traditional LDP administrations and the Koizumi Administration.

The Second Abe Administration is characterized by transformation, if partial (and with regard to matters in which the Prime Minister's advisors are interested), of the consensus-focused policy-making process of traditional LDP administrations. Factors behind this include the strengthening of prime minister's and Cabinet Secretariat's authorities as a result of political and public administration reforms since the 1990s. It must be noted, however, that it is not only institutional factors that are relevant. Institutional reforms that strengthened prime minister's authority were nearly complete when the Koizumi Administration was inaugurated. Whether the prime minister is able to take advantage of such institutions depends on other factors, including the personality of each prime minister; staff who work at the center of the government, such as the Prime Minister's Official Residence and Cabinet Secretariat, relationship with the ruling party, and how to lead the bureaucracy.

While efficient decision-making by the Abe administration may deserve a certain degree of recognition, its policy-making process is problematic in terms of contestability. Contestability has not necessarily worked well in the Japanese policy-making process in the first place but is undermined even further under the Second Abe Administration. This is especially because the Prime Minister's advisors have control over personnel matters of the bureaucracy, which makes it difficult for bureaucrats to resist the will of those advisors, and council meetings organized by the Prime Minister's advisors have become places where the directions set by those advisors are confirmed (Tanaka, 2019).

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Perceptions of Police Officers in Crisis Situations:

Why did Fukushima Police Officers Continue Their Duties in the field During the Nuclear Plant Disaster?[i]

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Abstract

Purpose: This study presents an examination of police officers' motivations to continue their duties during a crisis. It is based on a case study of the Fukushima Prefecture Police in Japan when the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station exploded in 2011. The research questions are as follows: (1) At the time of the nuclear power station explosion in 2011, how did the police officers working near the plant perceive the situation and their fate? (2) What were the police officers' motivations to carry out their duties despite possible nuclear contamination and other dangers?

Methodology: The present study conducted empirical analyses on the abovementioned issues; notably, they were based on quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews of police officers working near the power station at the time of explosion. The present study also relied on academic frameworks in sociology and criminology regarding the abandonment of duties and deviant behaviors.

Findings: As to the first research question, the conclusion in the present study was Fukushima's police officers continued their duties with deep personal inner conflicts during critical circumstances. Regarding the second research question, the conclusion was that various complex factors motivated police officers to continue their duties. In particular, a sense of mission and responsibility and a sense of solidarity with colleagues were the most important factors, while shame also had some influence.

Research limitations: Although the present study contains several policy implications, it remains abstract. Further research is necessary to formulate more tangible policies.

Originality/value: The present study is the first academic research dealing with this issue based on firsthand empirical data on Fukushima's historic incident. This research has made particular contributions to obtaining valuable lessons from the Fukushima explosion in an academic manner for future crisis management.

Keywords: crisis management, police administration, Fukushima, Great East Japan Earthquake

1. Introduction

The objectives of the present study were as follows: (1) to analyze the perceptions of police officers who were working near the site of the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 12, 2011; and (2) to elucidate the motivations of police officers in the field to carry out their duties in a crisis.

1 (1) Background and issues involved

At 3: 36 pm on March 12, 2011, the day after the Great East Japan Earthquake, a hydrogen explosion occurred at Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which was owned

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i The original manuscript of this article, written in Japanese, was published in *The Journal of Police Science,* Volume 66, Issue 2, in February 2013. This article is an English translation of the original manuscript, and is published with the publishing rights holder's permission.

by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings). A hydrogen explosion also occurred at 11: 01 am on March 14 in the Unit 3 reactor. Around this time, the government issued the following evacuation orders: within a radius of 3 km of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 11; within a radius of 20 km on March 12; and within a radius of 20 km to 30 km on March 15.

More than 100 police officers, including members of the Futaba Police Station and the Special Task Force of the Fukushima Police Headquarters, were on duty within 20 km or 30 km of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station between March 12 and 14.[2] The media reported that, during this period, police officers on the scene did not abandon their duties and were bravely engaged in their missions. All parties have highly praised their attitudes.

However, on a global scale, this situation is not always natural. For example, in August 2005, when Hurricane Katrina hit the southeast coast of the United States, it was reported that around 250 of the 1,500 police officers in the New Orleans Police Department in the State of Louisiana abandoned their duties.[3] The question worth examining is what caused the difference in police officers' responses in these two cases. This could be attributed to cultural or moral differences between the United States and Japan. However, there may also be other factors at play. If this is the case, the optimism regarding Japanese police officers being so diligent that they will always perform their duties, even in times of crisis such as a major disaster, may no longer hold. In such a case, to build a police force that can carry out its duties even in a crisis such as a major disaster in the future, it is necessary to implement proactive measures rather than resting on optimism.

1 (2) Objective of the study

Given the background of the abovementioned situation, the objectives of the present study were: (1) to analyze the perceptions of police officers who were working near the site of the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 12, 2011; and (2) to elucidate the motivations of police officers in the field to carry out their duties in a crisis.

1 (3) Previous studies

A few previous academic studies are relevant to the subject (see Chapter 2). For example, there are studies on American soldiers' behavior during World War II, comparative studies of Japanese and American culture in general, and criminological studies on deviant behavior. However, no academic research has focused on Japanese police officers' activities which examines the specific issues mentioned above. Notably, there is no academic research on this matter based on empirical data on first responders directly involved in the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.

2 At the time of the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, many police officers from outside Fukushima Prefecture were also serving in Fukushima. However, for the sake of convenience, the scope of the present study is limited to Fukushima Prefectural Police officers, especially those of the Futaba Police Station and the members of the Special Task Force deployed to the nuclear power station at the time.

3 "N. O. police fire 51 for desertion," *The Associated Press,* October 30, 2005; "Katrina made police choose between duty and loved ones," *USA TODAY,* February 20, 2006.

1 (4) Research questions and hypotheses

To achieve these objectives, the present study created two research questions. The first question (RQ1), is as follows: When the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station exploded on March 13, 2011, how did the police officers who worked near the plant perceive the situation and their fate? The second question (RQ2), is as follows: What were the police officers' motivations to carry out their duties despite possible nuclear contamination and other dangers?

To answer these research questions, three hypotheses were tested, focusing on the period from March 12 to 14, 2011 when the explosion occurred at the Fukushima power station. These hypotheses were: (1) The police officers on the scene may have been dealing with their duties with deep conflicts. (2) The motivation for police officers to continue their duties amid the crisis may have been from only a "sense of mission and responsibilities," but also from a variety of other complex factors. (3) In particular, "a sense of solidarity with colleagues" and "a sense of shame" may have been essential motivations for continuing the mission.

1 (5) Data and methodologies

To test these hypotheses, both quantitative and qualitative analyses were conducted based on the following data: (1) A questionnaire survey of police officers working in a field near a nuclear plant when an explosion occurred; (2) individual interviews with police officers; and (3) the analysis of police officers' memoirs.

The present study only involved the time period of March 12 to 14, 2011 when the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station exploded. The situation after that period is also an important issue to be considered in other studies.

1 (6) The structure of this paper

The structure of this paper is as follows:

Chapter 2 reviews previous research related to "abandonment of duty" as a premise for this research's overall discussion and develops hypotheses for the present study.

Chapter 3 examines the results of opinion surveys and individual interviews with police officers working at the scene at the time of the nuclear plant explosion.

Chapter 4 examines the study's research questions and hypotheses based on the discussion in Chapter 3. Moreover, this section also presents some policy implications for building a "resilient police organization that can carry out its mission even in a crisis."

The final section provides the conclusions of the study and briefly discusses the remaining issues.

2. Literature Review and Developing the Hypotheses of the Study

This chapter reviews previous research related to "abandonment of duty" as a premise for this research's overall discussion and develops hypotheses for the present study.

2 (1) Previous studies on the issue of "abandonment of duty"

To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has examined Japanese police officers' psychological perceptions at the time of a crisis from an academic perspective based on the present study's viewpoint. However, some academic studies have dealt with similar issues, such as a study on soldiers' motivations to fight on the battlefield, a study on the Japanese general behavioral pattern, and a criminological study on preventing individual deviant behaviors.

2 (1) (a) Research on American soldiers' motivation for combat in World War II

The American psychologist Samuel A. Stouffer and others conducted a study on the motivations for American combat soldiers on the battlefield during World War II. **Table 1** summarizes his research results (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star, & Cottrell [1949], pp. 105–191).

First, the results of the survey indicate that soldiers are motivated by a variety of factors, including a "desire to finish the mission quickly," a "sense of solidarity with fellow soldiers," a "sense of mission and self-esteem," a "love of family," and a "sense of self-preservation." At the very least, it shows that there are complex factors that go beyond a simple sense of mission.

The second characteristic is that "solidarity with the group"' is emphasized as a motive for fighting by both soldiers and officers. Although a "sense of mission and self-esteem" and "love of family" are also considered essential motivations, they are in a slightly lower priority than "soli

Table 1. Combat incentives named by U.S. Army company officers and enlisted infantryman during World War II

Question 1: Generally, in your combat experience, what was most important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well as you could?

Question 2: When the going is tough for your men, what do you think are the incentives that keep them fighting?

(Percentage of comments naming each incentive)

	(1) Enlisted Infantryman	(2) Company Officers
Ending the task	39%	14%
Solidarity with group; "My friends around me."	14%	15%
Sense of duty and self-respect	9%	15%
Thoughts of home and loved ones	10%	3%
Self-preservation; "kill or be killed."	6%	9%
Idealistic reasons; "Making a better world."	5%	2%
Vindictiveness: "anger, revenge, etc."	2%	12%
Leadership and discipline	1%	19%
Miscellaneous	14%	11%
TOTAL	**100%**	**100%**

Time of Survey: April 1944
Sample Size: (1) 568, (2) 1,116
* Source: Prepared by the author based on Stouffer et al. (1949), pp. 105–112.

darity with a group." In this regard, a previous study by Hitoshi Kono, a Japanese scholar who conducted a similar study on Japanese and American soldiers during World War II, also pointed out that "it is not hard to imagine that a strong sense of solidarity among comrades-in-arms (omission) was an essential factor motivating Japanese and American soldiers to fight" (Kawano, 2012, pp. 42–59).

2 (1) (b) Research on the general behavioral style of Japanese people

Many believe that "Japanese people are more collectivist than Americans" (i.e., they have a mental disposition to put the interests of the group ahead of the interests of the individual) regarding the general behavioral style of Japanese people and not just only in crises.[4] Such a perception can explain the aforementioned differences in Japanese and American police officers' behaviors in the Hurricane Katrina crisis and the Fukushima nuclear explosion.

However, various previous studies in social psychology by Toshio Yamagishi and others have pointed out that such a commonly shared perception is not necessarily academically supported (Yamagishi, 2010, pp. 20–31).[5] In his study, Yamagishi acknowledges that many Japanese seem to superficially act in a "collectivist" manner, but argues that this is not necessarily because they have "a mind that puts the group's interests ahead of their interests," but is the result of other factors (Yamagishi, 2010, p. 45).

As "other factors" that make Japanese people behave in such a way as to appear collectivist, Yamagishi points to "social mechanisms that prevent them from acting against the interests of the group," especially "the mechanisms of mutual surveillance and regulation that exist in Japanese society (Yamagishi, 2010, pp. 39–40).

Besides, Nagafusa's previous research in psychology has also verified that the "sense of shame" in relationships with peers (the depression that arises when one acts in a way that could be blamable in the eyes of others or the ideal self) has an impact on deterring deviant behaviors among Japanese people (Nagafusa, 2008, pp. 2–29).

2 (1) (c) Criminological research on the prevention of deviant behavior

Abandonment of duty by police officers or soldiers in a crisis is considered a type of deviant behavior. The social bond theory, developed by Travis Hirschi, an American criminologist, argues that the weakening of the "social bonds" that bind individuals to society can cause crime, delinquency, and deviance. There are four types of social bonds: (1) attachment bonds, (2) commitment bonds, (3) involvement bonds, and (4) belief bonds.

The first type, "bonds of attachment," refers to the attachment to family members and close friends. In other words, the sentiment of "I do not want to cause trouble to my family and friends" is thought to be a deterrent to crime, delinquency, and deviant behavior.

The second, "bonds of involvement," refers to "meritorious connections to values and behavioral goals" or "fear and attachment to the loss of what one has done or invested in." Specifically, "the fear of losing what one has gained in one's life after weighing the benefits and losses associated with crime, delinquency, and deviant behavior" may be a deterrent to these

4 The definitions of "collectivism" and "collectivist" are in Yamagishi (2010), p. 18.

5 According to Yamagishi, various academic experiments have verified that Americans tend to act more cooperatively in groups than Japanese in some cases. Conversely, the Japanese tend to act more as loners apart from the group than Americans (Yamagishi [2010] pp. 39–40).

behaviors.

The third category, "bonds of entanglement," refers to the situation where "small people stay quiet and do bad things." In other words, a situation in which a person is immersed in legitimate activities such as work and schoolwork and has no time to fall into criminal, delinquent, or deviant behavior is considered a deterrent to these behaviors.

The fourth, "bonds of belief" (normative consciousness), refers to the perception that one has to follow social rules. Namely, if there is a strong sense of guilt about a particular crime or deviant behavior, such a sense is considered to be a deterrent to these behaviors (Fujimoto, 2003, pp. 267–293; Segawa, 1998, pp. 111–113).

The idea that emphasizes "a sense of mission and responsibilities" as a motive to deter deviant abandonment of duty by soldiers and police officers seems to emphasize "bonds of belief or normative consciousness" as described in the social bond theory. On the other hand, the idea that emphasizes "solidarity with one's peers" seems to emphasize "bonds of attachment" as described in the same theory, and the idea that emphasizes "mechanisms of mutual monitoring and regulation in society" and "sense of shame" seems to emphasize "bonds of involvement" or "bonds of attachment."

2 (2) Hypotheses of the study

2 (2) (a) Developing the study's hypotheses

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the present study featured two research questions. The first one, RQ1, went as follows: When the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station exploded on March 13, 2011, how did the police officers who worked near the plant perceive the situation and their fate? The second question, RQ2, then asked: What were the police officers' motivations to carry out their duties despite possible nuclear contamination and other dangers.

To answer these research questions, there were attempts to test the following hypotheses, focusing on the period from March 12 to 14, when the Fukushima explosion occurred.

Hypothesis 1: The police officers on the scene may have been dealing with their duties with deep conflicts.

Hypothesis 2: The police officers' motivation to continue their duties amid their crisis may have been not only a "sense of duties and responsibilities" but also a variety of other complex factors.

Hypothesis 3: In particular, "a sense of solidarity with comrades and colleagues" and "a sense of shame'" may have been essential motivations for continuing the mission.

2 (2) (b) Data and methodologies

To test these hypotheses, both quantitative and qualitative analyses were conducted based on the following data:

- A questionnaire survey of police officers working in the field near the nuclear plant when an explosion occurred
- Individual interviews with those police officers
- Analysis of police officers' memoirs (Fukushima Prefecture Police [2012])

3. Surveys of first responders in the Fukushima Prefecture Police

This chapter provides an overview of the qualitative and quantitative surveys conducted on police officers of the Fukushima Prefecture Police.

3 (1) Outline of the survey

For this research, the present study conducted a questionnaire survey of 126 police officers with the cooperation of the Fukushima Prefectural Police. Seventy-four law enforcement employees worked at the Futaba Police Station on March 12, 2011, when Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station exploded. This police station has a nuclear power station within its jurisdiction. Fifty-two police officers who belonged to the Special Task Force of the Fukushima Prefectural Police were on duty in the vicinity of the plant at the time of the explosion.

The following is an overview of the survey implementation.

- Survey period: September 5, 2012 to October 1, 2012.
- Method: The Fukushima Prefectural Police Headquarters sent questionnaires to each subject's current department and asked for their cooperation.
- Number of valid responses: 125 out of 126.
- Questionnaire items: See Appendix.
- Breakdown of respondents' attributes (rank and age group): See **Table 2.**

In October 2012, the author interviewed 11 respondents regarding their behaviors and perceptions after the explosion.[6]

Table 2. Demographics of survey respondents (by rank and age)

	Constable	Junior Sergeant	Sergeant	Inspector	Chief Inspector	Super-Intendent	Total
The 20s	23	23	4	0	0	0	**50** (40%)
The 30s	0	14	17	10	2	0	**43** (34%)
The 40s	0	2	5	5	4	0	**16** (13%)
The 50s	0	0	5	8	0	3	**16** (13%)
TOTAL	**23** (18%)	**39** (13%)	**31** (25%)	**23** (18%)	**6** (5%)	**3** (2%)	**125** (100%)

* The 20s included a 19-year-old officer.
Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

6 The author conducted direct face-to-face interviews with 11 police officers on October 1 and 26, 2012, in a conference room at the Fukushima Prefectural Police Headquarters. The breakdown of the 11 interviewees is as follows: (Affiliation) Futaba Police Station: 4; Special Task Force: 7. (Rank) superintendent: 2; chief inspector: 0; inspector: 5; sergeant: 2; and junior sergeant: 2. (* The affiliations and ranks were as of the explosion.)

3 (2) Survey results

3 (2) (a) Recognition of the explosion (location, time, and method)

Questions (1) through (3) of the questionnaire asked about each respondent's situation at the time of the first explosion at the Fukushima power station (3: 36 pm, March 12).

Almost all of the 125 valid respondents were engaged in rescue and evacuation work when the first explosion occurred. The earthquake and tsunami that occurred the day before (March 11) had already caused significant damage.

At the time of the explosion, the work location varied from respondent to respondent. Still, almost all of them were engaged in rescue and evacuation work within the Futaba Police Station jurisdiction — that is, in the Fukushima power station area, within 20 to 30 km of the plant.

Most of the respondents became aware of the explosion within approximately 30 minutes after it happened (3: 36 pm). There were various ways of recognizing the explosion, but as shown in **Table 3,** listening to the police radio and reports from superiors and colleagues were relatively common. Those serving near the power station directly saw the smoke of the explosion. Many claimed that they perceived sound and vibration caused by the explosion.

Table 3. How did you become aware of the first information about the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 12, 2011?

Question 3: How did you get the first information about a nuclear power plant explosion? Please select the most appropriate option from the choices listed below.

(1) Self-directed observation	18 (14%)
(2) Listening to police radio	66 (53%)
(3) Reporting by superiors or colleagues	14 (11%)
(4) Reporting from other institutions	1 (01%)
(5) Media reporting (TV, radio news, etc.)	15 (12%)
(6) Other	9 (07%)
N/A	2 (02%)
TOTAL	**125 (100%)**

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

3 (2) (b) Whether or not "the concern about the danger of radiation" has arisen

3 (2) (b) (i) Overview

Question (4) of the questionnaire asked, "During the period from March 12 to 14, when the explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station continued, did you ever feel a 'concern for the danger of radiation' (concern for your own life, physical safety, or fear of death)?"

Table 4-1 shows the responses to this question. Nearly 70% (68%) of the respondents answered that they "strongly felt concerned about the danger of radiation, including fear of death. Adding the response, "I felt a certain amount of concern, but not the fear of death." (24%), more than 90% of the respondents continued working after the explosion, with some concern about radiation.

Table 4-1. How strongly did each police officer feel concerned about the danger of radiation between March 12 and 14? (General Overview)

Question 4: During the period from March 12 to 14, when the explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant continued, did you ever feel a "concern for the danger of radiation," such as a concern for your own life, physical safety, or fear of death? Please select the most appropriate option from the choices listed below.

(1) Strongly felt concerned about the danger of radiation, including the fear of death.	85 (68%)
(2) Felt a certain amount of concern, but not the fear of death.	30 (24%)
(3) Felt little (or no) concern.	6 (05%)
(4) Other	4 (03%)
TOTAL	**125 (100%)**
(*) The average degree of intensity of concern felt	1.6 / 2.0

(*) The "average degree of intensity of concern felt" is the weighted average of the above responses, with the following: (1) receiving two points; (2) receiving one point; and (3) and (4) receiving zero points. The full score was 2.0, and the higher the score, the stronger the concern or feeling.
Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

3 (2) (b) (ii) Analysis by rank and age groups

Tables 4-2 and **4-3** show the responses to this question by rank and age group. No statistically significant characteristics were detected in these results.[7, 8]

3 (2) (b) (iii) Comments in the free-response section

The following are examples of comments received in the questionnaire's free-response section and individual interviews regarding the question.[9]

- When I saw the smoke coming from the nuclear power station, I prepared for death. I had the image in my head that a nuclear accident means the Chernobyl disaster."
- "Some experts said, *'This is going to be like Chernobyl,'* and I seriously thought this is going

7 Regarding the responses to **item (1) in Table 4-2,** it seems that the constable rank group felt a lower degree of a concern than the other rank groups. However, in comparing the constable rank group (23 officers) and the sergeant and above rank group (102 officers), the chi-square test failed to prove that the difference between the two groups was statistically significant. The p-value (significance probability) was 0.0406, but the adjusted p-value was 0.1317, which was above the significance level (0.05).

8 Regarding the responses to **item (1) in Table 4-3,** it seems that the age group in their 30s felt a higher degree of concern than the other age groups. Nevertheless, in comparing the age group in their 30s (43 officers) and the different age groups (82 officers), the chi-square test failed to prove that the difference between the two groups was statistically significant. The p-value (significance probability) was 0.0691, and the adjusted p-value was 0.1683 for the comparison, both above the significance level (0.05).

Regarding the responses to item (3), it seems that there were relatively more people in the age group in their 20s who felt little or no concern. However, in comparing the age group in their 20s (50 participants) and the other age groups (75 participants), the chi-square test failed to prove that the difference between the two groups was statistically significant. The p-value (significance probability) was 0.0264, but the adjusted p-value was 0.0729, which was above the significance level (0.05).

9 To protect the respondents' privacy, the author slightly modified these comments from the original text. The same policy applies to the rest of the article.

Table 4–2. How strongly did each police officer feel concerned about the danger of radiation between March 12 and 14? (by rank group)

	Constable (n=23)	Junior Sergeant (n=39)	Sergeant (n=31)	Inspector (n=23)	Chief Inspector Superintendent (n=9)
(1) Strongly felt concerned about the danger of radiation, including the fear of death.	11 (48%)	27 (69%)	24 (77%)	18 (78%)	5 (56%)
(2) Felt a certain amount of concern, but not the fear of death.	8 (35%)	9 (23%)	6 (19%)	3 (13%)	4 (44%)
(3) Felt little (or no) concern.	3 (13%)	2 (5%)	0 (0%)	1 (4%)	0 (0%)
(4) Other	1 (4%)	1 (3%)	1 (0%)	1 (4%)	0 (0%)
TOTAL	**23 (100%)**	**39 (100%)**	**31 (100%)**	**23 (100%)**	**9 (100%)**
(*) The average degree of intensity of concern felt by this rank group.	1.3 / 2.0	1.6 / 2.0	1.7 / 2.0	1.7 / 2.0	1.6 / 2.0

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

Table 4–3. How strongly did each police officer feel concerned about the danger of radiation between March 12 and 14? (by age group)

	The 20s (n=50)	The 30s (n=43)	The 40s The 50s (n=32)
(1) Strongly felt concerned about the danger of radiation, including the fear of death.	29 (58%)	35 (81%)	21 (66%)
(2) Felt a certain amount of concern, but not the fear of death.	15 (30%)	8 (19%)	7 (22%)
(3) Felt little (or no) concern.	5 (10%)	0 (0%)	1 (3%)
(4) Other	1 (2%)	0 (0%)	3 (9%)
TOTAL	**50 (100%)**	**43 (100%)**	**32 (100%)**
(*) The average degree of intensity of concern felt by this rank group.	1.5 / 2.0	1.8 / 2.0	1.7 / 2.0

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

to be the end for the world.”

- “Rumors were flying around, *‘The plant was going to explode after the meltdown.’* People from the city hall, fire department, and other organizations had already evacuated. So, we were prepared to die.”
- “I was working near the nuclear power station and had to fight against the fear of invisible radiation. I did not think I would make it alive.”

- "I did not know about radiation, and I still remember how fearful I was whenever the electronic beeping of the dosimeter sounded."
- "I did not know exactly the extent of the effects of radiation, and it was horrifying because it was invisible."

Several comments, particularly from relatively young police officers, indicated that their lack of knowledge about radiation amplified their fears. On the contrary, some respondents commented that they had received appropriate training on radiation beforehand and had proper equipment such as dosimeters. It helped them to judge on their own that the radiation had not reached an imminent threat level.

3 (2) (c) Whether or not a "desire to abandon duty" has arisen

3 (2) (c) (i) Overview

Question (5) of the questionnaire asked, "During the period from March 12 to 14, did you ever have a feeling in your mind that you wanted to abandon the duties from the concerns about the danger of radiation?" **Table 5-1** shows the responses to this question.

Eleven percent of the respondents answered "strongly," and 30% answered "somewhat." Thus, approximately 40% to 50% of the total respondents dealt with their work with the feeling of "wanting to abandon the mission" in some way.

3 (2) (c) (ii) Causes of the desire to abandon duties

For those who answered in question (5) that they "felt a strong desire to abandon duties" or "felt some desire to abandon duties," question (6) asked, "What were the specific reasons that made you want to abandon your mission?" For this question, the respondents were requested to answer "Yes" or "No" to both (1) "Concern for one's own life and physical safety" and (2) "Concern for the safety and well-being of family members and relatives."

Of the 53 respondents, 45 (about 85%) answered "Yes" to (1), and 48 (about 91%) answered "Yes" to (2).

Table 5-1. How strongly did each police officer feel a desire to abandon their duties between March 12 and 14? (General Overview)

Question 5: During the period from March 12 to 14, did you ever feel in your mind that you wanted to "abandon the duties" caused by the "concerns about the danger of radiation." Please select the most appropriate option from the choices listed below.

(1) Felt a strong desire to abandon duties.	14 (11%)
(2) Felt some desire to abandon duties.	38 (30%)
(3) Felt little (or no) desire to abandon duties.	70 (56%)
(4) Other	3 (02%)
TOTAL	**125 (100%)**
(*) The average degree of desire to abandon duties.	0.5 / 2.0

(*) The "average degree of desire to abandon duties" is the weighted average of the above responses, with (1) receiving two points; (2) receiving one point; and (3) and (4) receiving zero points. The full score was 2.0, and the higher the score, the stronger the desire.

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

The results of these responses and the comments in the free-response section below (see section 3 [2] [c] iv) suggest that not only "concern for the safety of the respondents themselves" but also "concern for the safety of the respondents' families" was an essential factor behind the feelings of abandonment.

3 (2) (c) (iii) Analysis by rank and age groups

Tables 5-2 and **5-3** show the responses to the questions by rank and age groups. The results by rank show that "the middle-rank group (inspector, sergeant, and junior sergeant) are

Table 5-2. How strongly did each police officer feel a desire to abandon duties between March 12 and 14? (by rank group)

	Constable (n=23)	Junior Sergeant (n=39)	Sergeant (n=31)	Inspector (n=23)	Chief Inspector Superintendent (n=9)
(1) Felt a strong desire to abandon duties.	2 (9%)	3 (8%)	6 (19%)	3 (13%)	0 (0%)
(2) Felt some desire to abandon duties.	3 (13%)	16 (41%)	12 (39%)	7 (30%)	0 (0%)
(3) Felt little (or no) desire to abandon duties.	18 (78%)	19 (49%)	13 (42%)	11 (48%)	9 (100%)
(4) Others	0 (0%)	1 (3%)	0 (0%)	2 (9%)	0 (0%)
TOTAL	**23 (100%)**	**39 (100%)**	**31 (100%)**	**23 (100%)**	**9 (100%)**
(*) The average degree of desire to abandon duties by this rank group.	0.3 / 2.0	0.6 / 2.0	0.8 / 2.0	0.6 / 2.0	0.0 / 2.0

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

Table 5-3. How strongly did each police officer feel a desire to abandon duties between March 12 and 14? (by Age group)

	The 20s (n=50)	The 30s (n=43)	The 40s The 50s (n=32)
(1) Felt a strong desire to abandon duties.	4 (8%)	8 (19%)	2 (6%)
(2) Felt some desire to abandon duties.	13 (26%)	17 (40%)	8 (25%)
(3) Felt little (or no) desire to abandon duties.	32 (64%)	18 (42%)	20 (63%)
(4) Others	1 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (6%)
TOTAL	**50 (100%)**	**43 (100%)**	**32 (100%)**
(*) The average degree of desire to abandon duties by this age group.	0.4 / 2.0	0.8 / 2.0	0.4 / 2.0

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

more likely to have a strong feeling of abandoning their duties than the upper and lower rank groups (superintendent, chief inspector, and sergeant). The statistical test verified that the difference between the two groups was statistically significant[10, 11] and that the age group in their 30s was more likely to have a strong feeling of abandonment than the groups above and below them (20s, 40s, and 50s). The statistical test also verified that the difference between the two groups was statistically significant.[12] In other words, it is not merely the case that those who are higher in rank or age are less likely to feel compelled to abandon their duties.

Although the reasons for this situation are not always clear, there may be several factors. For instance, mid-level officers were more likely to be stressed because they struggled with their superiors and their subordinates. Also, those in their 30s were more likely to be married than those in their 20s, but their children were younger than those in their 40s, and they were more likely to be concerned about the safety of their families.

3 (2) (c) (iv) Comments in the free-response section

The following are examples of the comments received in the questionnaire's free-response section and individual interviews.

While many denied their feelings of abandoning their duties, many frankly expressed their wavering feelings. As mentioned above, many of the comments admitting that they had the desire to abandon their duties cited "concern for their families' safety."[13]

- "I could not think about myself when there were people in front of me who needed help."
- "There was no way I could abandon my mission when my colleagues were working so hard."
- "I was so focused on my task at hand that I had no time to think about abandoning it."
- "I wanted to run away, but I also thought, *'Someone has to do this job,'* so I was torn between running away and doing my duty, and I decided I had to do my duty."
- "I did not know where my family was, and I was unsure if I should abandon my job."
- "I did not know where my family was, so I wanted to go and look for them."
- "The nuclear power station exploded while I did not know if my family was safe, so I wanted to know if they were safe."
- "I was thinking of resigning, depending on the situation."
- "If I had been single, I think I would have been less inclined to abandon my mission."

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10 Regarding the responses to **item (1) in Table 5–2,** in comparing the mid-level cadre (inspector, sergeant, and junior sergeant: 90 officers) and the other rank groups (superintendent, chief inspector, and constable: 32 officers), the chi-square test indicates the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. The p-value (significance probability) was 0.0003, and the adjusted p-value was 0.0007, both below the significance level (0.05).

11 Apart from this, it is also noteworthy that in the group of superintendents and chief inspectors (9 officers), they all answered that they had little (or no) feeling of abandoning their duties. It may indicate a high sense of responsibility on the part of the senior officers. However, due to the small sample size, it remains to be seen whether the conclusion can be generalized.

12 Regarding the responses to **item (1) in Table 5–3,** in comparing the age group in their 30s (43 officers) and the other age groups (20s, 40s, and 50s: 79 officers), the chi-square test indicates the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. The p-value (significance probability) was 0.0106, and the adjusted p-value was 0.0180, both below the significance level (0.05).

13 Contrary to this, one respondent commented, "I was able to see my family healthy for a moment while I was on duty, so I was able to think that I would have no problem losing my life."

- "If I had been alone, I would not have been inclined to abandon my mission."
- "Seeing my seniors and colleagues busy checking on the safety of their families made me think that if I had a family, I would have been more vulnerable."

3 (2) (d) Reasons for being able to continue the mission

3 (2) (d) (i) Overview

Question (7) of the questionnaire asked, "What were the specific motivations that enabled you to continue your duties in the field despite concerns about radiation hazards during the period of March 12 to 14?" The questionnaire listed eight possible reasons for this question, and each respondent was requested to select "applicable" or "not applicable" for each item. **Table 6-1** shows the responses to this question. This indicates the following points:

First, most of the respondents answered "applicable" to several items to continue the mission. In other words, out of the eight items shown, the average number of items answered as "applicable" was 4.3 per person.[14] The results suggest that, for many police officers, their motives for continuing their duties were too complicated. Specifically, the motive for continuing the mission cannot necessarily be any one reason.

Second, there were two items which received the highest points as "applicable"' motives for

Table 6-1. What motivated each police officer to continue his or her duties during March 12-14? (General Overview)

Question 6: During the period from March 12 to 14, what were the specific motivations that enabled you to continue your duties in the field despite concerns about radiation hazards? For each of the following items, please select "Yes" or "No."

* The numbers in the table indicate the number and percentage of respondents who answered "Yes" to the question.

(1) I was aware that there was little danger of radiation.	4 (03%)
(2) I just followed the ordinary police discipline. There was nothing special.	82 (66%)
(3) I had a sense of solidarity and bond with colleagues (seniors, colleagues, subordinates, etc.) at work.	115 (92%)
(4) I was able to receive sufficient encouragement and instructions from my superiors at work.	67 (54%)
(5) I wanted to meet the expectations of my family and relatives.	51 (41%)
(6) I was concerned about my social evaluation and "the eyes of others" at work.	37 (30%)
(7) I had a sense of mission and pride as a police officer.	107 (86%)
(8) I felt a love for my hometown and wanted to respond to residents' appreciation and encouragement.	71 (57%)

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

14 Thirteen respondents answered that seven out of eight items were "applicable." Twenty-one respondents indicated six items. Twenty-seven respondents indicated five items. Twenty-three respondents indicated four items. Twenty respondents indicated three items. Twelve respondents indicated two items. Six respondents indicated one item and three respondents indicated no item.

continuing the mission. They were: (1) "I had a sense of solidarity and bond with colleagues (seniors, colleagues, and subordinates) at work" (92%); and (2) "I had a sense of mission and pride as a police officer" (86%). The points for these two items were far ahead of the other items, indicating that "a sense of mission as a police officer" and "a sense of solidarity with colleagues" were the main factors motivating the majority of the respondents to continue their duties. It is also noteworthy that "solidarity with colleagues" was considered more important than "sense of mission as a police officer" — although by a small margin.

Third, the percentage of respondents who answered "Yes" to the other items as motivation for continuing their duties are presented in this section. Some respondents considered these items as essential factors in motivating them, although they are less influential in general than the two most essential factors mentioned before. They are as follows:

- "I just followed the ordinary police discipline. There was nothing special." (66%)
- "I felt a love for my hometown and wanted to respond to residents' appreciation and encouragement." (57%)
- "I was able to receive sufficient encouragement and instructions from my superiors at work." (54%)
- "I wanted to meet the expectations of my family and relatives." (41%)
- "I was concerned about my social evaluation and 'the eyes of others' at work." (30%).

Fourth, only a few respondents (3%, four respondents) answered "Yes" to the item, "I was aware that there was little danger of radiation." As mentioned above, some pointed out that, on the contrary, the lack of knowledge about radiation amplified their fear.

3 (2) (d) (ii) Analysis by rank and age groups

Tables 6-2 and **6-3** show the responses to this question by rank and age group. For this question, there were few significant characteristics by rank and age group. For example, "a sense of mission as a police officer" and "a sense of solidarity with colleagues." Accordingly, these two characteristics seemed to be the two pillars of motivation for performing duties, and received high scores almost regardless of rank or age group.

First, in comparison by rank, the percentage of sergeants who answered that "sense of mission as a police officer" was "applicable" was 74%, which was slightly lower than other ranks (the overall average was 86%). The statistical test verified that the difference between the rank group of sergeant and the rank group of inspector and above is statistically significant.[15]

Second, "effective encouragement and direction from superiors" was selected as "applicable" by 83% of constables and 76% of those in their 20s, which is relatively higher than other ranks and age groups, respectively (the overall average is 54%). The statistical test

15 Regarding the responses to **item (7) in Table 6-2,** in comparing the rank group of sergeant (31 officers) and the rank group of inspector and above (inspector, chief inspector, and superintendent: 32 officers), the chi-square test indicates the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. The p-value (significance probability) was 0.0101, and the adjusted p-value was 0.0270, both below the 0.05 level.
However, regarding the responses to **item (7) in Table 6-3,** in comparing the age group in their 30s (43 officers) and the other age groups (20s, 40s, and 50s: 79 officers), the chi-square test which failed to verify the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. The p-value (significance probability) was 0.1321, and the adjusted p-value was 0.2158, both above the significance level (0.05).

Table 6-2. What motivated each police officer to continue his or her duties during March 12-14? (by Rank group)

	Constable (n=23)	Junior Sergeant (n=39)	Sergeant (n=31)	Inspector (n=23)	Chief Inspector Super-intendent (n=9)	TOTAL [All Ranks] (n=125)
(1) I was aware that there was little danger of radiation.	0 (0%)	3 (8%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (11%)	**4 (3%)**
(2) I just followed the ordinary police discipline. There was nothing special.	18 (78%)	21 (54%)	17 (55%)	19 (83%)	7 (78%)	**82 (66%)**
(3) I had a sense of solidarity and a bond with colleagues (seniors, colleagues, subordinates, etc.) at work.	23 (100%)	35 (90%)	29 (94%)	21 (91%)	7 (78%)	**115 (92%)**
(4) I was able to receive sufficient encouragement and instructions from my superiors at work.	19 (83%)	23 (59%)	13 (42%)	10 (43%)	2 (22%)	**67 (54%)**
(5) I wanted to meet the expectations of my family and relatives.	11 (48%)	20 (51%)	9 (29%)	10 (43%)	1 (11%)	**51 (41%)**
(6) I was concerned about my social evaluation and "the eyes of others" at work.	5 (22%)	8 (21%)	11 (35%)	8 (35%)	5 (56%)	**37 (30%)**
(7) I had a sense of mission and pride as a police officer.	20 (87%)	33 (85%)	23 (74%)	22 (96%)	9 (100%)	**107 (86%)**
(8) I felt a love for my hometown and wanted to respond to residents' appreciation and encouragement.	12 (52%)	25 (64%)	12 (39%)	16 (70%)	6 (67%)	**71 (57%)**

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

Table 6-3. What motivated each police officer to continue his or her duties during March 12-14? (by age group)

	The 20s (n=50)	The 30s (n=43)	The 40s and 50s (n=32)	TOTAL [All Ranks] (n=125)
(1) I was aware that there was little danger of radiation.	3 (6%)	0 (0%)	1 (3%)	**4 (3%)**
(2) I just followed ordinary police discipline. There was nothing special.	36 (72%)	19 (44%)	27 (84%)	**82 (66%)**
(3) I had a sense of solidarity and a bond with colleagues (seniors, colleagues, subordinates, etc.) at work.	48 (96%)	38 (88%)	29 (91%)	**115 (92%)**
(4) I was able to receive sufficient encouragement and instructions from my superiors at work.	36 (72%)	20 (47%)	11 (34%)	**67 (54%)**
(5) I wanted to meet the expectations of my family and relatives.	23 (46%)	19 (44%)	9 (28%)	**51 (41%)**
(6) I was concerned about my social evaluation and "the eyes of others" at work.	11 (22%)	15 (35%)	11 (34%)	**37 (30%)**
(7) I had a sense of mission and pride as a police officer.	44 (88%)	34 (79%)	29 (91%)	**107 (86%)**
(8) I felt a love for my hometown and wanted to respond to residents' appreciation and encouragement.	28 (56%)	24 (56%)	19 (59%)	**71 (57%)**

Source: Prepared by the author based on the survey results.

verified that both these differences were statistically significant.[16]

The reason for these characteristics is not always apparent, but there may be a factor that "those in lower ranks and ages tend to be dependent on their superiors and older people. Incidentally, all 23 constables are in the 20s age group. Of the 50 respondents in their 20s, 23 were constables.

3 (2) (d) (iii) Comments in the free-response section

The following are the main comments received from the questionnaire in the free-response section and during individual interviews.

— Comments related to a "sense of mission as a police officer"

- "I felt a sense of responsibility. As a police officer, I had no choice but to do so. If the Futaba Police Station did not do it, no one would."
- "I could not imagine abandoning the many evacuees in from of myself. As a police officer, I felt a sense of mission. *'Now is the time to play my role.'*"
- "As a police officer, I felt that I could not just turn my back on the dangers and fears of radiation and run away. I wanted to help the people of this prefecture. I was ready to die when I rescue the residents. I wanted to meet the expectations of residents who were waiting for us to come. Such a feeling became the source of my strength."
- "If you think about who is going to help the stranded residents and hospitalized patients who are unable to move, there is no way you can abandon your mission. I am a policeman, and there are people who can be helped in the field. I must perform as a policeman. That is why I continued my mission."
- "I did not have any great sense of pride or mission as a police officer, but I just acted as I thought I should. Someone has to do it, and I was in a position to do it.'
- "After the nuclear power station explosion, there were many people left behind in this town, and only the police could rescue them."
- "When I was assigned to work in a place where radiation levels were feared to be high, I went to the scene with my colleagues in tears. However, I did not run away from this mission since I had a sense of duty."
- "As a person in a position to lead subordinates in the field, I could not run away."
- "I felt that I had no choice but to do it myself. As a mid-level executive, I could not leave my young subordinates in danger."

— Comments related to a sense of solidarity with colleagues

- "I felt a sense of solidarity that I had never felt before, as the entire police station worked

16 Regarding the responses to **item (4) in Table 6-2,** in comparing the rank group of constables (23 officers) and the rank group of junior sergeants and above (junior sergeants, sergeants, inspectors, chief inspectors, and superintendents: 102 persons), the chi-square test indicates the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. The p-value was 0.0020, and the adjusted p-value was 0.0043, both below the significance level (0.05).

Regarding the responses to **item (4) in Table 6-3,** in the comparison between the age group in their 20s (50 officers) and the age group in their 30s or older (75 officers), the chi-square test indicates the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. The p-value was 0.0008, and the adjusted p-value was 0.0014, both below the significance level (0.05).

together to cope with the disaster.”

- “I felt confident since many of my colleagues would work together with me. However, if we had been a small group, we might have run away.”
- “I was able to do my best because I was with my colleagues, and the bond between members of the Futaba Police Station was strong.”
- “The human relations at work were excellent. Thus, I would not regret it if I die at work with these nice people.”
- “The sense of solidarity with my superiors and colleagues was solid. Thus, I could maintain a high level of sense of duty.”
- “I could work hard because of the good relationships and trust with my colleagues. I remembered the importance of trusting relationships with superiors, subordinates, and colleagues. There was an atmosphere of *‘let us do it together.’*”
- “At the dangerous site, I took a commemorative photo with my colleagues with smiles on our faces. At that moment, I threw away the idea that I want to go home.”
- “I felt sorry for my supervisor and colleagues who stayed with the residents near the nuclear power plant while I stayed at the police station.”
- “If I throw away my mission and run away, the workload of my remaining colleagues would increase even more. I thought it was unacceptable.”

— **Comments related to “sense of shame and public decency”**

- “As an officer at the management level, I never put up with the humiliation of being criticized for running away, leaving my subordinates in danger.”
- “I thought that running away before my subordinates and juniors would be more embarrassing and shameful than dying.”
- “On the one hand, I was afraid of my life, but on the other hand, I felt that if I abandoned my duties, I would lose my job, and my livelihood would be in jeopardy.”
- “I was afraid of the danger to my life. However, I thought that even if I were the only one who survived, I would face the shame of living.”
- “There was a group mentality at a workplace, and I felt resigned to life.”

— **Comments related to “appropriate instructions and encouragement from superiors**

- “When it became clear that the nuclear power station was in danger, the chief of the police station said to us, *‘Though the plant is in danger, the police can never run away. So, please be prepared for the worst.’* I will never forget those words” (Fukushima Prefecture Police [2012], pp. 52–54).
- “My supervisor instructed me, *‘As a police officer, you cannot run away before letting the residents evacuate.’*”
- “The most succinct comment I received from my superior was, *‘Do not die,’* which motivated me to do my best.”
- “When I saw my supervisor taking the initiative to go to the dangerous worksite, I thought I would be willing to risk my life with him.”
- “Some of my colleagues were worried because of the high radiation level at the worksite. However, my supervisor encouraged us by saying, *‘This is our mission,’* and *‘We are not taking you to a dangerous place.’* These were the words of a boss I trusted daily, so I felt at ease.”

4. Discussions

This chapter tests the present study's research questions and hypotheses based on the discussion in the previous chapter. After that, the present study offers several policy implications for "building a police organization that can carry out its mission even in a crisis."

4 (1) Examining the hypotheses and research questions

The survey's results indicated that many Fukushima police officers working in the field at the time of the nuclear power station explosion had an intense fear of radiation and sometimes struggled with the emotional conflict of wanting to "abandon their duties." These findings support the first hypothesis of the present study, Hypothesis 1: Fukushima police officers in the field may have been dealing with their work with deep conflicts. This result also answers RQ1: When the Fukushima nuclear power station exploded on March 13, 2011, how did the police officers who worked near the plant perceive the situation and their fate?

In the survey, the respondents were asked, "What motivates you to continue your duties despite your concerns about radiation hazards?" They answered "it applies" to an average of 4.3, out of 8 possible reasons given. These results supported the present study' s second and third hypotheses, starting with Hypothesis 2: Police officers' motivation to continue their duties amid their crisis may have been not only a "sense of duties and responsibilities," but also a variety of other complex factors. Correspondingly, there is Hypothesis 3: In particular, "a sense of solidarity with comrades and colleagues" and "a sense of shame"' may have been essential motivations for continuing the mission. However, while "solidarity with comrades" was recognized as an essential motive, a "sense of shame" was not necessarily strongly recognized by the majority. These results also answer RQ2: What were the police officers' motivations to carry out their duties despite possible nuclear contamination and other dangers?

4 (2) Policy implications

The results of examining the established research questions and hypotheses suggest that the optimism that "Japanese police officers are serious and will always do their duties even in a crisis such as a major disaster" may not necessarily be genuine. In other words, Fukushima police officers could continue their duties even under challenging circumstances because their circumstances satisfied several crucial conditions, such as "a strong sense of solidarity among comrades and colleagues" and "excellent leadership by senior officers." No one can guarantee that these favorable conditions will be satisfied in all workplaces in the event of a future crisis.

Therefore, to build a police organization that can carry out its mission in a future crisis, proactive measures must be implemented. Otherwise, it may be possible that a situation such as that of Hurricane Katrina may occur in Japan in the future.

Based on the results of this study, this section highlights some policy implications. These proposals may help build a resilient police organization capable of carrying out missions in a future crisis, although further research is needed to carefully formulate actual policies.

4 (2) (a) Fostering a "sense of mission as a police officer" and a "sense of solidarity with colleagues"

The present study confirmed that police officers have various motivations to continue to carry out their duties even in times of crisis. Among them, "a sense of mission and responsibility as a police officer" and "a sense of solidarity with colleagues" are essential. Therefore, to build a police organization that is resilient to crises, it is essential to further promote these senses among police officers through effective education and training.

More importantly, the present study revealed that a meaningful "sense of solidarity with colleagues" is not just an abstract idea but a tangible feeling (see section 3 [2] [d] [iii]). Such a sense cannot be fully developed through education and training alone, but must be recognized and accumulated through the actual actions and words of colleagues and superiors in daily work activities. For instance, during the individual interviews, one of the Fukushima police senior officials testified as follows:

> The tragedy occurred just before the normal annual personnel reshuffle period (which is mid-March), so the members of the police station had been working together for at least almost one year and had developed a mutual trust and good human relations to some extent. If the incident occurred at a different time and the mutual trust in the workplace had been weaker, we would have been unable to work so effectively.

4 (2) (b) Developing leadership in the field

The present study reveals that many police officers who were engaged in their duties during the crisis were dealing with personal inner conflicts (e.g., the desire to abandon their duties). How to cope with such personal struggles is ultimately up to the judgment of each police officer. Simultaneously, the present study shows that others' behavior often influences each police officer's final decision.[17]

In particular, strong statements by the head of each group or opinion leader often have a strong influence.[18] Therefore, to encourage police officers who have internal conflicts to make up their minds to carry out their duties, it would be critical for senior officers in the field to show appropriate leadership and share a "clear intention to carry out their missions" within the group.

According to the questionnaire survey, this tendency is more substantial, especially among the lower ranks (e.g., constables) and relatively younger age groups (e.g., those in their 20s). Many of the open-ended comments also suggest that their reliable superiors' encouraging words and actions helped them make up their minds.

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17 The concept of "frequency-dependent behavior" in psychology supports this phenomenon. The term "frequency-dependent behavior" refers to "behavior in which the decision to engage in a given behavior depends on how many other people are engaged in that behavior (Yamagishi [2010], p. 48). If a behavior is a "frequency-dependent behavior," then the more other people are engaging in the same behavior, the less cost you incur by performing the same behavior. Therefore, if many other people are engaged in the same behavior, it will be easier for you to do the same (Yamagishi [2010], p. 57). The concept of "atmosphere of the place" also can explain a similar phenomenon (Yamamoto [1983], p. 22).

18 The psychological concepts of "critical mass" and "complementary equilibrium" support this phenomenon that the intentions and actions of top managers and opinion leaders have a significant impact on the frequency-dependent behavioral decisions of group members (Yamagishi [2011], pp. 46–84).

In contrast, in the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the New Orleans police commissioner "went into hiding" after the disaster and failed to deliver a clear message to the police officers on the scene. The results of some follow-up investigations indicated that the police department had serious leadership issues (Baum, 2006).

Furthermore, according to the present study, "encouragement and instruction from superiors" in a crisis can only be practical if it is backed up with a sense of trust in the superiors. Such faith in supervisors cannot be built overnight but is accumulated through daily work in regular time.[19] Therefore, to create a resilient police organization that can carry out its mission even in times of crisis, it is necessary for executives not only to exercise clear leadership in actual crises but also to daily demonstrate good governance in the workplace during regular times.[20]

4 (2) (c) Establishing a method to confirm the safety of family members

According to the present study, not only "concern for one's safety" but also "concern for the safety of one's family" cannot be ignored as a factor that causes police officers to abandon their duties in crises.

Criminological theories also explain that an individual's "social bonds" are an essential factor that defines each individual's behavior (see section 2 [1] [c]). Individual police officers' social bonds (especially attachment bonds) may include solidarity with colleagues and solidarity with the family. Therefore, it is natural for conflicts to arise between sentiments in a crisis. Moreover, when the latter outweighs the former, it is not an unusual theory that police officers tend to abandon their duties for the sake of their family.

Many police officers cited in this survey that their anxiety increased from a lack of communication. In some cases, family members asked police officers to abandon their duties and evacuate with their families. On the other hand, one police officer said, "I was upset until I could confirm the safety of my family, but once I did, I could concentrate on my work with peace of mind." Similarly, many of the New Orleans police officers who abandoned their duties during Hurricane Katrina reportedly cited ensuring their families' safety as the reason for leaving their duties.[21]

Therefore, to build a resilient police force that can carry out its duties even in times of crisis, it is useful to establish a system to confirm each police officer's family's status quo during the crisis. In addition, it would be helpful for each family to consult in advance during periods of normality about evacuation plans in case of an emergency.

4 (2) (d) Educating mid-level officers

The present study confirms that the middle-rank cadre (e.g., inspector, sergeant, and junior sergeant) are more likely to abandon their duties than the upper- and lower-rank groups. Police

19 These points are consistent with the argument made in 4 (2) (a) that a meaningful "sense of solidarity with colleagues" is not just an abstract idea but a tangible feeling that must be recognized and accumulated through the actual actions and words of colleagues and superiors in their daily work activities.

20 Kono's previous study on a commander's leadership on the battlefield also points out the importance of "taking care of subordinates in daily life" for commanders to demonstrate their leadership in a crisis. In other words, trivial daily "care" for subordinates (e.g., priority access to food and leave) may positively impact building trust in the commander during a crisis (Kono [2012], pp. 53–54).

21 "Katrina made police choose between duty and loved ones," *USA TODAY,* February 20, 2006.

officers in their 30s also tended to have a stronger feeling of abandoning their duties than other age groups. It is worth noting that there is considerable overlap between the rank-and-file mid-level cadre and the group in their 30s.

The cause of this phenomenon is not exactly known, but several factors may be involved. For example, middle-ranking executives may be more likely to be stressed because they are between their superiors and subordinates. Officers in their 30s may bear higher family responsibilities than those in their 20s, while their job security may be more vulnerable than those in their 40s. Thus, officers in their 30s may be more concerned about their families' safety than other age groups.

Besides, as mentioned above, to build a police organization that can carry out its mission even in a crisis, it is crucial to foster a good sense of solidarity in each workplace on a daily basis. Organizational leaders must play a primary role in this mission. Simultaneously, the role played not only by organizational leaders but also by rank-and-file mid-level officers who are actual opinion leaders in the workplace is often essential.

In light of this situation, it is vital to provide more detailed training for mid-level officers and improve their sense of leadership.

5. Conclusion

The objectives of this study were as follows: (1) to analyze the perceptions of police officers who were working near the site of the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 12, 2011, and (2) to elucidate the motivations of police officers in the field to carry out their duties in a crisis.

For these objectives, the present study implemented two research questions. The first, RQ1, is as follows: When the Fukushima nuclear power station exploded on March 13, 2011, how did the police officers who worked near the plant perceived the situation and their fate? The second, RQ2, is as follows: What were the police officers' motivations to carry out their duties despite possible nuclear contamination and other dangers?

Based on the results of qualitative and quantitative surveys of police officers working near the nuclear plant at the time of the explosion, the answers to the above research questions were as follows:

Answer to RQ1: The police officers at the scene continued their duties with deep personal inner conflicts.

Answer to RQ2: Various complex factors motivated police officers in the field to continue their duties despite their conflicts. In particular, "a sense of mission and responsibility" and "a sense of solidarity with colleagues" were the most important factors, while "a sense of shame" also had some influence.

Based on these analysis results, the present study further indicated that the optimism regarding "Japanese police officers are serious and will always do their duty even in a crisis such as a major disaster" may not necessarily hold in a future crisis. The present study also highlighted the following policy implications for building a resilient police organization that can carry out its duties even under future crises. These suggestions were: (1) fostering a "sense of mission as a police officer" and a "sense of solidarity with colleagues," (2) developing leadership in the field, (3) establishing a method to confirm the safety of family members, and (4) educating mid-level officers.

The present study's conclusions may appear to be a common argument that lacks uniqueness and could be considered by some as "tacit knowledge." However, the present study is significant and unique because it is the first to examine these issues based on theoretical frameworks and empirical data. Notably, the present study has some limitations. The policy implications suggested remain abstract; subsequently, to realize them in tangible policies, more related studies are needed.

One crucial issue that is not within the scope of this study is how to build an organization that can withdraw when it has to. If the idea of "building a resilient police organization that can carry out its mission even in a crisis," goes too far, has the potential danger of cultivating a false perception that police should never withdraw even when they should. To avoid this, it is essential to develop the "value of proper withdrawal" within the police and society as a whole.[22] Theoretically, the value of continuing the duties and the value of proper withdrawal are both critical and not exclusive to each other. However, simultaneously cultivating both values in the same organization is a severe managerial challenge.[23]

22 "Fire departments face similar challenges," (*The Asahi Shimbun,* September 24, 2012).

23 Nagafusa's previous research argues that shame consciousness has a significant influence on Japanese people's behavior and that "denial," "consensus," and "justification" of shame are useful measures to prevent inappropriate behavior based on excessive shame consciousness. Specifically, Nagafusa points out that "denial of shame" is particularly useful in this regard. For example, it is persuasive that someone (e.g., superiors or colleagues) with whom the person feels solidarity advises him or her that "it is not shameful to withdraw or escape in this occasion" (Nagafusa [2008], p. 26).

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APPENDIX

Questionnaire (Excerpt)

Please tell us about your own situation from March 12 to 14, 2011.

(Question 1)

At 3: 36 pm on March 12, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) exploded. When did you learn about this explosion? (Please do not adjust the margins)

(Question 2)

Were you on duty when you learned about the explosion? If so, where were you working, and what were you working on?

(Question 3)

How did you obtain the initial information about the nuclear power station explosion? Please select the most appropriate option from the choices listed below.

(1) Self-directed observation
(2) Listening to the police radio
(3) Reporting by superiors or colleagues
(4) Reporting from other institutions
(5) Media reporting (TV, radio news, etc.)
(6) Other

(Question 4)

During the period from March 12 to 14, when the explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station continued, did you ever feel a "concern for the danger of radiation," such as a concern for your own life, physical safety, or the fear of death? Please select the most appropriate option from the choices listed below.

(1) I strongly felt concerned about the danger of radiation, including the fear of death.
(2) I felt a certain amount of concern, but not the fear of death.
(3) I felt little (or no) concern.
(4) Other

(Question 5)

During the period from March 12 to 14, did you ever have a feeling in your mind that you wanted to "abandon my duties" caused by "concerns about the danger of radiation?" Please select the most appropriate option from the choices listed below.

(1) I felt a strong desire to abandon my duties.
(2) I felt some desire to abandon my duties.
(3) I felt little (or no) desire to abandon my duties.

(4) Other

(Question 6)

* This question is only for those who answered either items (1) or (2) in Question 5.
At that time, what were the specific reasons that made you want to “abandon the mission,” at least to some extent? For each of the following items, please select “Yes” or “No.”

(1) Concern for one’s own life and physical safety.
(2) Concern for the safety and well-being of family members and relatives.

* If there are other important factors, or if you have a specific explanation for any of the above items, please feel free to write it below.

(Question 7)

During the period around March 12 to 14, what were the specific motivations that enabled you to continue your duties in the field despite concerns about radiation hazards? For each of the following items, please select “Yes” or “No.”

(1) I was aware that there was little danger of radiation.
(2) I just followed the ordinary police discipline. There was nothing special.
(3) I had a sense of solidarity and bond with my colleagues (seniors, colleagues, and subordinates) at work.
(4) I was able to receive sufficient encouragement and instructions from my superiors at work.
(5) I wanted to meet the expectations of my family and relatives.
(6) I was concerned about my social evaluation and “the eyes of others” at work.
(7) I had a sense of mission and pride as a police officer.
(8) I felt a love for my hometown and wanted to respond to residents’ appreciation and encouragement.

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